West Africa Facing the Jihadist Challenge: Between Regional Fragmentation and Attempts at Collective Response

The security situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate despite the changes in strategic partnerships made by the military juntas in power. An analysis of recent developments reveals a region caught between the manifest failure of current counter-terrorism strategies and the hesitant attempts to rebuild a collective security architecture. This complex dynamic profoundly reshapes African geopolitical balances and directly challenges regional capacities to generate endogenous responses to the jihadist threat.

The dramatic escalation of the terrorist threat in the Sahel today constitutes one of the main security challenges on the African continent. In 2024, more than half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in this region, confirming the extent of a crisis that now far exceeds the borders of the three member states of the Sahel Alliance (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso). Jihadist groups, primarily Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP), have not only consolidated their territorial grip but also demonstrate an increasing operational sophistication that challenges the capabilities of regional forces.

The offensive launched in January 2026 against Dori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 in Niger perfectly illustrates this worrying evolution. The ISSP mobilized drones, light weapons, and mortars in a coordinated attack against the very headquarters of the AES, revealing the gaping flaws in the defensive posture of Sahelian forces. In Burkina Faso, where JNIM now controls up to 60% of the national territory according to recent estimates, the group has demonstrated its ability to mobilize hundreds of fighters for simultaneous operations in several provinces, targeting both military installations and civilian populations.

This security degradation paradoxically occurs after the military juntas, which came to power between 2020 and 2023, justified their coups precisely by the inability of previous regimes to contain the jihadist insurrection. Blaming the inadequacy of Western assistance, particularly from France and the United States, these new authorities have made a radical strategic pivot towards new partners: Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. Moscow has become the most active external actor, initially deploying the Wagner Group, now renamed Africa Corps, for operations in Mali and the training of Burkinabè and Nigerien forces.

However, the results of this strategic realignment have proven disappointing. Despite several years of Russian assistance, the security situation has worsened rather than improved. This embarrassing reality reveals the limits of an approach that prioritizes short-term military solutions at the expense of institutional strengthening and local governance. Russian forces, increasingly perceived as acting more as mercenaries in areas of limited engagement than as true security cooperation partners, have clearly not provided the expected responses to an insurrection deeply rooted in local social and economic fractures.

In the face of this security impasse, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is attempting to regain the initiative. In February 2026, the chiefs of staff of the organization's armies met in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to discuss cooperation with the AES and the establishment of a 2,000-strong counter-terrorism force by the end of 2026. This initiative comes after the dramatic withdrawal of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, with the juntas accusing the organization of being pro-colonialist.

The ambition displayed by ECOWAS, however, raises serious questions about its operational feasibility. Given the pace at which JNIM is consolidating its territorial grip and influence, a force that will take nearly a year to become operational seems ill-suited to the urgency of the situation. Fundamental questions remain unanswered: how will this force be funded? Do the participating states have the air assets and intelligence capabilities necessary to conduct effective counter-terrorism operations? If the AES refuses any coordination due to ongoing political divergences, the force will face even greater obstacles.

Alongside this attempt at a collective response, bilateral initiatives are emerging within the continent. Nigeria and South Africa formalized a deep military partnership in March 2026 aimed at addressing insurgent threats and improving technical cooperation between the two leading African economies. This agreement, realized during the visit of General Lawrence Khulekani Mbatha, Chief of the South African Army, to the Nigerian Army headquarters in Abuja, builds on the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-national Commission, whose 6th session of the Defense and Security Committee was held in September 2025.

This bilateral cooperation is distinguished by its concrete operational dimension. South Africa has shown particular interest in Nigerian counter-insurgency tactics developed under Operation HADIN KAI in the Northeast, particularly methods for detecting and neutralizing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a favored weapon of terrorist groups in the asymmetric warfare of the Sahel. In exchange, Nigeria seeks to benefit from South African technical expertise to strengthen its embryonic Army Aviation Wing, particularly in terms of aeronautical maintenance and pilot training.

Beyond strictly military aspects, this cooperation includes an increasingly crucial cybersecurity dimension. The discussions in March 2026 focused on sharing intelligence regarding digital threats targeting critical military infrastructures, as both nations digitize their command and control structures. This concern reflects a growing awareness of the vulnerabilities induced by the technological modernization of African armed forces.

The American positioning in this regional dynamic remains ambivalent and constrained. After the expulsion of American forces from Nigerien air bases in 2024, essential for counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel, Washington is cautiously attempting to rebuild cooperation channels. The lifting in February 2026 of sanctions against three high-ranking Malian officials and ongoing negotiations for an agreement allowing American intelligence collection in Malian airspace testify to this desire for re-engagement. However, relations with Burkina Faso and Niger remain marked by a persistent distrust of local authorities towards Washington.

This attempt at American rapprochement fits into a broader strategy aimed at containing Russian and Chinese influence while securing access to the region's critical mineral deposits. The envisioned model draws inspiration from the security-for-minerals agreement negotiated with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Washington promised security assistance in exchange for increased mining concessions. Guinea, holding about 25% of the world's known bauxite reserves and 10% of global iron ore, as well as recently discovered lithium deposits, represents a major strategic stake in this geopolitical competition.

The war in Iran adds an additional layer of complexity to this already fragile situation. High energy prices and the resulting inflation particularly affect the AES countries. Niger and Mali, net importers of refined petroleum products, are feeling the brunt of these economic tensions. JNIM exploits this vulnerability by closing transit corridors and attacking fuel trucks in Mali to isolate the country from its regional trading partners. This economic war waged by jihadists could prolong the energy shortage and induce food insecurity, thereby reinforcing anti-regime sentiment and facilitating terrorist recruitment.

The withdrawal of the AES from ECOWAS also deprives these states of any economic protection that the organization could implement in the face of external shocks. Simultaneously, Iran's inability, engaged in a major conflict, to continue its security cooperation with the AES creates a vacuum that Moscow or Washington may attempt to fill, thus opening a new chapter in the competition for influence in the Sahel.

The threat of a geographical extension of the insurrection towards the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea constitutes a major concern for regional security analysts. Since 2019, JNIM has systematically expanded its operations into these territories, building a sophisticated network capable of undermining state authority and deterring military interventions. By exploiting the grievances of local populations, particularly in isolated areas where government presence is weak or nonexistent, jihadists have established what some experts describe as a "proto-state" extending from AES members to most coastal nations of West Africa.

Over the past five years, JNIM has established resilient terrorist cells and logistical hubs allowing for repeated engagements with security forces in Benin and Togo. Attacks on critical economic infrastructures could extend to port cities, either to deter ECOWAS members from contributing to the counter-terrorism force or to disrupt regional supply chains. The port of Lomé in Togo, the fourth most active container port on the continent and a vital logistics hub, represents a focal point in the rivalry between powers for regional dominance. The security cooperation agreement ratified by Moscow last year in exchange for unlimited access to the port illustrates the strategic stakes associated with these infrastructures.

This complex situation reveals the extent of the challenges facing West Africa. The regional fragmentation between ECOWAS and the AES significantly weakens collective response capacities to a threat that recognizes no borders. Jihadist groups capitalize on this division, exploiting gaps in security coordination to consolidate their positions and expand their influence. Meanwhile, civilian populations bear the heaviest price of this instability, caught between the violence of armed groups and the often inadequate or brutal responses of security forces.

The solution to this multidimensional crisis will require much more than sporadic military interventions. It will demand a complete rethinking of the security approach, integrating the strengthening of local governance, improving public services in marginalized areas, inclusive economic development, and inter-community reconciliation. Military partnerships, whether with Russia, the United States, or between African countries, can only be components of a broader strategy addressing the root causes of the insurrection.

The deadline of late 2026 for the deployment of the ECOWAS counter-terrorism force will be a crucial test for the organization's ability to generate credible regional solutions. Its success or failure will profoundly influence the security and political trajectories of West Africa for years to come. In the immediate term, the top priority must be to slow the territorial expansion of jihadist groups and protect civilian populations, while laying the groundwork for long-term stabilization that necessarily involves more inclusive governance responsive to local needs.