The Unified Force of the AES: A New Security Architecture for Central Sahel

The creation of the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in December 2025 marks a major strategic turning point in the approach to regional security in the central Sahel. Comprising 6,000 personnel and based in Niamey, Niger, this new joint military structure brings together the operational capabilities of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger within an unprecedented confederal framework. This initiative represents the third attempt by Sahelian states to establish a mechanism for collective security, following the failure of the Multinational Joint Force for the Liptako-Gourma region announced in January 2017 and the gradual dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force created in July 2017.

The analysis of this new architecture reveals substantial differences compared to previous initiatives, both in its structural design and its geopolitical positioning. Unlike the G5 Sahel, which grouped five nations (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) and which gradually disintegrated following military coups from 2020 to 2023, the Unified Force of the AES relies on remarkable political homogeneity among its three member states. All led by military governments resulting from revolutionary transitions, these countries share a common vision of rejecting Western influence, particularly French, which they consider has hindered their security sovereignty over the past decade.

The operational dimension constitutes the major innovation of this force. While the battalions of the G5 Sahel Joint Force were confined to defined geographical sectors with pursuit rights limited to a radius of 100 kilometers on either side of national borders, the units of the Unified Force of the AES are designed to operate across the entire territory of the three member countries. The headquarters based in Niamey has complete operational authority over the deployed troops, allowing it to deploy and redeploy forces without prior approval from national staffs. This centralization of command represents a fundamental break from the structural constraints that had paralyzed the G5 Sahel, where each operation required complex inter-state coordination.

The tripartite operation Yereko 2, conducted between February and March 2025 in the Liptako-Gourma area where the borders of the three countries converge, served as an operational validation of this integrated approach. This joint mission demonstrated the ability of the AES armies to effectively coordinate their actions against jihadist groups affiliated with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) in this strategic border region. The tangible results of this operation have strengthened the confidence of military governments in the cooperation model they have chosen to institutionalize through the Unified Force.

Funding constitutes another distinctive pillar of this new architecture. The G5 Sahel Joint Force had been chronically hampered by structural underfunding. Its annual operating budget, initially set at 423 million euros, far exceeded the contributory capacities of its member states, making the force excessively dependent on external partners. This financial dependence limited the strategic autonomy of Sahelian countries and placed them in a position of subordination to France and Operation Barkhane, both for mobilizing financial support and for conducting joint military operations. The lack of adequate air assets and a functional intelligence system, critical elements for counter-terrorism operations, had significantly undermined the operational effectiveness of this force.

The AES states opted for a radically different approach, prioritizing financial autonomy as a guarantee of their strategic independence. Although the individual financial contributions of the three countries have not been made public, they mobilize domestic resources through three parallel mechanisms: the Patriotic Support Fund of Burkina Faso, the Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland in Niger, and the Fund for Supporting Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects in Mali. This desire for self-financing is enshrined in the founding charter of the AES, which explicitly states that the funding of the Alliance must be ensured by contributions from member states. On March 28, 2025, the three countries took an additional step by establishing an import tax of 0.5 percent intended to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified Force.

The diversification of external military partnerships represents another strategic dimension of the approach adopted by the AES. Unlike the G5 Sahel model, which relied primarily on French and European support, the AES states have developed a multipolar procurement policy for their equipment and armaments. Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China are now the main military suppliers to these countries. The Russian African Corps has established itself as the preferred security partner of the AES, although the terms of engagement vary significantly by country. In Mali, Russia not only provides military equipment but also participates in combat operations alongside the Malian armed forces. In Burkina Faso and Niger, Russian engagement is primarily limited to training and capacity-building missions. A military cooperation agreement between Russia and the AES member states was ratified on July 22, 2025, facilitating the continuous provision of equipment and logistical support.

The operational challenges that the Unified Force of the AES will face remain considerable. The effective integration of this regional force with national security structures is a critical issue. The effectiveness of the Unified Force will depend on the clarity with which its role is articulated with the operations of national defense and security forces, including components that do not formally fall under its command. Coordination between the confederal and national levels will require precise protocols to avoid overlaps in competencies and operational gaps that could be exploited by armed groups.

A more fundamental challenge lies in the need to avoid the major pitfall of international interventions in the past decade in the Sahel: a siloed approach that treats the region in isolation from its West African neighbors. The effectiveness of the Unified Force will largely depend on its ability to cooperate with the armies of neighboring states, many of which also face threats from violent extremism and transnational criminal networks. The illicit supply and smuggling channels that fuel armed groups with weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones, and other operational resources cross many regional borders. The W-Arly-Pendjari protected area complex, which extends between Niger and Benin, particularly illustrates this border porosity that threatens the security of coastal states.

The deterioration of relations between the AES countries and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), following the formal withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from this regional organization, has created a climate of distrust that hinders intelligence sharing and coordination of military operations. As highlighted by analyst Jeannine Ella Abatan from the Institute for Security Studies in March 2025, this distrust between the two organizations prevents vital intelligence sharing and coordination of military operations, allowing certain territories to be used as safe havens by armed groups.

Despite their political divergences with non-member states of the AES, regional stability requires that the three countries maintain or strengthen their military and security cooperation with their immediate neighbors, notably Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. The Tarha Nakal exercise, conducted in May 2024 in Tillia, Niger, by the armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Togo, demonstrated the ability of these countries to pool their resources and coordinate their operations, thus offering a pragmatic model of cooperation that transcends political divides.

The African Union appears to be the institution best positioned to facilitate the resolution of tensions between the AES countries and their Gulf of Guinea neighbors. Politically, mediation efforts could help rebuild trust and ease tensions. In terms of counter-terrorism, the AU could promote structured cooperation between the ECOWAS anti-terrorist force and the Unified Force of the AES, thereby creating a continental framework for a coordinated approach to regional security.

During its five years of existence, the G5 Sahel Joint Force conducted 25 security operations that, according to its commander in 2021, General Oumarou Namata, resulted in the neutralization of hundreds of terrorists and the seizure and destruction of significant quantities of equipment. Yet, this force ultimately failed to stem the expansion of the terrorist threat or reduce its intensity in the region. The statistics speak for themselves: jihadist violence in the Sahel continued to intensify throughout the operational period of the G5, leading to the displacement of millions of civilians and the gradual collapse of state control over vast rural areas.

The Unified Force of the AES has structural and political advantages that its predecessor lacked. The close political alignment of the three military governments, their shared willingness to preserve their sovereignty, and the centralization of operational command provide a stronger foundation than that of the G5 Sahel. However, the long-term success of this initiative will depend on factors that go beyond the purely military framework. Regional integration, the restoration of trustful relations with neighboring countries, and the ability to maintain adequate funding without compromising strategic autonomy will be the true tests of the viability of this new security architecture.

The evolution of the Unified Force of the AES in the coming months will provide crucial insights into the ability of Sahelian states to build an authentically African model of collective security, free from the external dependencies that have characterized previous approaches, while maintaining the operational effectiveness necessary to confront a terrorist threat that remains one of the most complex and deadly on the African continent.