69 drone attacks in two years — JNIM transforms asymmetric warfare in the Sahel

Since the beginning of 2023, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Sahelian branch of al-Qaeda, has conducted 69 drone attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo. A figure that redefines the tactical capabilities of jihadist groups in the region.

This is not an isolated phenomenon. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has carried out 10 similar attacks since 2024 in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The Islamic State's Wilayat Sahel has conducted about 10 more, including the most recent at Niamey airport at the end of January.

A tactical revolution from Ukraine

These drones are not sophisticated military systems. They are primarily modified commercial drones — often DJI quadcopters or similar — equipped to drop improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Militants also use FPV (first-person view) drones, a technology massively popularized by combat videos from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Most strikes occur at night. Government forces frequently confuse them with artillery or mortar fire, meaning that the actual number of attacks is likely higher than the 69 recorded.

Operational advantages

The use of drones gives jihadists three decisive advantages:

• Reduced attack costs — A commercial drone costs between $500 and $2,000. A traditional ambush risks the lives of several fighters and requires ammunition, vehicles, and complex coordination.
• Low-risk intelligence — Drones allow for monitoring military convoy movements, identifying weak points in bases, filming routes without exposing scouts.
• Striking previously inaccessible targets — Isolated outposts, ground patrols, and ammunition depots can now be targeted without direct engagement.

The result: fewer losses among insurgents, increased strike efficiency. This is exactly what Ukrainian forces have demonstrated against Russian positions since 2022.

Transnational diffusion

The geography of the attacks reveals regional coordination. JNIM operates in the Mali-Burkina Faso triangle, with an incursion into Togo (a first). ISWAP is expanding its use of drones from the Lake Chad basin into Niger and Cameroon. The Wilayat Sahel has demonstrated its ability to strike the Nigerien capital itself.

This tactical convergence is not coincidental. Sahelian jihadist groups share instruction manuals, training videos, and feedback via encrypted channels. Some fighters have likely received direct training from instructors with ties to the Syrian or Libyan conflict, where homemade drones have been used since 2015.

Structural flaws in government forces

The Sahel armies lack appropriate countermeasures. Electronic warfare (EW) remains in its infancy. Air defense systems, when they exist, are designed to intercept aircraft, not quadcopters flying at 50 meters altitude.

Identifying and destroying assembly and launch sites would require quality human intelligence (HUMINT), mobile units capable of rapid intervention, and continuous aerial surveillance — three capabilities that Sahelian forces struggle to maintain in the face of jihadist expansion.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have received Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and Chinese Wing Loong drones. But these aircraft are optimized for strike missions, not for detecting enemy micro-drones at low altitude. This is a fundamental capability gap.

What comes next

If the countries in the region do not invest heavily in electronic warfare, anti-drone defense, and close-range intelligence, the next attacks will be more destructive.

The jihadists will test heavier explosive payloads, coordinated swarm tactics, and likely target critical infrastructure — power plants, dams, secondary airports. The Ukrainian model has already demonstrated that a homemade drone can paralyze a military base for hours.

From experience, I know that a typical Sahelian outpost — surrounded by sandbags, with a perimeter of 200 meters — is an ideal target for a drone dropping an IED inside the camp. No protective netting, no active jammer, no nighttime anti-drone procedures.

Asymmetric warfare in the Sahel has just crossed a technological threshold. The 69 attacks by JNIM are just the beginning.