The Strategic Blind Spot Revealed by the Request to Freeze the Relocation of Marines to Guam

On February 13, a paper presented by Lieutenant Colonel Caleb Eames of the Atlantic Council has stirred ripples among defense officials in Japan and the United States. He called for the freezing of the plan to relocate 5,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. This proposal raises fundamental questions about the core of the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) agreed upon in 2006.

What draws the author's attention is not Lieutenant Colonel Eames' argument, but the fact that his superior, General Eric Smith, Commandant of the Marine Corps, also publicly stated that moving the Marines "from Okinawa would be a step in the wrong direction" in 2025. The simultaneous outcry from both field commanders and the highest command is not merely a tactical-level discussion.

What the Distance of 1,500 Miles Means

When the DPRI was formulated in 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed to relocate 9,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland, leaving 10,000 Marines in Okinawa. Behind this was the political slogan of "burden reduction," but military rationality was secondary.

The distance between Okinawa and Guam is approximately 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometers). In the event of a Taiwan contingency, this distance is fatal. To position the Marines, who require the most mobility in the defense of the First Island Chain, 2,400 kilometers away from the battlefield—this is not strategy, but a product of political compromise.

• Okinawa-Taiwan distance: Approximately 600 kilometers
• Guam-Taiwan distance: Approximately 2,400 kilometers (four times that of Okinawa)
• Deployment time for Marine Expeditionary Forces: A few hours from Okinawa, several days from Guam

The Discontinuity of the Strategic Environment Between 2006 and 2026

At the time of the DPRI negotiations, even stating that China was a "future enemy" was taboo. The People's Liberation Army Navy's aircraft carriers had not yet been commissioned, and there was no serious discussion about the defense of the Nansei Islands.

However, the reality in 2026 is entirely different. The Chinese Navy operates multiple aircraft carrier strike groups and has completed the militarization of the South China Sea. Russia and North Korea are also increasing their activities around Japan. Yet, the DPRI, based on the slogan of "burden reduction" from 20 years ago, continues to define the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Another blind spot pointed out by Lieutenant Colonel Eames is the issue of relocating the Futenma Air Station to Henoko. The current plan involves closing a full-service airbase capable of accommodating all types of aircraft and replacing it with a small facility that is essentially just a helipad. This signifies a substantial decrease in operational capability.

Political Inertia and Financial Interests

So, why is the review of the DPRI not progressing? The answer is simple—bureaucratic inertia and vested interests.

The relocation to Henoko involves a budget of several trillion yen, creating a complex web of interests among contractors, politicians, and bureaucrats. To dismantle this structure, strategic necessity alone is insufficient. Political decisions are required.

"The job of a Marine leading the assault team in Fallujah is truly 'difficult.' Reconsidering the DPRI is just a matter of the alliance managers and leaders working a little harder." — Grant Newsham, former U.S. Marine Corps Colonel

The Possibility Opened by the Takai Administration

Ironically, the most suitable political environment for reviewing the DPRI is now emerging on the Japanese side.

In the recent House of Representatives election, all four seats in Okinawa were won by pro-base candidates from the Liberal Democratic Party. This suggests a growing understanding among Okinawa residents of the strategic importance of the bases. Prime Minister Sanae Takai's emphasis on defense could also serve as a tailwind for resuming negotiations.

The problem lies with the U.S. side. If the Department of Defense and the Indo-Pacific Command continue to repeat the bureaucratic excuse that "renegotiation is too difficult," nothing will change. However, now is the time to act, as the Marine commanders on the ground are raising their voices.

Author's Perspective

The true challenge of the U.S.-Japan alliance lies not in military capability, but in the speed and flexibility of political decision-making. The DPRI is a legacy of a political compromise from 20 years ago and does not fit the current strategic environment.

If the People's Liberation Army applies pressure on the First Island Chain, will there be any room to urgently deploy Marines from Guam? The answer is clear. The essence of strategy is to accept inconveniences in peacetime and survive in times of crisis.

The warnings from Lieutenant Colonel Eames and General Smith may be a final ultimatum to both governments. The Marines in Okinawa should not be moved. At least, not until the tensions in the Taiwan Strait are resolved.