The Sahel in April 2026: War of Jihadists, Unified Forces, and Regional Strategic Reconfiguration

The security situation in the Sahel has seen an unprecedented intensification of inter-jihadist violence since the beginning of April 2026, an acceleration of regional military initiatives, and a major diplomatic reshaping that redefines the geopolitical balances across the entire West African space. The developments observed during the first two weeks of April outline a security landscape of increasing complexity, where the states in the region are trying to adapt to multifaceted threats and the emergence of new alliances.

The rivalry between the two main jihadist groups in the region, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP), reached a new level in early April with deadly clashes spilling over into Nigerien territory. According to a statement from the ISSP dated April 6, the group claimed responsibility for the killing of 35 JNIM fighters as well as the seizure of weapons and motorcycles. These clashes are a direct continuation of the defection at the end of January of a senior JNIM commander, Sadou Samahouna, who switched sides to the ISSP, an event that triggered a massive regional offensive by the JNIM aimed at restoring its internal cohesion and deterring further defections.

In Niger, the ISSP has intensified its violent campaign against military and security forces, conducting at least nine distinct attacks in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions and in the municipality of Ayorou. The most conservative estimates report at least 35 Nigerien soldiers killed during these operations, during which militants burned vehicles, captured weapons, and carried out deadly ambushes in the rural municipalities of Sanam, Dioundiou, and Allela. The Tillabéri region, already identified as the deadliest area in central Sahel in 2025, confirms its status as the epicenter of jihadist violence in the sub-region.

The JNIM, for its part, has continued its offensive in Benin, launching large-scale attacks on Beninese military positions in Kofouno and the former Pendjari Lodge in the Alibori and Atacora departments on March 4 and 7. These attacks, which targeted military camps located in the natural reserves of the W and Pendjari Parks, resulted in the destruction of infrastructure and the capture of weapons and military equipment, including an M113 armored personnel carrier. Beninese authorities reported that 21 militants were neutralized, while the JNIM claimed the deaths of 11 soldiers. This campaign in Benin, which is part of the regional offensive launched in early February, is clearly aimed at countering the defecting commander's accusations that the JNIM was negotiating ceasefires with the Beninese and Ivorian governments.

In the face of this deteriorating security situation, the states in the region are seeking to build new defense architectures. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger under the leadership of their respective military juntas, launched its Unified Force in December 2025, a joint mechanism intended to strengthen the fight against terrorism in a coordinated manner. However, this initiative faces considerable structural challenges, including the lack of proven operational frameworks for conducting joint operations, persistent tensions among the three military regimes, and the historical inability of such coordinated efforts to produce sustainable results in the region.

Alongside the Sahelian Alliance, a significant bilateral dynamic has developed between Morocco and Mauritania. On April 9, Lieutenant General Mohammed Berrid, Inspector General of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces, visited Nouakchott for the sixth session of the Morocco-Mauritania Joint Military Commission, co-chaired with General Mohamed Vall Ould Rayess. During this visit, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani awarded Berrid the National Order of Merit at the rank of Commander, a highly symbolic gesture reflecting the political importance of this strategic partnership. Security cooperation between Rabat and Nouakchott is now evolving from mere technical coordination to a more structured framework, with an expanded operational scope focused on protecting the vast common desert borders.

At the same time, the conference of military intelligence chiefs from Sahel and Mediterranean countries opened on April 6 in Tripoli, under the auspices of the Libyan Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, illustrating the broadening of the security reflection perimeter beyond the strict Sahelo-West African framework. On the western side, the Flintlock 2026 exercise, conducted by U.S. special operations forces with the participation of over thirty countries, took place in early April with a focus on interoperability and counter-terrorism coordination across the Sahel region.

The most structural analysis of the situation comes from a report published on April 10 by the Horn Review, which highlights the emergence of a transcontinental security axis linking the Red Sea to the Sahel through Sudan. According to this analysis, the Sudanese civil war, now in its fourth year, serves as the strategic keystone that has merged previously distinct theaters. Illicit gold flows, arms smuggling, mercenary networks, and massive population displacements—over ten million internally displaced persons and more than two million refugees—have created self-reinforcing war economies that external powers, notably the Russian Wagner Group and Gulf states, exploit for influence and access to resources. Gold extracted from the Sudanese regions of Darfur and Kordofan fuels armed groups on both sides of the conflict, before being transported to Chad or Niger via ancient trade networks, exchanged for weapons or cash, feeding a vicious cycle that sustains fighting thousands of kilometers from their extraction point.

All these developments converge towards an unavoidable conclusion: the fragmented regional approaches that have dominated international security policy in Africa for two decades are structurally ill-suited to the reality of current threats. The interdependence of the Sudanese, Sahelian, and Maghreb crises demands trans-regional stabilization frameworks, the appointment of dedicated envoys for the Red Sea-Sahel corridor, and enhanced coordination between security and economic assistance initiatives. Chad, as a critical buffer state between these different theaters, should be the priority starting point for any coherent strategy.