AFC/M23 expands its grip in the DRC — 35% of territory gained despite Washington and Doha

In Goma and Bukavu, on July 1, a new report from the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided figures on what the residents of North Kivu and South Kivu are already witnessing on the ground. The Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement, AFC/M23, has not only maintained its position despite the processes in Washington and Doha. According to UN experts cited by Actualite.cd, the area of territories occupied by the group has increased by more than 35% since the launch of the Doha process in March 2025.

This is the military point of the dossier. The statements talk about mediation, withdrawal, guarantees. On the ground, AFC/M23 administers, recruits, indoctrinates, and advances. The real map does not follow the diplomatic map.

A rebellion that speaks like a proto-state

The report submitted to the Security Council, as part of the mandate extended by resolution 2825 of 2026, describes an organization that retains a maximalist objective: to overthrow the government of Kinshasa. But it also indicates a fallback option, more dangerous in the medium term because it seems negotiable: the establishment of an autonomous region in eastern DRC.

Experts report that the leaders of AFC/M23 are discussing the creation of a "Federal Republic of Congo" in the areas they control. They would no longer only demand the integration of their fighters into the Armed Forces of the DRC, the FARDC. They want to build and lead the new armed forces of this federal entity. For a former officer, this is a change in nature. We are no longer talking about a rebellion seeking amnesty, but about a politico-military apparatus preparing a chain of command, a tax territory, and external legitimacy.

The wording must be handled with caution. It comes from a report by experts and local sources, not from a complete public statement by the AFC/M23 staff. But the elements align with a known practice in eastern Congo: occupy first, administer next, negotiate finally by presenting the de facto administration as an irreversible fact.

The figure of 10,000 Rwandan soldiers changes the scale

The report from Actualite.cd on July 1, citing the same set of UN works, also mentions support from over 10,000 soldiers of the Rwandan army to AFC/M23, with no signs of significant withdrawal. This figure, if confirmed in all its modalities, exceeds the logic of simple clandestine support. Ten thousand men, even distributed among combat, intelligence, artillery, logistics, and command elements, constitute an operational architecture.

In this region, geography imposes its laws. Between Goma, Rutshuru, Masisi, Walikale, Bukavu, and the routes to Beni or Kisangani, holding the roads is sometimes worth more than holding the cities. A force that controls the crossroads, bridges, and ridges can cut the Congolese state off from its own provinces without needing to plant a flag everywhere. This is what Kinshasa has struggled to counter for months.

The UN had already demanded, through resolution 2773 of 2025, the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the end of Kigali's support for AFC/M23. The current observation is therefore politically brutal: the international injunction has not reversed the balance of power. It has, at best, slowed it down in the chancelleries while the military dynamic continued on the hills.

Washington and Doha produce time, not deterrence

The Washington process and the Doha cycles were supposed to create a framework for de-escalation. They mainly created a diplomatic clock. The problem is that AFC/M23 and Kigali, according to Kinshasa and UN experts, have used this clock differently: not as a deadline for withdrawal, but as a space to consolidate positions.

There is a classic lesson here from fragmented theaters. A ceasefire or mediation without a robust verification mechanism becomes a maneuvering tool. Units reposition themselves. Civil networks are tested. Taxes appear. Local leaders understand who has the final word at the checkpoint. From experience, it is at this level that sovereignty changes hands, even before a political agreement acknowledges it.

The report also indicates that AFC/M23 seeks official recognition through negotiation. This detail is central. An organization that demands recognition is not content with winning a battle. It wants to transform territorial conquest into political status. This is exactly the trap for Kinshasa: refusing to negotiate may prolong the war, but negotiating under pressure can legitimize the order imposed by arms.

The Kabila factor complicates Kinshasa's narrative

The second part of the report, published by Actualite.cd on July 1, mentions an imminent reshuffle of AFC/M23, a possible name change, and a leading role that could be envisioned for former president Joseph Kabila. The former head of state and his associates reject these accusations, and the issue remains politically explosive. But his appearance in the UN reading alters the narrative terrain.

So far, Kinshasa has gained diplomatic ground by presenting the conflict as an external aggression supported by Rwanda. If AFC/M23 reconstitutes itself around known Congolese figures, Kigali may attempt to sell the idea of a "Congolese problem" as primarily internal. This would not erase the accusations of Rwandan support. But it would blur Kinshasa's diplomatic effort at a time when President Félix Tshisekedi is criticized for a possible constitutional revision and an opening towards a third term.

ISS Africa highlighted on June 30 that this constitutional controversy risks undermining Kinshasa's democratic credibility and strengthening the M23's demands for autonomy. This is a harsh but fair analysis on one point: a state fighting a rebellion supported from the outside cannot afford to lose the battle for legitimacy on the inside.

What the FARDC should fear now

The immediate threat is not just a new spectacular offensive on Goma or Bukavu. It is more diffuse. The report mentions expansion objectives towards Walikale, Kisangani, Kalemie, and Beni. All these names do not represent the same type of objective, but they outline a logic: to connect the areas under influence, threaten economic axes, and give AFC/M23 enough depth to survive diplomatic pressure.

For the FARDC, the question is not whether AFC/M23 can hold every square kilometer occupied. The question is whether Kinshasa can prevent the movement from transforming its gains into sustainable administration. A frontline can shift. A system of taxes, local police, recruitment, and parallel courts takes root more slowly, but it is harder to uproot.

The next alert to watch for will therefore be less a summit communiqué than a discreet change on the roads: more barriers, new local appointments, written orders in the name of a renamed rebel authority, and increased pressure towards Walikale or Beni. If these signs multiply, Washington and Doha will not have failed because they did not speak loudly enough. They will have failed because they did not prevent AFC/M23 from governing while peace was being discussed.