Xi Jinping Emphasizes Political Loyalty of the Military: The Dual Dilemma of Anti-Corruption Purges and PLA Modernization

On March 7, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the plenary session of the delegation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police Force during the fourth session of the 14th National People's Congress, reiterating that the military must ensure political loyalty and calling for a "resolute advancement of the anti-corruption struggle." This statement comes against the backdrop of an ongoing and expanding purge within the military's upper echelons, highlighting the deep-seated contradictions faced by the PLA during its modernization transformation.

In his speech, Xi explicitly stated, "There must be no disloyal individuals to the Party within the military." According to Xinhua News Agency, he emphasized the need to "fully leverage the unique advantages of political building in the military," while declaring that "corrupt elements must have no place to hide." This statement continues the anti-corruption campaign in the military that Xi has been promoting since he came to power in 2012, but the current scale and high level of the purges are indeed rare in recent years.

Just a week before this speech, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress revoked the representative qualifications of nine military officers, including two members of the Central Military Commission, as well as senior generals from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force. This week, three more generals were stripped of their qualifications as members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. According to statistics from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States, since 2022, Xi has purged 101 senior PLA generals. Even more shockingly, of the 47 individuals who served or were promoted to general rank in 2022, 41 have been confirmed to have been purged or are likely to be purged.

This large-scale purge has significantly altered the power structure of the Central Military Commission. When Xi took office as chairman of the commission in 2012, there were 11 members. However, at the Central Military Commission meeting on March 5, only two individuals were seated at the head table: Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman General Zhang Shengmin. The Central Military Commission has been completely transformed from its original collective leadership mechanism into a highly centralized command system under Xi. This structural change has raised doubts about whether the commission can operate normally.

While emphasizing political loyalty and anti-corruption, the Chinese government announced on March 5 that the national defense budget for 2026 will increase by 7%, reaching 1.91 trillion yuan (approximately $270 billion). This increase is slightly lower than the average annual growth rate of 7.2% over the past three years and is the lowest increase since the 6.8% during the pandemic in 2021. This reflects the constraints of China's economic realities on military spending growth. Notably, China's defense budget has maintained single-digit growth for 11 consecutive years, moving away from the era of double-digit growth seen in the early 2000s.

However, the publicly announced budget figures are likely far below China's actual defense spending. The "China Military Power Report" released by the U.S. Department of Defense in December 2025 warned that academics, think tanks, and industry experts generally believe that the publicly announced defense budget does not encompass all of China's defense expenditures. The report noted that China's actual military spending in 2024 could be 32% to 63% higher than the publicly disclosed figures. Public budgets typically do not include defense-related R&D, certain capital expenditures, internal security, and mobilization activities.

The Chinese government stated that this budget will be used to "continue advancing realistic combat training, accelerate the development of advanced combat capabilities, and enhance strategic capabilities to defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests." The government also emphasized the need to "promote the formulation of the military's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), implement major defense projects, and advance the modernization of military theory." These goals point to a key milestone: 2027—the 100th anniversary of the PLA's founding.

Xi has repeatedly mentioned the 2027 goal, urging the PLA to "accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization" before that year, achieving "modernization of military theory, organizational forms, military personnel, and weaponry." The U.S. Department of Defense noted that China deliberately obscures the specific requirements of the 2027 goal, but Chinese media have linked this goal to "developing capabilities to counter U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region and forcing Taiwan's leadership back to the negotiating table under Beijing's conditions."

The PLA itself associates the 2027 goal with the development of "three strategic capabilities." The first is "strategic decisive combat capability," requiring the military to achieve victory in conflicts at an acceptable cost. The second is "strategic counteraction capability," which necessitates establishing strategic deterrent forces, including nuclear deterrence, to prevent or limit U.S. military intervention in Taiwan Strait conflicts. The third is "strategic control capability," meaning the ability to limit the horizontal escalation of conflicts or prevent other countries from taking opportunistic actions.

The Taiwan issue has always been China's "core concern." In 2025, PLA aircraft conducted a total of 5,709 sorties in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone, setting a historical record. Since January 2026, 460 PLA aircraft have entered Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone. Notably, PLA aircraft were grounded for a full seven days after February 27, resuming activities only on March 7—this is the longest recorded interruption. Analysts believe this may be related to former President Trump's visit to China from March 31 to April 2 to meet with Xi, as Beijing attempts to create a "peaceful" posture. However, Taiwanese security officials warn that one should not infer a change in Beijing's intentions based solely on a few days of activity changes.

The current situation presents a paradox: on one hand, China continues to increase defense investment and advance military modernization, striving to achieve key capability goals by 2027; on the other hand, the large-scale purges are undermining the continuity and stability of the command system. Reports from the U.S. Department of Defense and several think tanks indicate that the ongoing anti-corruption campaign may negatively impact the PLA's command effectiveness and readiness.

From a broader perspective, Xi's high degree of centralization over the military and repeated emphasis on political loyalty reflect his deep-seated anxiety about controlling the military. In the power logic of the Chinese Communist Party, controlling the military equates to controlling the state. Deng Xiaoping retained the position of chairman of the Military Commission, holding supreme power for 11 years without any other formal position. Xi's large-scale purges and restructuring of the military are both a necessity for anti-corruption and a political means to consolidate personal authority.

However, the costs of this approach are also evident. A highly centralized Military Commission lacking a collective decision-making mechanism, along with a military that has experienced frequent personnel upheavals, raises significant questions about its ability to operate effectively in future high-intensity conflicts. Especially as the critical milestone of 2027 approaches, balancing political loyalty with professional capability and weighing organizational stability against the intensity of reforms will be core challenges that the PLA must face in its modernization process.

When Xi reiterated in the Great Hall of the People that "there must be no disloyal individuals to the Party within the military," he effectively articulated the true dilemma of current Chinese military construction: how to build a truly capable modern military while ensuring absolute political loyalty. The answer to this question may only be revealed after 2027.