Two Hours Instead of a World — Why the Geneva Talks Are Doomed to Stall

The negotiations in Geneva concluded on February 18, 2026. The second day lasted exactly two hours. This number — not the rhetoric of Zelensky, not the phrasing of Medinsky, not the "significant progress" from Caroline Levitt — is the most honest indicator of the state of the peace process.

Two hours is less than the duration of any self-respecting academic seminar. In two hours, it is impossible to agree on a protocol for the exchange of prisoners of war, let alone the fate of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. This means either that the parties have reached such a dense mutual understanding that there is nothing to discuss — which is absurd — or that they have encountered walls so high that continuing the conversation is physically meaningless. The second option is obviously closer to reality.

Medinsky and the Art of Diplomatic Ambiguity

Vladimir Medinsky — a man who has written textbooks in which Ukrainian national identity is described as a construct — characterized the negotiations as "complex but businesslike." This phrase should be viewed not as an assessment but as a signal. In the Soviet and Russian diplomatic tradition, "businesslike" means "the parties were physically present and exchanged documents." This is the minimum standard confirming the very fact of negotiations. Nothing beyond that.

As for "complexity" — this is also a code word. The Russian side did not come to Geneva with new proposals. The Kremlin's position has remained unchanged since April 2022, when the first negotiations collapsed in Istanbul: Ukraine is obliged to legally formalize the transfer of all four occupied regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. This is not a negotiating position. This is an ultimatum framed as a proposal. To call such a situation "complex" is to delicately describe a complete deadlock.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov added that "it is too early to talk about the results." This also says a lot. When there is a result, it is talked about immediately. When there is none — it is said that it is too early to talk.

Three Walls Against Which Negotiations Break

Zelensky may have been unusually straightforward in his disappointment, but his words provide an accurate map of the negotiation deadlocks. He named three specific issues where the parties' positions fundamentally diverge: the status of the occupied territories, the fate of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and the mechanism for security guarantees. Each of these issues alone is sufficient to block negotiations. All three together render the current format functionally meaningless.

The territorial issue is the axis around which everything else revolves. Russia demands formal legal recognition of its conquests. Ukraine cannot provide this — neither constitutionally nor politically. Zelensky stated this unequivocally: "Emotionally, people will never forgive this. Never." He was speaking about the people of Ukraine but directed his words at Donald Trump, who, according to available information, is pressuring Kyiv to make territorial concessions as a first step. A compromise between "100% concede" and "0% concede" does not mathematically exist. One can come up with beautiful formulations — demilitarized zones, temporary statuses, "freezing without recognition" — but behind each of them, both sides see different things. Russia sees a temporary halt before the next phase. Ukraine sees a permanent territorial division without guarantees.

The Zaporizhzhia NPP is a question that goes beyond the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. It is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, captured by Russian troops in the early days of the invasion, operating under military occupation with Ukrainian personnel under military control. The IAEA has repeatedly warned of the risks. Russia uses the plant as a lever of pressure — a radiological argument that Moscow keeps in reserve. Any peaceful settlement that leaves the NPP under Russian control without strict international inspection guarantees means embedding a potential catastrophe into the architecture of peace. Russian negotiators have shown no willingness to relinquish this lever.

Finally, security guarantees are where the Ukrainian-American gap becomes particularly evident. Zelensky wrote on X what his team has been repeating in various formulations for several months: first guarantees, then territorial compromises, not the other way around. The Trump administration wants the reverse sequence: first territorial concessions, then guarantees. Kyiv's logic is clear: as soon as Ukraine makes territorial concessions, the American leverage over Russia will disappear — along with it, the guarantees will vanish. The logic of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 is very relevant here: there were guarantees then, there were signatures too. How that ended is well known.

Why Moscow is Dragging Out Time

Supporters of an optimistic interpretation of the Geneva negotiations point out that Zelensky characterized the "military track" as "constructive" — this supposedly indicates progress in technical issues regarding monitoring a possible ceasefire. Perhaps. But before celebrating, it is worth remembering: the Minsk agreements also contained detailed technical mechanisms for monitoring. And Russia systematically violated them from 2015 to 2022, until it itself transitioned to a full-scale invasion.

A more important question is: why should Russia rush at all? Twenty-four hours before the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations, Ukraine reported 740 casualties among Russian troops killed and wounded. This is a high but not atypical figure for recent months. Cumulative Russian losses, according to Ukrainian data, have exceeded 1.25 million people. This figure is disputed, but even if taken with a significant adjustment — the scale of losses that would be politically unbearable for any Western democracy, the Russian political system absorbs with astonishing calmness.

Slow tactical pressure on the Donbas front continues. The pace of Russian territorial gains is low — the count is in square kilometers, not districts — but they are stable. As long as the front moves in a direction favorable to Moscow, the Kremlin has no structural incentives to make concessions. Medinsky can return to Geneva every two weeks — the main thing is that what is happening is not in Swiss negotiating halls, but in Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar.

European leaders have articulated this logic more honestly than American partners: Putin will not make real compromises until the military situation or the domestic political situation deteriorates to the point where negotiations become the only way out. None of these conditions are currently being met.

Washington's Optimism as a Domestic Political Product

"Significant progress" from Caroline Levitt should be viewed in context: Trump publicly promised to end the war "on the first day" of his presidency. That deadline has long passed. The administration needs a success narrative — and "significant progress without a breakthrough" is the minimally possible such narrative. This is not an assessment of the negotiation dynamics. This is managing the domestic audience.

The real American leverage over Moscow — the threat of escalating military aid to Ukraine, tightening sanctions, or full diplomatic isolationism — is not visible in the current administration. Trump is simultaneously pressuring Zelensky to concede territory, reducing military support for Kyiv, and signaling a desire to normalize relations with Moscow. This is not pressure on Russia. This is pressure on Ukraine under the guise of mediation.

Without real American pressure on Moscow — and not on Kyiv — the next round of negotiations, scheduled for "later this month," will resemble the Geneva talks. Perhaps a little longer than the second day. But not by much.

What Needs to Change for Negotiations to Become Real

To summarize without embellishments. For the peace process to move off dead center, at least one of the following conditions must be met: a significant deterioration in Russia's military situation on the front (not 740 losses a day, but a systemic collapse at any of the key sections); a domestic political crisis in Russia that makes the continuation of the war politically unbearable for the Kremlin; a fundamental change in the American negotiation strategy from pressure on Ukraine to pressure on Russia; or finally — the emergence of a realistic compromise on security guarantees that Ukraine can accept without political suicide. None of these conditions matured over the two days in Geneva.

The war has entered its fifth year. Negotiations will continue — because the diplomatic process has become necessary as a rhetorical shield for all participants. Russia demonstrates to the international community its readiness for dialogue. Ukraine proves to the West that it, not Moscow, is the constructive side. The U.S. shows its domestic audience that diplomacy works. But as long as all three need the process more than the result — Geneva will continue. Two hours or twenty — all of this is part of the performance, behind which lies the simple fact: the war will not end at the negotiating table. It will end when one of the sides is unable to continue it.