The Sahel Facing the Failure of Military Juntas: Resurgence of Terrorism and Geopolitical Realignment

The spectacular attack on the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey on January 29, 2026, marks a turning point in the security crisis affecting the Sahel. For two hours, thirty fighters from the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP) used armed drones, small arms, and mortars to assault the civilian infrastructure and Air Base 101, which houses the headquarters of the Sahel States Alliance (AES). Despite the elimination of all assailants, the operation demonstrated the growing operational capacity of jihadist groups and their determination to undermine the authority of the military juntas that promised to eradicate terrorism.

This offensive is part of an unprecedented security deterioration affecting Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, three nations now governed by military juntas that justified their coups d'état between 2020 and 2023 by the failure of democratic regimes to contain the jihadist insurgency. The figures are relentless: in 2024, more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in the Sahel, reflecting the evident failure of the new military authorities to fulfill their security promises despite the deployment of the Russian Wagner Group, renamed Africa Corps, on Malian soil and its training role with Burkinabè and Nigerien forces.

The main threat remains Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the dominant Al-Qaeda affiliate in the region. This group has consolidated considerable territorial control in Mali and Burkina Faso, where it now administers up to 60% of the national territory, gradually encircling the capital Ouagadougou. In Mali, JNIM has demonstrated its strategic sophistication by imposing a partial economic blockade on Bamako between September 2025 and early 2026, intercepting fuel convoys from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, burning a dozen tankers, and creating a shortage that disrupted the daily lives of the population. Although the group loosened the grip without explanation at the beginning of 2026, the psychological impact remains profound, with the population living in fear of a return of the blockade or direct attacks on urban infrastructure.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025 according to the SITE Intelligence Group. The mid-February offensive against the locality of Titao in the north of the country illustrates the group's striking power: 80 soldiers and militiamen as well as at least 20 civilians were killed in a coordinated operation targeting simultaneously a military camp, the local market, and communication facilities. Nighttime attacks on military supply lines and the systematic use of improvised explosive devices have confined government forces and volunteer militias to the immediate vicinity of their bases in the Central-North, East, and Sahel regions, allowing terrorists to consolidate their grip on rural areas.

In the face of this escalation, the chiefs of staff of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in Sierra Leone last month to discuss cooperation with the AES and the creation of a 2,000-strong counter-terrorism force by the end of 2026. However, this initiative raises serious questions about its viability: the pace at which JNIM consolidates its territorial grip makes it unlikely that a task force could effectively respond to the threat by such a deadline. Moreover, questions of funding, air capabilities, and intelligence gathering remain unanswered, and the potential reluctance of the AES to cooperate due to political divergences could further compromise the effectiveness of this force.

It is in this context of security fragility that Washington is making a major diplomatic pivot. The Trump administration, through Nick Checker, head of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, made two trips to the Sahel in one month, visiting Mali in February and then Burkina Faso and Niger in March 2026. This re-engagement, described as "pragmatic cooperation" by U.S. authorities, is manifested by the lifting of sanctions against three senior Malian officials in February 2026 and the finalization of an intelligence-sharing agreement with Bamako allowing the United States to resume its collection operations in Malian airspace.

This normalization of relations with the military juntas, which had severed all cooperation with Washington and Paris after their coups and expelled U.S. forces from two critical Nigerien air bases for counter-terrorism operations in 2024, responds to a dual strategic priority. On one hand, Washington seeks to rebuild a counter-terrorism footprint in a sub-region where jihadist insurgencies have continued to expand. On the other hand, the United States aims to secure access to critical mineral deposits and counter the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the Sahel.

The "security for minerals" model that Washington has experimented with in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—where military assistance is exchanged for increased mining concessions—could be replicated in the AES states. Neighboring Guinea, which holds about 25% of the world's known bauxite reserves, 10% of global iron ore, and new lithium reserves, illustrates the geopolitical stakes of controlling the value chains of critical minerals in the region, currently dominated by China.

However, the obstacles to stabilizing the Sahel remain considerable. JNIM has methodically built a "proto-state" since 2019 extending from the AES countries to the coastal nations of the Gulf of Guinea, exploiting the grievances of local populations in isolated areas where government authority is absent. The group has established resilient terrorist cells and logistical hubs in Benin and Togo, allowing it to regularly engage security forces in these countries. Analysts from African Security Analysis note that "these dynamics are likely to continue in the coming months, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger, where the presence and mobility of armed groups remain structurally entrenched with no indication of slowing down."

The conflict in Iran adds a new dimension to this crisis. Rising energy prices and inflation are expected to have a significant impact on the AES countries, with Niger and Mali being net importers, Bamako particularly dependent on imported refined petroleum products. In a context of a turbulent global economy, the economic war waged by JNIM—which continues to close transit corridors and attack fuel trucks in Mali—could prolong the energy shortage and induce food insecurity, thereby reinforcing anti-regime sentiment and facilitating terrorist recruitment efforts. The withdrawal of the AES from ECOWAS also deprives these countries of any collective economic protection that the regional organization could implement.

The deterioration of security conditions in the three AES countries stands in stark contrast to the promises of the junta leaders to eradicate terrorism in a way that their democratic predecessors could not achieve. A senior lecturer at the University of Legal and Political Sciences in Bamako, speaking anonymously for fear of reprisals, summarizes the situation: "The Malian army is stretched to its limits by persistent terrorist attacks and defections to JNIM. The junta does not seem to have a response to the terrorist expansion, not even its counterparts in Niger and Burkina Faso."

Despite their successes in controlling Burkinabè campaigns, terrorist groups, however, lack the numbers and firepower necessary to conquer the capitals, according to analysts Djiby Sow and Hassan Koné from the South African Institute of Strategic Studies. This operational limitation offers a strategic respite to governments but does not change the reality of a massive territorial grip and the capacity to disrupt the regional economy and security sustainably.

The security equation in the Sahel thus proves particularly complex: weakened military juntas despite Russian support, expanding jihadist groups in territorial and operational terms, a fragmented regional security architecture between the AES and ECOWAS, and a pragmatic but limited U.S. re-engagement constrained by global geopolitical pressures. In this context, the establishment of a regional counter-terrorism force by the end of 2026 appears to be an absolute necessity, but its effective implementation and efficiency remain highly uncertain, as JNIM and the ISSP consolidate their grip on the heart of the Sahel day by day.