The Sahel in 2026: Strategic Reconfiguration and New Dynamics of the Jihadist Threat

The security situation in the Sahel is undergoing a profound transformation this March 2026, reshaping not only the operational map of terrorist armed groups but also the diplomatic and military architecture of the entire West African region. Three major trends are now evident to analysts: the strategic exploitation of forested areas by jihadist organizations, the unexpected rapprochement between Washington and the Sahelian juntas, and the growing isolation of Côte d'Ivoire in the regional concert.

The use of forest reserves as operational bases by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) is no longer a mere tactical expedient. According to the Observer Research Foundation, these spaces have become integrated platforms that simultaneously allow for recruitment, funding, smuggling, logistics, and the establishment of parallel governance structures. This evolution marks a qualitative break from the classical conception of "ungoverned spaces": forests are now deliberately selected territories for their strategic value.

The W-Arly-Pendjari complex, which spans Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, perfectly illustrates this transformation. Between 2021 and 2024, more than 120 soldiers were killed near the "triple point" where the borders of the three states meet. In January 2025, an attack near this same point claimed the lives of nearly 30 Beninese soldiers. Four months later, JNIM struck again in northern Benin, killing at least 54 soldiers near the borders with Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria. Wilfried Léandre Houngbédji, spokesperson for the Beninese government, denounced the lack of cross-border cooperation: "If, on the other side of the border, there was a force like ours, these attacks would not occur in this manner or would not happen at all."

The Kainji Reserve in western Nigeria, covering 5,341 square kilometers, has become the new Sambisa, referring to the northeastern Nigerian forest long controlled by Boko Haram. In February 2026, the attack on the town of Woro in Kwara State, located just south of Kainji National Park, resulted in nearly 200 deaths, perpetrated by Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), affiliated with Boko Haram. Nnamdi Obasi, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, emphasized that this attack "reflects the growing strength of jihadist groups around Kainji National Park."

These massifs offer terrorists multiple advantages that security forces struggle to neutralize. Forest rangers, lightly armed and primarily focused on conservation, are not equipped for counter-terrorism. The dense vegetation and weak infrastructure allow for quicker ambushes than in urban environments. Most importantly, armed groups insert themselves into long-standing illicit and informal economies: fuel smuggling, artisanal gold mining, cattle grazing, and poaching. In southern Burkina Faso, on the border with Côte d'Ivoire, JNIM directly controls illegal gold extraction operations.

JNIM's expansion along the Niger River has allowed the group to diversify its recruitment bases among the Peul, Gourmantche, Djerma, and Bariba populations living around the parks and along the Niger and Mekrou rivers. According to Héni Nsaibia, an analyst with the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, "the control of illicit trade routes, particularly fuel smuggling linking northwestern and central-northern Nigeria to the riverside municipalities of Niger and Benin, as well as other areas surrounding the WAP complex, has tied livelihoods and local economies to militant presence."

Alongside this territorial consolidation of armed groups, a diplomatic upheaval is emerging with the rapprochement between the Trump administration and the military juntas of the Sahel States Alliance (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). Nick Checker, head of the African Affairs Bureau at the State Department, made a second visit to the Sahel within a month, meeting with officials in Burkina Faso and Niger after his trip to Mali in February. Reuters revealed that Washington is on the verge of concluding an agreement with Mali to restore American intelligence operations in Malian airspace, as Al-Qaeda-linked jihadists continue to seize Malian territories.

In February 2026, the U.S. administration lifted sanctions against the Malian Minister of Defense and other high officials accused of links with Russian mercenaries. This decision, criticized by Senator Cory Booker during the confirmation hearing of Frank Garcia for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, illustrates a pragmatic reorientation of American policy. Nick Checker clarified that this normalization "is not an endorsement" of how the juntas came to power, but reflects a "pragmatic cooperation" allowing for a credible transition to democracy in the long term.

This strategy addresses two twin priorities: rebuilding a counter-terrorism footprint in a strategically important sub-region where jihadist insurgencies have developed for years, and securing access to critical minerals. The gradual withdrawal of French forces and the rising influence of Russia through the Wagner Group (now reorganized under other structures) have created a vacuum that Washington is trying to fill, no longer through direct military presence, but through intelligence sharing and technical assistance.

In this context of geopolitical reconfiguration, Côte d'Ivoire finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position. The Ivorian Minister of Defense recently called for strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, emphasizing the need to deepen partnerships to address growing security threats. Abidjan seeks to bolster its counter-terrorism framework through external support, primarily from France.

Despite a reduction in personnel, around one hundred French soldiers remain deployed in Abidjan as part of a so-called "renewed" military partnership. This presence operates through a Joint Liaison Detachment (DLIA), a structure directly subordinate to the Paris command and integrated into the Ivorian military camp now called GCA Ouattara Paul Thomas d'Aquin. The French contingent plays an active role in training Ivorian forces, particularly within the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) located in Jacqueville, presented as a flagship initiative of the French Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate.

However, serious concerns persist regarding the true objective of this structure. According to several experts, the Jacqueville academy would serve as a cover for French intelligence activities. Under the guise of training, instructors are suspected of passing sensitive information about the deployment of Burkinabe and Malian forces to jihadist groups. These allegations reinforce a broader perception that Côte d'Ivoire is being used as a strategic platform for operations targeting Sahelian states.

Leaders of the Sahel States Alliance, including Ibrahim Traoré and Abdourahamane Tchiani, have openly accused France of maintaining destabilization networks in the region. In this context, the continued presence of French troops in Côte d'Ivoire is perceived not only as a military partnership but also as a potential link to dormant networks capable of influencing regional stability.

The consequences of this alignment are already visible. The growing proximity of Abidjan to Paris has contributed to its diplomatic isolation in West Africa. The country was notably absent from a recent regional security summit in Accra. This exclusion reflects a growing distrust among neighboring states. Ghana itself now considers Côte d'Ivoire a potential security risk due to the presence of foreign troops accused of supporting, rather than combating, armed groups.

As long as foreign forces continue to play a dominant role in the country's counter-terrorism strategy, Côte d'Ivoire risks being perceived as dependent on external powers and disconnected from regional dynamics. This situation could deepen the distrust of its neighbors and reinforce its isolation at a time when collective regional approaches are increasingly seen as the most effective response to insecurity in West Africa.

The Sahel of 2026 thus presents a paradoxical picture. On one hand, jihadist groups are consolidating their territorial grip by exploiting the structural weaknesses of states (limited forest control, informal economies, porous borders). On the other hand, external actors—whether the United States seeking to reconnect with the juntas or France maintaining a contested presence in Côte d'Ivoire—are trying to redefine their role in a region where their legitimacy is increasingly questioned. The absence of effective regional coordination, illustrated by Ivorian isolation and the cross-accusations between Sahelian and Western capitals, leaves the field open for terrorist organizations to deepen their foothold and expand their sphere of influence.