The Sahel States Alliance Strengthens Its Unified Force: Analysis of a New Regional Security Architecture

The Sahel States Alliance (AES) reaches a crucial milestone in its collective defense strategy with the expansion of its Unified Force, now increased to 6,000 soldiers by early 2026. This ramp-up occurs against a backdrop of profound reorganization of security alliances in West Africa, marked by an intensification of counter-terrorism operations and a redefinition of international partnerships. An analysis of recent developments reveals a complex dynamic where sovereign ambitions, operational effectiveness, and geopolitical issues intertwine.

Founded in September 2023 as a mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the AES gradually transformed into a confederation in July 2024. The Unified Force, initially composed of 5,000 soldiers at its inception in January 2025, was reinforced in February 2026 to reach 6,000 personnel. This expansion reflects the commitment of the three Sahelian states to consolidate their military capabilities in the face of a persistent and evolving jihadist threat. The force integrates air assets, intelligence sharing, and coordinated ground operations, representing an ambitious operational architecture for countries with limited resources.

The first weeks of March 2026 were marked by a significant intensification of military operations. Between February 21 and March 6, the Malian and Burkinabè armed forces conducted a series of airstrikes that neutralized over 100 militants in the provinces of Sikasso in Mali and around Djibo in Burkina Faso. These operations illustrate a notable tactical evolution: the systematic use of air power to compensate for the difficulties of ground combat in vast and hard-to-access rural areas. On February 7, 2026, the Malian army had already announced three successful airstrikes that eliminated 35 fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) near the Niger River in the Ségou region. This sustained operational tempo suggests an improvement in targeting capabilities and coordination among the three AES members.

The Burkinabè offensive around Djibo, a northern city besieged for several years by armed groups, holds particular significance. The blocking operations and airstrikes aim to break the encirclement of a city that symbolizes the territorial isolation imposed by the insurgency. More than 50 militants were eliminated in this single operation, according to official sources. This concentration of efforts on Djibo reflects the priority given by the Burkinabè government to restore territorial continuity in the Burkinabè Sahel, a strategic region for controlling trans-Saharan trade routes.

The Russian dimension in this new security architecture cannot be overlooked. According to Western estimates from February 2026, around 1,000 Russian security contractors are deployed in Mali, with smaller contingents in Burkina Faso and Niger. This presence, which has replaced the former French Barkhane force, provides support in training, tactical advice, and, in some cases, direct participation in operations. The Russo-Sahelian partnership fits into a logic of diversifying international alliances and breaking away from former colonial powers, a powerful narrative that resonates in regional public opinion.

In the face of this consolidation of the AES, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is trying to maintain its security relevance. In September 2025, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel Fatau Musah, announced the planned deployment in 2026 of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 soldiers. This figure, significantly lower than the initial ambition of 260,000 soldiers mentioned in August 2025, illustrates the funding and coordination difficulties that paralyze ECOWAS's collective security mechanisms. The gap between announcements and concrete achievements undermines the credibility of the regional organization, already weakened by the withdrawal of the three AES states.

The long-term viability of the AES Unified Force raises several questions. The failure of the G5 Sahel, which included the same countries plus Mauritania and Chad before its de facto dissolution, serves as a reminder that pooling military resources is not enough to reverse the insurgent dynamic. The G5 Sahel also benefited from substantial international support, particularly from France and Europe, before collapsing under the weight of successive coups and political divergences. The AES Unified Force will need to demonstrate that it can avoid the same pitfalls: ineffective operational coordination, rivalries among member states, and, above all, an inability to sustainably secure reclaimed territories.

Operational challenges remain considerable. Groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, notably JNIM, and those linked to the Islamic State, particularly the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, have shown remarkable adaptability. The Barsalogho massacre last August in Burkina Faso, where hundreds of civilians digging defensive trenches were killed by JNIM, illustrates the persistent brutality of the insurgents and their strategy of terrorizing populations to prevent any collaboration with authorities. In Niger, the Islamic State in the Sahel is intensifying its activities, creating an additional front for Nigerien security forces already under pressure.

The cross-border dimension of the threat requires coordination that transcends the AES's borders. Armed groups exploit the gray areas between central Sahel and North Africa on one hand, and the coastal states of West Africa on the other. The Accra Initiative, established in 2017 by coastal states to counter the insurgency's southward expansion, struggles to coordinate its actions with the AES due to regional political tensions. Chad, a major security player in the Lake Chad region and traditionally a pillar of Sahelian counter-terrorism operations, recently ended its defense cooperation agreement with France and hints at a possible rapprochement with the AES. Chadian membership would substantially transform the Alliance's capabilities.

The sovereignist discourse championed by AES leaders, particularly Burkinabè President Ibrahim Traoré, resonates with a Sahelian population weary of decades of foreign interventions that have not delivered the promised security. This decolonial and pan-African narrative constitutes a powerful political resource but cannot replace operational effectiveness on the ground. The legitimacy of the military juntas in power in the three countries ultimately depends on their ability to reverse the trend of insecurity, restore state authority across the territory, and improve the living conditions of the populations.

The coming months will be crucial in assessing the viability of the AES model. The intensification of air operations shows a willingness to act, but the question of holding the ground after the strikes remains. Territorial reconquest requires not only sustained military presence but also an inclusive governance strategy capable of addressing local grievances that have fueled the insurgency. Without improvements in basic services, justice, and economic opportunities in rural areas, military victories risk remaining ephemeral. The AES Unified Force represents a bold experiment in collective security sovereignty, the success or failure of which will have repercussions far beyond the Sahel, influencing the future of security architectures in Africa.