A Century of Military Founding Struggles: Interpreting the PLA Modernization Roadmap During the "15th Five-Year Plan" Period

On March 18, 2026, Jiang Bin, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, systematically elaborated on the spirit of President Xi Jinping's important speech at the plenary meeting of the delegation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police Force during the Fourth Session of the 14th National People's Congress at a regular press conference. This speech occurred at the beginning of the "14th Five-Year Plan," outlining a clear roadmap for the modernization of national defense and the military for the next five years and even longer, with a core focus on a historic goal—achieving the centenary goal of building the military on schedule.

In his speech on March 7, President Xi focused on the construction of a strong nation and the great rejuvenation of the nation, profoundly expounding on the significant meaning of "fully leveraging the unique advantages of political military building, uniting efforts to promote the steady and far-reaching modernization of national defense and the military." This statement elevates political military building to an unprecedented strategic height, emphasizing that high-quality political military building ensures high-quality modernization. This is closely related to the unique political attributes and historical traditions of the Chinese military—the PLA has been a people's army under the absolute leadership of the Party since its inception, and political military building is the fundamental guarantee.

According to a notice from the General Office of the Central Military Commission, the entire military will incorporate the study and implementation of President Xi's speech into four levels: theoretical study by party committees at the regiment level and above, theoretical training for cadres, ideological and political education for troops, and political theory teaching in military academies. This comprehensive and multi-level learning deployment ensures that strategic intentions can be conveyed from the highest command to grassroots units, forming a unified action consciousness from top to bottom.

The four major work focuses of national defense and military modernization during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period are worth in-depth analysis. First, strengthen political leadership, continuously deepen political training, rectify conduct, and combat corruption, firmly safeguarding the political character of the people's army. In recent years, the systematic political training conducted by the PLA has eliminated the negative influence of corrupt individuals such as Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Fang Fenghui, and Zhang Yang, laying a solid political foundation for the strong military cause in the new era. Second, focus on preparing for war, ensure the implementation of the military construction "14th Five-Year Plan," and accelerate the integration of system combat capabilities. This means the PLA will continue to advance the construction of a joint combat system and strengthen cross-service coordination capabilities. Third, adhere to practical work, establish and practice a correct view of political achievements, and enhance the overall quality and effectiveness of military construction and development. This is a clear requirement aimed at addressing the issues of formalism and bureaucratism present in some units and among certain leaders. Fourth, continue strict management and governance, tighten and solidify the political responsibility of managing the Party, and ensure that comprehensive strict requirements are fully implemented.

From the relevant content in the government work report, further insights can be gained into the specific path of the PLA's modernization. The report clearly states: "Solidly promote military training and preparation for war, accelerate the construction of advanced combat capabilities, and improve the strategic capacity to defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests." Here, "advanced combat capabilities" refer to the future battlefield dominant forces represented by new types of combat power such as artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and hypersonic weapons. The report also emphasizes "implementing major projects for national defense development and advancing military theory modernization," indicating that the PLA is not only pursuing modernization at the equipment level but also seeking breakthroughs in theoretical innovation, operational concepts, and strategic tactics.

It is noteworthy that the report proposes "jointly promoting cross-military and civilian reforms, optimizing the national defense science and technology industry system and layout, and consolidating and enhancing the integrated national strategic system and capabilities." This means that the strategy of military-civilian integration will be further deepened, the national defense science and technology industry system will become more efficient, and national strategic capabilities will achieve deep integration of military and civilian resources. Specifically, this includes promoting the two-way transformation of cutting-edge technologies, strengthening national defense mobilization capabilities, and deepening national defense education for all citizens across multiple dimensions.

From a timeline perspective, 2027 marks the centenary of the military, with less than two years remaining. The five-year period of the "14th Five-Year Plan" (2026-2030) spans this historical milestone, meaning the next two years are a sprint to achieve the centenary goal of building the military. According to previously disclosed goals, by the centenary of the military, it is expected to have basically achieved mechanization, made significant progress in informationization, and greatly enhanced strategic capabilities. From the current progress, the PLA's mechanization has been basically completed, informationization is transitioning to intelligence, and strategic capabilities, especially in offshore operations, strategic delivery, and joint combat capabilities, have significantly increased.

Regarding defense spending, Jiang Bin provided a strong response to criticisms from countries like Japan. He pointed out that China's defense spending has long accounted for less than 1.5% of GDP, far lower than that of military powers like the United States, and also below the world average and the general military expenditure of NATO countries, which exceeds 2% of GDP. The growth of China's defense spending budget for 2026 reflects characteristics of "reasonable, moderate, and restrained," entirely necessary for safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests. In contrast, Japan's defense budget has increased for 14 consecutive years, with a growth rate exceeding 60% over the past five years, and defense spending as a percentage of GDP reaching 2%, with the per capita defense expenditure of its citizens being more than three times that of China. This comparison clearly reveals who is truly driving the regional arms race.

From a strategic perspective, the external environment facing the PLA's modernization is becoming increasingly complex. The United States continues to advance its "Indo-Pacific Strategy," strengthening military cooperation with allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, with multilateral security frameworks like AUKUS and the QUAD mechanism clearly targeting China. Traditional security challenges such as the Taiwan Strait situation, South China Sea disputes, and the China-India border issue remain severe. In this context, the PLA must accelerate the enhancement of strategic deterrence and combat capabilities to ensure it can defend national core interests under any circumstances.

Political military building runs through the entire article as a core thread, which is not only a summary of historical experience but also a strategic choice for the future. In an international environment where great power competition intensifies and ideological struggles are sharp, maintaining the political character of the people's army is crucial. President Xi's emphasis on "fully leveraging the unique advantages of political military building" essentially positions political military building as a unique competitive advantage on the path to strengthening the military with Chinese characteristics, countering the advantages of Western armies in terms of technological equipment and combat experience.

The arrangements for military open house activities also reflect the confidence in the PLA's modernization. In 2026, the entire military will organize over 2,100 open house activities across more than 700 units, including heroic army companies, main battle ships of the navy, the "Zhuhai Airshow" of the air force, and missile bases of the Rocket Force. This unprecedented level of openness not only showcases the achievements of the people's army's construction but also serves as an important measure to enhance national defense awareness among the public and strengthen military-civilian relations.

It is thought-provoking to note Jiang Bin's strong statements regarding the South China Sea issue. In response to the Philippine Coast Guard's actions near Huangyan Island, which involved bringing journalists to film and hype a "victim" narrative, he clearly stated that this was a "self-scripted farce" and warned the Philippine side: "No matter how you edit the footage or fabricate lies, it will not change the sovereignty of Huangyan Island and other reefs in the South China Sea, nor will it shake China's firm determination to safeguard its rights according to the law." This unequivocal statement reflects the PLA's unwavering stance on maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

On the Taiwan issue, Jiang Bin severely criticized the cold-blooded actions of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities regarding the evacuation of citizens from the Middle East. "War is ruthless, but the motherland is loving. The compatriots in Taiwan are our family with blood ties"—this emotional expression sharply contrasts with the condemnation of the DPP authorities' relentless pursuit of independence through military means, devoid of conscience and humanity, conveying the sincerity of peaceful reunification under the "one country, two systems" framework and an uncompromising attitude towards "Taiwan independence" separatist forces.

In summary, the modernization of the PLA during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period will exhibit several distinct characteristics: first, political military building will lead the overall situation, ensuring the Party's absolute leadership over the military; second, focus on preparing for war and combat, enhancing the level of practical training and system combat capabilities; third, promote comprehensive innovation in military theory, weaponry, organizational forms, military personnel, and military management; fourth, strengthen military-civilian integration and optimize the national defense science and technology industry system; fifth, adhere to comprehensive strict governance of the Party and the military, continuously purifying the political ecology.

The centenary of the military in 2027 is an important historical milestone, but it is by no means the endpoint. According to the strategic arrangements in the report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party, the centenary goal of building the military should be achieved by 2027, and by 2035, national defense and military modernization should be basically realized, with the people's army fully built into a world-class military by the middle of this century. The "14th Five-Year Plan" period serves as a bridge, aiming to complete the final sprint for the centenary of the military while laying a solid foundation for the 2035 goals.

In the complex and changing international security environment, the challenges facing the PLA's modernization are all-encompassing: technologically, it must catch up with and even surpass Western advanced levels; strategically, it must respond to multi-directional and multi-domain security threats; institutionally, it must complete deep reforms; and in terms of style, it must continue to purify the political ecology. But as Jiang Bin stated: "All military officers and soldiers are confident and determined to achieve the centenary goal of building the military on schedule and to promote the high-quality modernization of national defense and the military." This confidence stems from the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China, the advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the fine traditions of the people's army, and the sense of mission shared by all officers and soldiers.

History and reality have proven that a strong people's army is a strong guarantee of national security and a strategic support for national rejuvenation. On the new journey of building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation, the PLA will continue to play a strategic supporting role, providing a strong guarantee for achieving the second centenary goal.