What it takes to succeed as Secretary of the Navy

Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, once remarked the world was full of people who wanted to become Secretary of the Navy. Few senior-level jobs in the federal government have as much glamor as the SECNAV does, so it is not surprising that the job often goes to well-connected politicians or donors. As successful as those people may be outside the Pentagon, few are actually suited to survive in the job, with former Secretary John Phelan the most recent example. 

So, what makes a good SECNAV? Using historical examples, here is a checklist for the ideal candidate for Secretary of the Navy. 

A grounding in history, geopolitics and economics. One of the most important tasks of any SECNAV is to justify and articulate the purpose of the U.S. Navy to the Congress and the American people when fighting for the Navy’s budget. But how can you do that without an awareness of how and why the United States is a maritime nation that depends on its sea lines of communications (SLOCs in naval lingo) for both its economic and national security. SECNAVs need not quote legendary American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt often did, but they should understand at some level the lessons of history and the necessary conditions for being a sea power, particularly the role of determined, consistent political leadership. 

A familiarity with the Navy as an institution. It is an obvious advantage to have served in the Navy or Marines in either a uniformed or civilian capacity. SECNAVs should understand the different communities that comprise the Navy and Marines and how they each contribute to the national interest. The fact that Gideon Welles ran the Navy’s Bureau of Provisions (i.e. logistics) during the Mexican-American War meant he was ideally suited to expand the Navy during the Civil War to blockade the Confederacy. Unfortunately, by the time neophytes master the intricacies of the job, it is usually too late to affect meaningful changes.

Be a skilled bureaucratic operator. Those who seek to change the direction of the Navy may confront considerable resistance from both the uniformed leadership and the civil service. Throughout U.S. naval history, many of the great innovations that have transformed our Navy only took root because civilian leaders challenged established ways of thinking. Graham Claytor, a superb SECNAV for Jimmy Carter, convinced Secretary Brown not to relegate the Navy to a purely defensive force but to use the Navy to strike at the Soviet Union’s weak flanks. Claytor also deftly outmaneuvered Adm. Hyman Rickover, the “Father of Nuclear Navy,” when the admiral tried to conduct his own nuclear strategy through congressional lobbying. When push comes to shove, SECNAVs should not hesitate to exert civilian control, as John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson’s SECNAV, Paul Nitze, did when he fired an admiral who tried to slow-roll Nitze by telling Navy employees that “Secretaries of the Navy come and go.”

Have some experience in the private sector. Ideally, in the competitive economy of financing and producing goods and services, profit and loss statements and balance sheets. Hopefully, they can use that experience to determine when and how the Navy can import best practices from the private sector to restore our ailing defense-industrial base. One of James Forrestal’s greatest contributions to American victory in World War II was understanding that the Navy’s antiquated procurement system could not keep up with the demands of waging a modern war. Over the objections of the Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, Forrestal, initially as Under Secretary of the Navy, created a new office to oversee the billions of dollars of contracts the Navy planned to sign and ensure that these agreements would generate the required forces and not conflict with the requirements of the other military services, which were rearming at the same time.

Possess credibility on Capitol Hill. A British admiral once explained that he never lobbied Parliament because “They are not the sort of chaps one would invite to one’s club.” There is an implication within national security circles that politicking is somehow beneath those who guide national security. This attitude is profoundly mistaken. SECNAVs must spend a great deal of time in person on the Hill, cultivating, socializing, lobbying and convincing congressional leadership that the SECNAV understands the problems confronting the Navy at that moment, has a plan to address those deficiencies and possesses the determination to carry out the necessary changes. Josephus Daniels, SECNAV for President Woodrow Wilson, ran circles around Navy admirals who wanted to manipulate Congress to enhance their power at the expense of the SECNAV. Daniels did so not by openly challenging the admirals (although there will be times when that is necessary) but by ensuring that his voice carried the greatest weight with the relevant legislators.

Earn political top cover from the Secretary of Defense and the President. The SECNAV’s power flows from the defense secretary and president’s belief that the SECNAV is serving as a faithful executor of the administration’s policies. If they are not willing to beat off challenges, a SECNAV will quickly become bogged down. During his time as SECNAV in the Reagan administration, the co-author of this article never had a close personal relationship with either President Ronald Reagan or Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. But he was still effective because the White House, Navy and the Pentagon knew that his policies directly supported the administration’s grand strategy. It also helped that the Secretary of Defense had the wisdom to delegate significant authority to the service secretaries for the implementation of departmental policies rather than trying to micromanage the entire Pentagon.

Of course, these hypothetical attributes may play out in the real world thanks to the Trump administration’s nomination of Hung Cao for the SECNAV role. 

Cao has shown some of the attributes to thrive in the job. He obviously has considerable military experience and good relations with key leaders in the administration. Over his career, Cao has demonstrated courage to take on strong opponents and daunting tasks. He is not afraid to be derided as “controversial,” which is a deadly insult for careerists. He is also known to be a fast learner and loyal to his friends and teammates.

This could be a formula for success in these unpredictable times if he is willing to grow and acquire the other skills we have mentioned. Only time will tell. 

Regardless of what happens with Cao’s nomination, the secret of success for an effective Secretary of the Navy is a combination of talent, experience and circumstance. The Navy is currently in the midst of its most challenging period since the end of the Cold War, and it needs someone with the right set of skills, experiences and, we daresay, charm, to steer the Navy back on course. 

John Lehman was Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987. Anand Toprani is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of The Man in the Middle: John Lehman, Naval Power, and the End of the Cold War (Stanford University Press, 2027).