Training of Senior Cadres in the People's Liberation Army and Political Rectification: Analysis of Signals from the PLA's Deep Cleanse in April 2026

On April 8, 2026, the People's Liberation Army of China held a special meeting titled "Senior Cadre Training Course for the Whole Army" at the National Defense University. General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping personally attended and delivered an opening speech, emphasizing the need to "carry out ideological rectification and deepen political training." The uniqueness of this meeting lies in the fact that it is possibly the first high-level military officer meeting convened under this specific name in the history of the PLA, and the political signals reflected behind it warrant in-depth interpretation.

M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a prominent scholar on Chinese military issues, provided a detailed analysis of the meeting on social media. He pointed out that the participants included senior officers from various departments and committees of the Central Military Commission, directly affiliated institutions, joint operations command centers, as well as all theaters and military branches. In other words, these are the core units most severely affected by the current purge. This form of concentrated training for high-ranking officers across the army is distinctly different from the usual expanded meetings of the Military Commission, with a more pronounced focus and political significance.

Xi Jinping's use of the term "ideological rectification" in his speech has drawn significant attention from international observers. Fravel believes that this expression is relatively rare in the political discourse of the PLA, and its direct reference to the historical metaphor of the Yan'an Rectification Movement is thought-provoking. In the early 1940s, Mao Zedong consolidated his absolute authority within the party through the Yan'an Rectification Movement, eliminating political dissent. Now, Xi's revival of "rectification" at the highest levels of the PLA suggests that he may be initiating a large-scale political movement within the military. Meanwhile, General Yang Zhijin, commander of the Eastern Theater Command, published a signed article the same day in the Central Party School's official newspaper, "Study Times," calling for a crackdown on so-called "false combat effectiveness" and urging the troops to return to "real combat" standards. However, in the political discourse of the Communist Party of China, "false combat effectiveness" does not refer to a lack of military competence but rather implies doubts about political loyalty. This judgment criterion stems from the "political supremacy" principle proposed by Lin Biao in the 1960s—regardless of how well-equipped, tactically proficient, or high-spirited a unit may be, if its political loyalty to the party's leader is questioned, it is still considered to possess "false combat effectiveness."

Notably, on April 8, Xinhua News Agency simultaneously published a lengthy report titled "Forge a Heroic and Strong Army," in which a subtle change in wording caught the keen attention of the outside world. The second paragraph of the article stated: "Based on the initial answer given by Comrade Mao Zedong of 'Let the people supervise the government,' the new era Chinese Communists have provided a second answer: the Party's self-revolution." Previously, this position had long been occupied by Xi Jinping's name, serving as a symbolic rhetorical device to place Xi alongside Mao at the same historical height. Now, replacing "Xi Jinping" with the collective term "new era Chinese Communists," while seemingly minor, constitutes a significant demotion within the political discourse system. Some analysts believe this suggests that the elder forces within the party may be exerting some checks on Xi's power expansion.

A recent research report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides a broader perspective for understanding this meeting. Based on a database specifically tracking military purges since 2022, the report reveals shocking data: as of now, 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged, and another 65 officers are missing or suspected of being purged, totaling 101 officials confirmed or potentially targeted for purging. The report clearly states that the scale of purges within the PLA is far more extensive than previously understood by the outside world. This data context makes the senior cadre training course on April 8 even more unusual—it is not merely a routine educational activity but rather appears to be a collective political pressure and loyalty reaffirmation for the surviving senior officers amid ongoing purges.

On April 11, the PLA Daily published an editorial on the front page titled "Always Maintain the Purity and Glory of the People's Army," further reinforcing the signals of political rectification. In the tradition of Communist Party political discourse, the emphasis on "purity" often indicates internal instability—when the highest leadership repeatedly stresses loyalty and purity, it precisely indicates that loyalty and cohesion are facing doubts. Xi Jinping mentioned in his speech that "the world, the country, the party, and the military are undergoing profound and complex changes," and this vague statement conceals deep concerns about the deteriorating international environment, domestic economic difficulties, and rising discontent within the military. The article subsequently reiterated the classic expression of the Communist Party's political survival anxiety, "jumping out of the historical cycle of chaos and prosperity," further revealing the core power structure's deep-seated unease about its long-term legitimacy in power.

From the Gutian Conference to the Yan'an Rectification, the Communist Party of China has always been adept at reshaping organizational structures and power dynamics through political movements. This senior cadre training course for the whole army, whether viewed from the level of participation, the format of the meeting, or the wording of the discourse, points to a possible new round of large-scale political rectification that may be unfolding. For the PLA, the ongoing high-level purges have already had a substantial impact on the military's command system and morale. When loyalty becomes the primary criterion for everything, military professionalism is inevitably weakened, which undoubtedly poses a deep structural contradiction for a modern military attempting to transition to informatization and intelligence.

In summary, the April 8 meeting marks a new phase in Xi Jinping's political control over the PLA. By holding a high-profile senior cadre training course, initiating an "ideological rectification" movement, and launching a media propaganda campaign, Xi is attempting to further consolidate his absolute control over the military against the backdrop of over a hundred officers being purged. However, the subtle changes in Xinhua's wording, potential pressure from party elders, and the increasingly accumulated discontent within the military all indicate that the direction of this rectification movement remains fraught with uncertainty. For observers concerned with China's military development and regional security situation, personnel changes at the high levels of the PLA and the direction of official discourse in the coming weeks will be key indicators for assessing the depth and breadth of this movement.