Tshisekedi Forces the Referendum in 2026 and Weakens the Front Against the M23

On June 16, in Kinshasa, the Congolese opposition denounced the Senate's adoption of a bill paving the way for a constitutional referendum that would allow Félix Tshisekedi to seek a third term. The scene may seem parliamentary. It is not just that. In a country where the war in the East is already absorbing the army, finances, and diplomatic attention, a legitimacy crisis at the center of power quickly becomes an operational factor.

The text adopted by the Senate, after passing through the National Assembly, is now awaiting the president's signature. According to the Associated Press, it would create a mechanism to reset Tshisekedi's term limits, as he has been in power since 2019. The opposition parties, grouped in the Coalition Article 64, announced a march on July 8 to demand his departure. A few days earlier, on June 12, a protest against this reform had already escalated in Kinshasa, with several opposition leaders injured.

This is where politics meets the ground. Kinshasa is over 1,500 kilometers from Goma by road, and much more if we consider the actually passable routes. Between the capital and North Kivu, there is not just distance. There are transport disruptions, river routes, saturated airstrips, poorly paid units, and chains of command that depend on trust in the central authority. When this authority becomes contested in the streets, the effect is rarely felt immediately on a map. But it is felt in orders, rotations, and discipline.

An Eastern Front Already Under Pressure

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not experiencing an ordinary security crisis. The Council on Foreign Relations reminds us that the M23 has regained a central role in the war in the East after its offensive in 2025, culminating in the capture of Goma. The same report estimates that Rwanda, the main supporter of the M23 according to Kinshasa and several Western partners, supported this offensive with 3,000 to 4,000 ground troops. Kigali denies or nuances according to the files, but on the ground, the FARDC operates as if facing a hybrid adversary, not just a local militia.

The key figure remains that of the displaced. More than seven million Congolese have been forced to leave their homes, especially in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. This mass of people weighs on all operations. It slows down convoys, clogs assembly areas, multiplies friction points with armed groups, and makes intelligence harder to sort. From experience, when an army fights in a space where civilians, militias, traffickers, and displaced persons cross paths on the same routes, theoretical superiority is not enough.

The latest indicator is bad. The Kivu Security Barometer, cited by the CFR, recorded a 21% increase in security incidents in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu between April and May. This increase is mainly attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces, which reportedly killed 109 civilians in May compared to 53 in April. This means that the M23 is not the only problem. Kinshasa must negotiate or fight a structured adversary in the East while containing a nebulous array of other groups that take advantage of any slackening.

The Risk of a Politicized Army from the Rear

The constitutional reform thus arrives at the worst moment. Tshisekedi has already stated that the 2028 elections could not be organized properly as long as the conflict is not resolved and stability has not returned. This statement is militarily understandable but politically dangerous. It transforms the war into a possible justification for an extendable presidential timeline. For the officers engaged in the East, the message is ambiguous: are they fighting to restore the authority of the state, or to provide political time to Kinshasa?

This doubt matters. An army that doubts the political purpose of its effort becomes less reliable in difficult phases. It can hold a position; it holds less well in a long campaign. In Congo, the FARDC already resorts to local Wazalendo militias, foreign partners, drones, and security diplomacy that passes through Washington, Doha, Kigali, and sometimes Beijing. Adding a constitutional crisis to this architecture shifts the center of gravity of the front towards the capital.

The M23 knows how to exploit this type of opening. Its advantage is not only tactical. It is also political. Every image of disorder in Kinshasa reinforces its narrative that the central government neither represents nor protects the East. Every suppressed march, every opposition deputy absent from the vote, every accusation of power confiscation feeds the idea that the war is led by a regime concerned with its survival. It is an informational weapon, and it costs less than a surface-to-air missile.

Negotiation Becomes More Fragile

The Congolese dossier now depends on several negotiation tables. Agreements and frameworks supported by the United States, Qatar, or other mediators seek to combine ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces, restoration of state authority, and humanitarian access. But no table works if one of the signatories appears weakened at home. Kigali can wait. The M23 can stall. Secondary armed groups can test local lines while Kinshasa looks towards July 8.

One must remain cautious: the bill has not yet produced a referendum, and the political outcome is unknown. The ground data in the East are also incomplete, especially in areas where independent observers have difficulty moving. But the sequence is already readable. In a theater as vast as Congo, presidential authority is not a legal abstraction. It is a logistical line. It starts from the offices in Kinshasa, crosses public finances, passes through regional commands, and then arrives on the tracks of Sake, Rutshuru, Beni, or Bunia.

What to Watch For

• The march announced by the Coalition Article 64 on July 8, especially the reaction of the police and army in Kinshasa.
• The movements of the M23 around the Goma-Sake and Bukavu-Uvira axes, where a limited initiative can have a disproportionate political effect.
• The posture of Kigali, which may harden its demands if Tshisekedi appears isolated.
• The attacks by the ADF in Ituri and North Kivu, as they measure the actual capacity of the FARDC to manage multiple fronts simultaneously.

The immediate danger is not a spectacular collapse of Kinshasa. Congo has survived worse. The danger is more subtle: a slow loss of coherence between the political center and the units holding the East. If the capital enters a third-term crisis, the M23 will not need to win all its battles. It will only need to buy time.

Sources

Associated Press, June 16, 2026; Associated Press, June 12, 2026; Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker, updated February 18, 2026, and notes from June 2026.