Why Europe's 67 Percent Increase in Military Aid for Ukraine Does Not Close the Strategic Gap

In 2025, European countries increased their military support for Ukraine by 67 percent compared to the average of the years 2022-2024, while U.S. aid plummeted by 99 percent — from an average of 17.3 billion euros per year to a meager 0.4 billion. Germany leads with 9 billion euros, followed by the United Kingdom (5.4 billion), Sweden (3.7 billion), Norway (3.6 billion), and Denmark (2.6 billion). These figures, published by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy on February 11, 2026, are celebrated in European capitals as evidence of the success of "strategic autonomy."

However, a closer look at the mechanisms behind these numbers reveals a fundamental paradox: Europe is spending more money but continues to predominantly buy American weapons — through a procurement system controlled by the U.S.

The PURL Dilemma: European Money for American Systems

The Procurement for Ukraine through Rapid Logistics (PURL) mechanism, funded in 2025 by 24 donor countries with at least 3.7 billion euros, is at the heart of European military aid. According to Kiel data, 75 percent of all Patriot missiles delivered to Ukraine and almost 90 percent of missiles for other air defense systems were procured through PURL. On February 11, 2026, the U.S. Special Representative named Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany as "program leaders" with a total of 4.5 billion dollars in weapon commitments.

What appears at first glance to be efficient multilateral coordination is, upon closer inspection, an extension of European dependency: PURL primarily purchases HIMARS rocket systems, Patriot batteries, and other U.S. products. Europe pays, but the production capacity remains in the U.S. The strategic control over supply chains, maintenance, and spare parts continues to lie with American manufacturers like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

Even Norway and Denmark, which each spent over 0.6 percent of their GDP on military aid in 2025 (for comparison: Germany reached about 0.3 percent), primarily invest in foreign value chains. This is not autonomy — it is outsourced procurement.

The Illusion of Compensation: 67 Percent Growth Amid Stagnant Total Aid

The often-cited 67 percent increase obscures an uncomfortable truth: the total amount of international aid remained roughly constant in 2025 because the American decline (down 99 percent in military aid, zero new financial or humanitarian commitments) was so drastic. Europe did not compensate for the American withdrawal — it merely prevented a complete collapse of support for Ukraine.

Even more problematic is the structure of financial aid: EU institutions (not individual member states) accounted for 89 percent of European financial aid in 2025, compared to about 50 percent in 2022. This centralization may seem efficient, but it masks a deeper problem: no major EU member state is willing to bear the fiscal burden that Washington has shouldered so far.

Germany may lead in 2025 with 9 billion euros, but that is only about one-third of what the U.S. provided annually in pre-Trump years. And even this amount is politically contentious: the ongoing Bundestag election campaign shows that none of the major parties are willing to promise a long-term doubling of aid to Ukraine.

Direct Procurement in Ukraine: A Ray of Hope or a Drop in the Bucket?

A positive trend deserves mention: the share of procurements directly from Ukrainian defense companies rose from 4 percent at the end of 2024 to 22 percent in the second half of 2025. By the end of 2025, at least 11 countries financed procurements involving Ukrainian manufacturers. This could indeed be a step towards industrial resilience — provided these contracts focus on systems that Europe itself also needs (artillery ammunition, drones, electronic warfare).

But here too, the question remains: 22 percent of what? Of total procurements, which continue to be dominated by U.S. systems. As long as European states are not willing to drastically ramp up the production of critical systems like IRIS-T, Eurofighter components, or French SCALP cruise missiles, Ukrainian procurement will remain a niche.

The Structural Inability of Europe to Replace American Volumes

The central problem is not political will, but industrial capacity. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has an annual budget of only 343 million euros — a ridiculous sum compared to the 9 billion euros that Germany alone spent on aid to Ukraine in 2025. This discrepancy shows: Europe can spend money, but it cannot build coordinated arms production.

Even the often-praised Nordic countries — Sweden, Norway, Denmark — are buyers, not producers on a relevant scale. Sweden's 3.7 billion euros mostly flowed into already existing defense packages (Archer artillery, Gripen fighter jets), not into new production lines. Norway and Denmark procured American systems through PURL.

Germany has laid the fiscal groundwork with the increase of special funds and the 2 percent commitment, but converting money into production capacity takes years. Rheinmetall estimates that the planned artillery ammunition factory in Lower Saxony will not reach full operation until at least 2028 — too late for Ukraine's current needs.

The Paradox of European "Leadership"

On February 10, 2026, NATO announced that three Joint Force Commands (Norfolk, Naples, Brunssum) are now under European leadership. At the same time, Kiel data shows that while Europe is paying more, it continues to invest in dollar-dominated value chains. This is the essence of European defense policy since 2022: symbolic leadership amid structural dependency.

Europe cannot close the American gap as long as it does not build its own industrial base. The 67 percent increase is impressive — but it is a band-aid on a wound that needs emergency surgery. As long as PURL remains the dominant procurement instrument, Europe is paying for the privilege of remaining dependent on the American defense industry.

The bitter irony: Europe is spending more money than ever before — and thereby strengthening the industrial base of the U.S., while its own arms production stagnates. This is not strategic autonomy. This is outsourcing with a European price tag.