2026 PLA 71st Group Army Replaces Equipment with PLZ-05, Taiwan Strait Nearshore Firepower Chain Enters the 155mm Era

A Batch of Replacements Worthy of Separate Observation

According to a report by the South China Morning Post on September 9, the PLA 71st Group Army's heavy combined brigade has received a batch of 155mm PLZ-05 self-propelled howitzers over the past two months and has completed its first live-fire exercise. The report cites CCTV, indicating that this is not merely an equipment display but has entered the training and firepower verification stage within the troops. The 71st Group Army is part of the Eastern Theater Command, primarily focused on the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea directions.

Public reports did not specify the number of replacements nor disclose the distance, types of ammunition, and hit rates of the live-fire exercises. Therefore, interpreting this action directly as a "countdown to attacking Taiwan" is not rigorous. However, from the perspective of troop composition, the shift of the heavy combined brigade from a 122mm system to a 155mm system is indeed a noteworthy capability change.

What Firepower Options Does the PLZ-05 Add?

The PLZ-05 is a tracked 155mm self-propelled howitzer that features an armored chassis, fully enclosed turret, and automated loading system. Its core value lies not just in the larger caliber but in integrating longer range and greater projectile power with the mobility of mechanized forces into the same firepower chain. According to the Chinese military network, the conventional effective range of 155mm shells typically reaches 40 to 50 kilometers, and can be further increased under specific conditions; specifically for the PLZ-05, the actual range still depends on the type of shell, propellant, and firing conditions.

• 122mm artillery is more suitable for high mobility and sustained support, while the 155mm system can cover larger target areas and strike more fortified structures.
• The tracked chassis allows the PLZ-05 to operate alongside armored units, and automated loading helps shorten the preparation time for subsequent shots.
• What truly determines effectiveness is not a single artillery piece, but whether reconnaissance drones, counter-battery radars, communication networks, and ammunition supply can work in sync.

In simple terms, the 155mm shell itself is not a "miraculous weapon"; it is more like a heavy wrench that requires a complete supply chain to operate. Without target designation and stable supply, the range figures are merely a paper advantage.

What This Means for Taiwan Strait Operations

The most realistic impact of this equipment replacement is that the Eastern Theater Army now has stronger long-range conventional fire support options in nearshore and coastal directions. It can serve various tasks such as beach, port, assembly areas, and beachhead defense, and can exert pressure on key nodes without immediately deploying air and missile forces. For cross-sea landings, artillery cannot replace air superiority, naval control, and logistical support, but it can influence the firepower density and rhythm after landing troops come ashore.

Taiwan is also strengthening mobile artillery, precision munitions, and dispersed deployments, and the external support system has long included 155mm equipment such as the M109 series. A common trend on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is transforming artillery from "guns on the battlefield" into network nodes supported by drones, satellites, and digital command systems. The difference lies in the PLA's greater emphasis on internal system coordination and concentrated firepower within combined brigades, while Taiwan places more importance on concealment, mobility, and survivability.

Quantity and Support Are the Next Threshold

The author believes that the most important word in the report is actually "a batch," rather than the parameters of the PLZ-05. Public information does not specify how many guns a brigade has received, nor does it show ammunition reserves, maintenance cycles, and wartime replenishment capabilities. The 155mm system's shells are heavier and have higher transportation requirements, and the maintenance of automated loading systems and tracked chassis is more complex than that of older artillery. If it is only a small number of replacements, it mainly enhances the brigade's firepower as a spearhead; if it can be continuously rolled out across multiple Eastern Theater brigades, it will change the scale structure of the army's conventional firepower.

Therefore, what should be observed next is not the next promotional video, but three details: whether the replacements expand to more heavy combined brigades, whether training includes rapid firing guided by drones, and whether the production and frontline supply of 155mm ammunition can keep up. The 71st Group Army's live-fire exercise showcased the artillery, but what remains undisclosed is the quantity and support system behind it.

Source

South China Morning Post "Beijing boosts Taiwan-facing firepower with brigade-level 155mm howitzers," September 9, 2026; Chinese military network "Military Technology Special Issue: Why 155mm Shells Have Become the 'Darlings' of the Battlefield"; Chinese military network public information on 155mm artillery and training reports from the 71st Group Army.