Iraq

Iraq sits between Iran, Türkiye, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf, making it a core state in Middle Eastern security. Its modern defense problems are inseparable from the 2003 invasion, the collapse and rebuilding of security institutions, the ISIS/Daesh war, and continuing competition among domestic and foreign actors.

The country's strategic problem is sovereignty under pressure. Federal ministries, elite counterterrorism forces, Popular Mobilization Forces, Kurdish security structures, coalition advisers, and neighboring states all affect security outcomes.

Iraq's security environment is best understood as a complex ecosystem involving multiple state and non-state actors.

Iraq's defense and security forces include Ministry of Defense forces, counterterrorism capabilities, interior ministry elements, and other national security organizations. The Kurdistan Region also maintains Peshmerga forces with distinct political and command relationships.

Popular Mobilization Forces emerged as a major security actor during the anti-ISIS war and remain central to debates over state authority, militia integration, Iran-linked influence, and command accountability.

A high-value page should make these institutional layers visible because they determine how force is actually generated and controlled.

Iraq's strongest military experience comes from ground operations, counterterrorism, and urban warfare lessons from the ISIS/Daesh campaign. Elite units proved important in retaking major cities, while regular forces required rebuilding after earlier collapse.

Capability gaps include air defense, intelligence integration, logistics, maintenance, corruption control, militia-state relationships, and the ability to sustain national operations without heavy external support.

Modernization should therefore be judged by institutional depth and command cohesion, not just equipment totals.

NATO Mission Iraq is a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission intended to help Iraq strengthen security institutions and prevent the return of ISIS/Daesh. It sits alongside other coalition, diplomatic, and bilateral security relationships.

Iraq also faces pressure from Iran-linked networks, Turkish security operations connected to Kurdish militants, Syrian instability, Gulf politics, and domestic debates over foreign troops.

Iraq's most capable security activity has often come from counterterrorism units and coalition-supported operations against ISIS, but those efforts sit alongside powerful militia networks and political bargaining over force control.

Iraqi security policy is shaped as much by who commands what as by how many personnel exist on paper.

Iraq's security environment includes protecting oil infrastructure, border crossings, highways, and trade corridors. Those sites matter because they fund the state and because insurgents or smugglers can exploit weak control.

Territorial security and fiscal security overlap in Iraq.

Public data on Iraqi force size and readiness can be inconsistent because units may exist on paper, fall under different ministries, answer to political patrons, or depend on external support for key enablers.

Separating legal status from operational control is important. Formal incorporation of a force does not automatically mean unified command, reliable accountability, or coherent national strategy.