The Sahel on the Brink of the Abyss: Strategic Reconfiguration in the Face of Jihadist Expansion

The security architecture of the Sahel is undergoing a period of radical reconfiguration as jihadist groups consolidate their territorial grip and international military partnerships are being reinvented in urgency. Between February and March 2026, the region was the scene of a series of developments that redefine the balance of power and question the viability of current counter-terrorism strategies.

The security situation has dramatically deteriorated since the rise to power of military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso between 2020 and 2023. Paradoxically, these regimes, which justified their coups by the failure of their predecessors to contain the jihadist insurgency, now face an unprecedented expansion of the terrorist threat. In 2024, more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide were recorded in the Sahel, a figure that reflects the intensification of the conflict despite Russian military assistance via the Wagner Group, now renamed Africa Corps.

Jama'at al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Al-Qaeda affiliate that represents the main terrorist threat in the region, has demonstrated increasing operational sophistication in recent weeks. In February 2026, the group launched a coordinated series of attacks over a week across eastern and northern Burkina Faso, mobilizing hundreds of fighters against military and civilian targets in several provinces. This offensive illustrates not only JNIM's ability to project force but also its effective control over approximately 60% of Burkinabé territory, transforming vast portions of the country into areas where state authority has collapsed.

The Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) is not lagging behind. In January 2026, ISSP fighters used drones, small arms, and mortars to attack the Dori Hamani International Airport in Niger and Air Base 101, which houses the headquarters of the Sahel States Alliance Joint Force (AES). This bold attack on a strategic military infrastructure reveals the limitations of AES's defensive capabilities, this alliance formed in 2023 by the three Sahelian juntas after their withdrawal from ECOWAS.

In response to this escalation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reacted in February 2026 with a meeting of its chiefs of staff in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The stated goal is to establish a 2,000-soldier counter-terrorism force by the end of 2026 and to explore potential cooperation with AES despite political tensions. However, military observers express pronounced skepticism regarding the effectiveness of a force that will not be operational for several months, as JNIM consolidates its territorial grip day by day. Questions of funding, air capabilities, and intelligence gathering remain largely unanswered, and AES's potential refusal to coordinate could render this initiative obsolete even before its deployment.

In this context of disintegration, the United States is attempting to rebuild its strategic presence in the region after the forced withdrawal of its bases in Niger in 2024. Washington recently lifted sanctions against three senior Malian officials and is finalizing an agreement that would allow American intelligence gathering in Malian airspace. More significantly, the deployment in Nigeria of several MQ-9 Reaper drones and approximately 200 American troops in March 2026 marks a turning point in the American repositioning strategy. These aircraft, capable of flying at high altitudes for over 27 hours, are officially limited to surveillance missions, while the American troops based at the Bauchi airfield in northeastern Nigeria provide training and intelligence support without being integrated into Nigerian frontline units.

This American redeployment fits into a broader logic of South-South partnerships that are developing in parallel. Nigeria and South Africa formalized in March 2026 a substantial deepening of their military cooperation following the visit of Lieutenant General Lawrence Khulekani Mbatha, chief of the South African army, to the Nigerian army headquarters in Abuja. This agreement operationalizes the defense cooperation framework signed in 2013 and emphasizes the transfer of specialized tactical skills. South Africa has shown particular interest in Nigerian counter-insurgency tactics developed under Operation HADIN KAI in the northeast, particularly methodologies for neutralizing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which remain the weapon of choice for terrorist groups in the Sahelian asymmetric warfare.

In return, Nigeria seeks to leverage South African technical expertise to strengthen its Army Aviation Wing, which is currently in the process of expanding its close air support and helicopter medical evacuation capabilities. South Africa's experience in aircraft maintenance and pilot training could significantly shorten the operational ramp-up time for these new Nigerian units. Beyond tactical exchanges, the two countries have also addressed the need for cybersecurity cooperation, as the digitization of their command and control structures exposes them to threats from state and criminal interference.

At the same time, the African Union announced in February 2026 the deployment of a 3,000-soldier counter-terrorism force in the Sahel, a more ambitious figure than that of ECOWAS but which raises similar questions about funding, timing, and coordination with actors already present on the ground. The proliferation of these multilateral initiatives reflects both the gravity of the situation and the fragmentation of the responses provided.

JNIM's strategy is not limited to territorial consolidation in the Sahel. Since 2019, the group has systematically expanded its network into the Gulf of Guinea states, building what some analysts describe as a "proto-state" extending from AES countries to the majority of West African coastal nations. By exploiting the grievances of local populations, particularly in isolated areas where government presence is weak or nonexistent, JNIM has established resilient terrorist cells and logistical hubs in Benin and Togo, enabling repeated engagements with the security forces of these countries. The economic warfare waged by JNIM in Mali, with the closure of transit corridors and attacks on fuel tankers, aims to isolate Bamako from its regional trading partners, exacerbating energy insecurity in a context of high oil prices linked to the war in Iran.

The port of Lomé in Togo, the fourth most active container port on the continent and a vital logistics center, crystallizes the stakes of this expansion. Moscow ratified a security cooperation agreement with Togo in 2025 in exchange for unlimited port access, a troubling development in the competition for regional influence. Yet, this partnership seems insufficient to contain the growing violence of JNIM against Togolese soldiers and civilians. For Washington, successfully securing this strategic infrastructure could demonstrate the superiority of the American approach to security partnerships while protecting the port from Russian influence.

In Niger, the army announced on March 21, 2026, the neutralization of 27 terrorists in the west and northwest of the country, the result of coordinated operations targeting armed groups operating in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions, two border areas with Mali regularly affected by terrorist attacks. These tactical successes, as significant as they are, do not mask the structural fragility of Sahelian armed forces in the face of adversaries who master the terrain and benefit from superior strategic mobility.

The strategic equation in the Sahel is also complicated by the impact of the war in Iran on the regional economy. High energy prices and inflation particularly affect Niger and Mali, net importers of refined oil, with Bamako being especially dependent on imports. In this turbulent economic context, the economic warfare waged by JNIM may prolong energy shortages and induce food insecurity, thereby reinforcing anti-regime sentiment and facilitating the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups. The withdrawal of AES from ECOWAS also excludes these members from any economic protection that the organization could implement.

The central question now is the long-term viability of the Sahelian military regimes. Jihadist groups are deeply rooted in the social and territorial fabric of the region, skillfully exploiting governance failures and the absence of state presence in peripheral areas. Dismantling the networks and capabilities of JNIM and ISSP will require a long-term capacity-building effort, but Washington's attention and resources are increasingly diverted to the war in Iran. Should the juntas collapse, the spillover of conflict into the coastal states of West Africa would likely intensify, risking further disruption of global trade and complicating American efforts to access critical mineral deposits in the region.

The proliferation of multilateral military initiatives, American strategic repositioning, the development of South-South partnerships, and the persistence of Russian influence outline a fragmented security landscape where no actor seems capable of imposing a sustainable solution. Meanwhile, civilian populations continue to pay the heaviest price for this asymmetric war that shows no signs of abating, gradually transforming the Sahel into one of the most complex and deadly conflict theaters in the world.