Haiti
🇭🇹Republic of Haiti
Haiti security profile covering gang violence, police capacity, restored armed forces, UN-authorized security support, governance collapse, and assessment limits.
| Demographics | |
| Population, Total | 11.77M persons (2024) |
| Population Growth Rate | 1.15% (2024) |
| Urban Population Ratio | 55.04% (2024) |
| Working Age Population | 64.11% (2024) |
| Life Expectancy | 64.94 years (2023) |
| Defense | |
| Military Expenditure | 19.75M current US$ (2024) |
| Military Expenditure Ratio | 0.07 % of GDP (2024) |
| Military | |
| Military Branches | the Haitian Armed Forces (FAdH): Army Ministry of Justice and Public Security: Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haïti or PNH) (2025) text (2025) |
| Military Service Age | men and women 18-25 may volunteer for the FAdH (2023) years (2023) |
| Active Military Personnel | estimates vary; up to 2,000 trained military personnel (the force is planned to eventually have around 5,000 personnel); estimates for the National Police range from a low of 9,000 to a high of about 13,000 (2025) count (2025) |
| Military Equipment Overview | in recent years, Canada, Taiwan, UAE, and the US have provided some equipment to the Haitian security forces, including vehicles (2025) text (2025) |
| Conscription System | men and women 18-25 may volunteer for the FAdH (2023) text (2023) |
| Economy | |
| GDP (Nominal) | 25.22B current US$ (2024) |
| GDP (PPP) | 37.60B current international $ (2024) |
| GDP Per Capita | 2,142.62 current US$ (2024) |
| GDP Growth Rate | -4.17% (2024) |
| Inflation Rate | 26.95% (2024) |
| Foreign Reserves | 2.72B current US$ (2024) |
| Trade Balance | -3.90B current US$ (2024) |
| Industry | |
| Manufacturing Value Added | 6.62B current US$ (2024) |
| Industry GDP Ratio | 33.36 % of GDP (2024) |
| Manufacturing GDP Ratio | 26.23 % of GDP (2024) |
| Natural Resources | bauxite, copper, calcium carbonate, gold, marble, hydropower, arable land text |
| Infrastructure | |
| Air Transport Passengers | 74,542 passengers (2023) |
| Electricity Access | 51.30% (2023) |
| Logistics Performance Index | 2.1 index 1-5 (2022) |
| Total Area | 27,750 km² |
| Land Area | 27,560 km² |
| Water Area | 190 km² |
| Land Boundaries | 376 km |
| Coastline | 1,771 km |
| Irrigated Land | 800 km² (2013) |
| Merchant Marine | 4 count (2023) |
| Electricity Capacity | 472,000 kW (2023) |
| Electricity - Fossil Fuel | 81.30% (2023) |
| Electricity - Hydroelectric | 18.30% (2023) |
| Electricity - Solar | 0.40% (2023) |
| Electricity Consumption | 861 kWh (2023) |
| Other Statistics | |
| Terrain | mostly rough and mountainous text |
| Climate | tropical; semiarid where mountains in east cut off trade winds text |
| Natural Hazards | lies in the middle of the hurricane belt and subject to severe storms from June to October; occasional flooding and earthquakes; periodic droughts text |
| Government Type | semi-presidential republic text |
| Capital | Port-au-Prince text |
| Legal System | civil law system strongly influenced by Napoleonic Code text |
| Administrative Divisions | 10 text |
| Internet Country Code | .ht text |
Haiti's main security problem is not interstate defense but armed-group control, institutional collapse, and public-order restoration.
Haiti's security environment is dominated by armed gangs, political paralysis, weak justice institutions, humanitarian crisis, and limited state capacity. Port-au-Prince and surrounding routes have been especially important because control of roads, ports, neighborhoods, and public facilities shapes daily survival.
The country does not fit a normal defense template. Police, courts, customs, prisons, local governance, and international support matter more than conventional military equipment totals.
Haiti represents a security-governance crisis where armed groups can produce strategic effects without being a formal army.
The Haitian National Police remains central, while the restored armed forces have limited capacity compared with the scale of gang violence.
The Haitian National Police is the primary domestic security institution, but it has faced severe pressure from casualties, equipment shortages, corruption risk, territorial overstretch, and gang intimidation. Haiti has also restored armed forces, but their role and capacity remain limited compared with the scale of the crisis.
Security capacity cannot be measured only by headcounts. The central question is whether state institutions can hold territory, protect civilians, reopen roads, secure ports and airports, and support courts and prisons after operations end.
This makes Haiti's page useful for understanding the relationship between policing, military assistance, and state authority.
The UN Security Council authorized a multinational security support mission to assist Haitian police against armed gangs.
In 2023, the UN Security Council authorized a Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti under Resolution 2699. The mission was intended to support Haitian police efforts against gangs and improve security conditions while operating outside a traditional UN peacekeeping model.
The authorization matters because Haiti's own security institutions were not able to restore public order alone. It also highlights the political difficulty of external intervention: security support must avoid abuses, coordinate with Haitian authorities, and produce durable state capacity rather than temporary tactical gains.
The mission connects Haiti to broader patterns of international security assistance, police support missions, and urban security challenges.
Armed groups affect national security by controlling neighborhoods, routes, ports, prisons, and access to humanitarian services.
Haiti's armed groups have used violence, kidnapping, sexual violence, extortion, roadblocks, attacks on public facilities, and intimidation to shape political and economic life. Their influence over transport corridors and urban neighborhoods gives them leverage over state institutions and civilians.
This threat environment blurs the line between criminal violence, insurgent-like territorial control, and political coercion. It also makes humanitarian access and civilian protection central parts of the security picture.
A high-value profile should therefore explain how non-state armed control can become a national security problem even without conventional battle lines.
Haiti's defense problem is the collapse of territorial authority and the dependence on external support to stabilize key areas.
Haiti shows what happens when public authority fragments so badly that security becomes a coalition problem. Gangs, weak policing, and political paralysis make territorial control fragile and humanitarian access difficult.
Haiti is a state-collapsing security environment where external missions, police reform, and civilian protection are intertwined. Simple country summaries often overlook this central dynamic.
Haiti assessments should separate formal security institutions from actual territorial control and operational sustainability.
Haiti's security data can shift quickly because gangs, police operations, international deployments, and political arrangements change. Formal government announcements may not reflect actual control on the ground.
The best assessment approach is to track territorial access, protection of civilians, police capacity, external support, and whether security gains can survive after operations move on. This avoids thin descriptions that treat Haiti as only a country fact sheet.
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