美军护航霍尔木兹，靠谱吗？外界质疑

【环球时报特约记者 武彦】After Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. President Trump stated on the 3rd that if necessary, the U.S. Navy would begin to escort tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz. However, outside observers believe that the U.S. Navy currently deployed in the Middle East does not have the capability to undertake this task.

According to a report on the U.S. Naval Institute website on the 3rd, despite Trump's call to protect tankers, the U.S. Navy has informed the shipping industry that there are not enough vessels to provide escort for tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Currently, about 12 vessels deployed by the U.S. Navy in the Middle East can participate in escort operations, including 9 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and 3 littoral combat ships are forward-deployed in Bahrain, a significant portion of which need to undertake combat operations against Iran.

The U.S. website "Power" reported on the 3rd that escorting passing tankers in the Strait of Hormuz also means that U.S. Navy vessels would need to change their current practice of avoiding entering the range of Iranian anti-ship firepower, significantly increasing the risk of operations. The report noted that in the late 1980s, in response to the "tanker war" during the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. Navy deployed about 30 warships to escort passing vessels and sent a large number of aircraft and special forces for support, but this operation came at a heavy cost. In 1987, before the escort mission began, the U.S. Navy's Perry-class frigate USS Stark was hit by two Exocet anti-ship missiles fired by Iraqi fighter jets while operating in the Persian Gulf; in 1988, another Perry-class frigate was severely damaged by a mine while on escort duty in the Persian Gulf.

The report stated that between 2023 and 2025, the U.S. Navy deployed a large number of vessels, including aircraft carrier strike groups, to engage in a prolonged offensive and defensive battle with the Houthi armed forces in the Red Sea, which also demonstrates the significant difficulty of such escort operations. In contrast, the Strait of Hormuz is more enclosed, with very limited maneuvering space for vessels, while Iran's anti-ship capabilities far exceed those of the Houthi forces. Open intelligence indicates that Iran possesses various types of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, suicide drones, explosive-laden suicide unmanned boats, and mines that can block the Strait of Hormuz, posing a significant threat to passing U.S. Navy vessels. In particular, Iran's anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and suicide drones can all be launched from road-mobile launchers, "some of which can even be disguised as civilian trucks, making it more difficult to detect and respond to these threats in advance." In nearshore areas, the approach of these threats will only further shorten the response time of U.S. Navy vessels.

Analysis suggests that this also means that U.S. Navy vessels risking entry into the Strait of Hormuz must possess strong air defense capabilities to have sufficient self-defense capability. However, if Iran lays mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. Navy can only rely on littoral combat ships to perform mine countermeasure tasks, and the latter has almost no air defense capability when equipped with mine countermeasure modules.