34 Miners and Traders Killed on the Gao-Ansongo Road: When Military Escorts Turn Civilian Convoys into Targets in Mali

On February 7, near the village of Kobe, between Gao and Ansongo, a convoy of 19 civilian vehicles carrying more than 100 people — mostly Nigerien miners and Malian traders — came under fire from Islamist fighters. The toll: at least 34 dead and 34 injured. What was supposed to be a protective measure turned into a deadly trap.

An Escort that Attracts Fire

Since late 2024, the military authorities in Gao have imposed armed escorts for all civilian movements on this 90-kilometer road. Five military pick-ups and several motorcycles carrying Malian soldiers and militia flanked the convoy that day. Two vehicles at the front, three at the back. The convoy stretched nearly a kilometer long.

"All of a sudden, we heard gunfire, intense shooting," recounts a 51-year-old man who was injured while jumping from a bus. "I felt something in my right thigh, then I saw blood. I lay down and played dead until the soldiers rescued me."

Fighters from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) — an organization suspected of the attack although no official claim has been made — opened fire shouting "Allah Akbar." The Malian army retaliated, claiming to have killed 19 "terrorists" and recovered weapons and equipment. But the price paid by civilians is heavy: 13 Malians (including 5 women) and 21 foreigners, mostly Nigeriens.

The Security Paradox

From experience, I can assert that a military escort transforms a civilian target into a military target in the eyes of the adversary. On the ground, the distinction fades. "The soldiers simply attract the attention of armed groups," explains a 45-year-old trader from Ansongo. "Military escorts are a danger to us, because if the army is attacked, civilians find themselves caught in crossfire."

This observation is not new for those who have operated in the area. Malian security forces, supported since December 2021 by the Wagner Group (renamed Africa Corps), are conducting an aggressive counter-insurgency campaign. A week before the attack in Kobe, Malian soldiers and Wagner fighters had struck EIGS positions along this same road, killing several insurgents and recovering money and equipment.

The retaliation was swift.

A Road Under Jihadist Control for Three Years

Witnesses and residents confirm that the EIGS has de facto controlled the Gao-Ansongo axis for at least three years. The organization regularly imposes illegal "tolls" on travelers — a classic sign of territorial control. In this context, a military escort does not protect: it designates.

The victims were largely artisanal Nigerien miners traveling to or from gold extraction sites in northern Mali. This informal economic activity, crucial for thousands of Sahelian families, is becoming increasingly perilous. Every trip is now a survival calculation.

The Void Left by MINUSMA

The attack in Kobe is part of a widespread security deterioration since the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in December 2023, at the request of the Malian authorities. More than 378,000 people have been displaced by violence since 2012. Human Rights Watch has documented massive abuses committed by all belligerents — Islamist groups, Malian armed forces, ethnic militias, and Wagner fighters.

Without international observers on the ground, the protection of civilians now relies solely on the conflict actors themselves. However, international humanitarian law requires all parties to take precautions to minimize civilian casualties. The EIGS, by opening fire on a convoy clearly composed of civilians, likely violated the laws of war. But did the Malian forces take all possible precautions to protect those they were escorting?

Insufficiently Explored Alternatives

Human Rights Watch suggests that police escorts — which do not constitute legitimate military targets — could offer protection without turning convoys into combat zones. But this solution assumes a clear distinction between civilian and military security forces, a nuance that fades in a conflict where local militias and the regular army operate side by side.

On the ground, the reality is more brutal: as long as the EIGS controls this road, any movement will remain dangerous. A weekly patrol is not enough to secure 90 kilometers. A permanent presence is needed — or accepting that certain areas fall outside state control.

The Endless Militarization

Mali currently has at least two active jihadist groups — the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM, linked to Al-Qaeda) and the EIGS. Since 2012, successive military strategies have not reversed the trend. The arrival of Wagner in 2021, far from stabilizing the situation, has exacerbated intercommunal tensions and fueled jihadist recruitment through brutal counter-insurgency operations.

The attack in Kobe is not an isolated incident. It reveals the failure of a purely military approach and the urgent need to rethink civilian protection in a conflict where lines are blurred. Every military escort raises the same question: are we really protecting civilians, or are we using them as shields in a no-win war?

As long as this question remains unanswered, the roads of northern Mali will continue to resemble death corridors for those who have no choice but to use them to survive.