219 drones and 24 missiles overnight — Russia's massive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as a system of air defense exhaustion

On the night of February 12, the Russian Armed Forces launched one of the largest combined strikes in recent months: 219 drones and 24 ballistic missiles targeting Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipro. This is not just another "massive strike" — it embodies a new Russian doctrine of war of attrition, where the balance of 219:24 becomes the arithmetic of strategy. When nine out of ten means of destruction are relatively cheap drones, and one out of ten is an expensive ballistic missile, we see not improvisation, but a calculated system of suppressing Ukrainian air defense through economic asymmetry.

The logic of the combined strike: from saturation to breakthrough

The ratio of 219 drones to 24 missiles (approximately 9:1) is not a coincidence, but the result of a three-year evolution of Russian tactics in striking the enemy's rear. In early 2022, Russia relied primarily on cruise missiles — expensive, highly accurate, but limited in quantity. By the end of 2024, the share of kamikaze drones like "Geran-2" (a licensed copy of the Iranian Shahed-136) had risen to 70–80% of the total number of means in massive strikes. By February 2026, this ratio reached 90%.

The tactical logic is simple but effective. The first wave consists of 150–200 drones flying at low altitudes along pre-calculated corridors. The task is not necessarily to hit targets (although some will reach their destination), but to force Ukrainian air defense units to expend short- and medium-range missiles, reveal the positions of anti-aircraft systems, and exhaust MANPADS operators. In the second wave, 20–40 minutes later, ballistic missiles follow — "Iskander-M" and outdated S-300/S-400 systems, repurposed for strikes on ground targets (according to Ukrainian intelligence, several hundred of these remain in Russia's air defense arsenal).

When Ukrainian air defense is already partially exhausted from repelling the drone swarm, a ballistic missile traveling at speeds of up to 2.5 km/s has significantly better chances of reaching its target. Such were the strikes on February 12: according to the General Staff of Ukraine, energy facilities in Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipro were hit, despite the operation of air defense.

Economic asymmetry: a war of calculators

"Geran-2" costs Russia about $20,000–50,000 (according to Western analysts, taking into account licensing fees to Iran and the production of components circumventing sanctions). A Ukrainian medium-range air defense missile (NASAMS, IRIS-T) costs between $500,000 and $1 million. One Patriot PAC-3 missile costs about $4 million. The arithmetic is simple: Russia spends $10–12 million on a wave of 200 drones, while Ukraine spends $100–200 million to intercept them. Add to this 24 ballistic missiles (each "Iskander-M" costs about $3 million, totaling $72 million), and the total cost of the Russian strike amounts to $80–85 million against Ukrainian expenditures on defense, measured in hundreds of millions.

This is a war of attrition on Western aid arsenals. On February 12, the UK announced the supply of thousands of air defense missiles and systems to Ukraine worth £500 million — but even this massive assistance will cover only a few months of defense at the current intensity of Russian strikes. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, European military aid increased by 67% in 2025 compared to 2022–2024, but American aid fell by 99% — the US was the main supplier of Patriot and NASAMS missiles.

Strikes on energy: a strategy of demoralization

The choice of targets on February 12 was not accidental. All three strikes targeted energy infrastructure facilities at a time when temperatures in Kyiv dropped to –13°C. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported that 2,600 apartment buildings were left without heating, and another 1,100 had already been without heat after previous shelling. This is classic winter campaign tactics: not to destroy the enemy's army, but to break the will of the civilian population to resist through everyday hardships.

Since October 2022, Russia has been methodically destroying Ukraine's energy system. By February 2026, Ukrainian power plants, according to Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, produce "too little electricity" for the country's needs. Each new strike is not just a military operation, but also an element of psychological pressure: Russia demonstrates that it can carry out such strikes regularly, and Ukrainian air defense is unable to fully repel them.

Limits of the strategy: the question of arsenals

How long can Russia maintain such intensity? The production of "Geran-2" at factories in Tatarstan (according to Ukrainian intelligence, two assembly lines are deployed there) is estimated at 300–500 drones per month. If Russia uses 200–250 drones per strike and conducts 2–3 massive raids per month, the balance of production and consumption roughly aligns. The problem lies with ballistic missiles. Estimates from open sources suggest that fewer than 200 "Iskander-M" missiles remain in Russian arsenals; the production of new ones is slow due to a shortage of Western microchips (according to Ukrainian intelligence, each missile contains up to 50 imported electronic components).

Russia's transition to using S-300/S-400 systems as "ground-to-ground" missiles is a sign of the exhaustion of more modern stocks. These missiles are less accurate, require mass application to hit stationary targets, and their stocks are also not infinite. If the current pace continues, by the summer of 2026, Russia may face a shortage of ballistic means — and then the "combined strike" will turn into a purely drone raid, simplifying the task for Ukrainian air defense.

Conclusion: the war of calculators will continue

219 drones and 24 missiles are not just numbers from another shelling, but a formula for war of attrition in its purest form. Russia has found a way to impose an economically disadvantageous game on Ukraine, where every Russian dollar spent on a drone requires thirty dollars from the opponent to intercept. This strategy will work as long as the West is willing to finance the depletion of Ukrainian arsenals — or until Russia runs out of ballistic missiles, without which the drone swarm loses its striking power. February 2026 shows that we are still far from both of these limits.