The Sahel in 2026: Geopolitical Restructuring and New Security Landscape

The Sahel is undergoing a profound transformation of its security architecture in 2026, marked by the withdrawal of traditional Western powers and the emergence of new regional and international actors. This geopolitical reconfiguration occurs in a context of exacerbated security crisis, where jihadist groups maintain their pressure on the fragile states of the region.

The security situation in central and western Sahel has significantly deteriorated during the first months of 2026. According to reports from international organizations, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has launched a series of coordinated attacks of unprecedented scale in several regions of Burkina Faso. Between March 22 and 27, simultaneous operations targeted the regions of Sahel, Boucle du Mouhoun, and Centre-Nord, demonstrating increased operational capacity and extensive mobility across vast territories. These attacks, described as "unprecedented" by analysts, resulted in dozens of casualties among security forces and civilians, illustrating the persistence of terrorism despite the efforts made by the concerned states.

This violent escalation coincides with the gradual withdrawal of UN forces, notably the MINUSMA mission, which completed its first phase of withdrawal in August 2025. Jihadist groups seized the opportunity of this massive departure to intensify their operations, as evidenced by the blockade of the city of Timbuktu and repeated attacks against military and civilian targets. The alarming toll reveals that the Sahel now accounts for more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide, according to the latest data from the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

In the face of this destabilization, three Sahelian states — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — have strengthened their strategic alliance formed in September 2023 under the name Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This confederation, structured around the Liptako-Gourma Charter, has gradually consolidated its defensive cooperation, particularly after the expulsion of French troops and the withdrawal of ECOWAS by these three countries in 2023. By 2026, the AES has become a major regional player, illustrated by symbolic initiatives such as the organization of the first international chess tournament from May 11 to 17 in Bamako, intended to strengthen cultural and political ties among the three members.

The break with the Western international community has manifested concretely with the ban on American travelers starting January 1, 2026, justified by security risks and concerns regarding information sharing. In response, the AES countries adopted the principle of reciprocity, imposing their own restrictions on American citizens. This measure symbolizes the diplomatic rupture and a refocusing towards new international partners.

Militarily, Russia has played a central role in this strategic reconfiguration. After the decline of the Wagner Group, whose mercenaries left Mali in 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense formalized the creation of the "African Corps" in 2023, absorbing the majority of Wagner's structures and operations. This new state entity has continued to provide military support to the juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, although performance on the ground has been mixed. Major challenges persist, such as the blockade of fuel supplies to Bamako or tactical defeats like that at Tinzawaten in 2024. Nevertheless, the Russian presence, although contested, has allowed the AES states to reduce their dependence on the former French partner.

Russia is not the only power to have benefited from the Western withdrawal. China has significantly increased its economic and military influence in the region. Between 2023 and 2024, the three juntas received at least ten shipments of Chinese arms, including vehicles, drones, and communication equipment provided by NORINCO as part of the Chinese Global Security Initiative. Chinese investments focus on strategic sectors: in Niger, energy ($5.12 million), mining ($620 million), and real estate ($140 million). Recent agreements in the gold and uranium sectors illustrate this economic approach, which is accompanied by a strengthening of military cooperation.

China particularly benefits from Sino-American tensions and the prevailing anti-colonial sentiment in the region. Its flexible military assistance model, combining affordable financing and accessible defense equipment, meets the needs of financially struggling Sahelian states, contrasting with Western demands often perceived as conditional.

In response to these developments, ECOWAS has attempted to counter destabilization by launching its own initiative. The organization announced the deployment of a Reserve Force of 1,650 personnel in 2026, intended for sub-regional counter-terrorism action. This force, approved by military chiefs of staff, aims to counter the expansion of terrorist networks that have caused thousands of deaths and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The transition from a "standby" force to a "rapid intervention" force represents the most significant change in the 2026 plan, seeking to correct the delays of the previous system. However, analysts point out that several announcements regarding the activation of this force have not materialized in the past, exposing ECOWAS to criticism for its inaction against terrorism.

The prospects for Sahelian security in 2026 remain uncertain. The balance of power appears fragile, with a consolidated AES and its new partners (Russia, China) on one side, and ECOWAS attempting to maintain its traditional influence on the other. The risk of increased fragmentation in the region persists, with serious humanitarian consequences and complex geopolitical implications.

The future of counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel will largely depend on the ability of states to develop mixed approaches combining military efforts and political solutions. The success of purely military strategies seems limited, as evidenced by the persistence of the jihadist threat despite successive foreign interventions. The question of negotiations with armed groups, raised by some analysts, could become a crucial element of a sustainable exit from the crisis, but it raises complex debates about the conditions and modalities of such a process.

In conclusion, the Sahel of 2026 presents itself as a laboratory for global geopolitical reconfigurations, where old and new powers clash to influence the future of the region. The evolution of Sahelian security will remain a major indicator of the ongoing transformations in African and international geopolitics.