Africa Facing the Terrorism Paradox: Decline in Attacks but Strategic Anchoring of Jihadist Groups in the Sahel

The annual report of the Global Terrorism Index 2026, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, reveals an apparently contradictory finding: the year 2025 recorded the largest year-on-year decline in terrorism globally, with a 28% decrease in deaths and a 22% decrease in attacks. A significant part of this decline is attributable to sub-Saharan Africa, where countries like Burkina Faso saw their death toll decrease by about 45%. However, behind these encouraging figures lies a more worrying reality, that of a profound strategic transformation of armed groups that, far from weakening, are becoming entrenched in the political and social landscape of the Sahel.

Africa remains the global epicenter of terrorism. In 2025, six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism were located on the African continent, and all twenty of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the year were carried out on African soil. Four of these, including the three deadliest, struck Burkina Faso. This geographical concentration of extreme violence illustrates the persistence of a threat that, although manifesting differently, remains devastating.

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, armed Islamist groups killed nearly 24,000 people across the continent in 2025, an increase of 24% compared to the previous year. They also generated 8,375 violent events, an unprecedented figure. Three theaters of operations account for 98% of all deaths related to armed Islamist groups in Africa: the Sahel, Somalia, and the Lake Chad basin. The Sahel alone represents 41% of the total death toll, a position it has held for five consecutive years.

JNIM, the Sahelian branch of Al-Qaeda, perfectly illustrates this tactical evolution. The group no longer merely conducts hit-and-run attacks against security forces. It now exerts significant territorial control over central Mali and a large part of the rural areas of Burkina Faso. According to data from the Global Terrorism Index, the Burkinabè army effectively controls only about 30% of the national territory. JNIM killed 1,274 people in 2025 across four countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, with more than three-quarters of its victims being police or military personnel, reflecting a deliberate strategy of decapitating state security apparatuses.

Sahelian researcher Alidou Werem summarizes the situation with clarity: what we are observing is not a reduction in jihadist capacity, but a transition from hit-and-run attacks to systems of control. The groups are no longer just violent actors; they are becoming rooted local powers. This analysis is corroborated by the blockade imposed by JNIM on certain parts of southwestern Mali, where the group has targeted fuel trucks to prevent fuel from reaching Bamako, thereby weakening the ruling military power without engaging in direct confrontation.

At the same time, rivalries among jihadist groups are intensifying and spreading beyond traditional borders. On April 2, 2026, fighting broke out in the Tillabéri region of Niger between JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahara (ISSP). According to a statement from ISSP, the group killed 35 JNIM fighters and seized weapons and motorcycles in retaliation for a prior JNIM attack on a village in the region. This intra-jihadist escalation in Tillabéri reflects an increasing competence for resource control and local recruitment.

In Nigeria, the situation is also alarmingly deteriorating. On April 13, 2026, Boko Haram militants on motorcycles stormed a Nigerian army base near Monguno in Borno State, killing a base commander colonel and six other soldiers. This incident brings the number of senior officers lost by the Nigerian army to seven in 75 days. ISWAP conducted coordinated attacks in several neighborhoods of Maiduguri on the same day. ACLED data reveals that 68 people were killed in Maiduguri over the past four months, compared to no casualties in the previous four months. Five suicide attacks have already been recorded in 2026, while the annual average had been only five since 2020.

The report from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies highlights a critical point: the heavy military responses from Sahelian security forces and Russian paramilitary elements have actively fueled jihadist recruitment. The current counterinsurgency approach generates more fighters than it eliminates. This finding is all the more concerning as the military juntas in power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all adopted a rigid security posture, breaking with traditional Western partners and relying on private actors like the Afrika Corps group.

The cross-border dimension of the conflict remains a structural challenge. JNIM exploits the porous borders of the W-Arly-Pendjari park complex to establish sanctuaries and move freely between Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger. This protected area has become a strategic corridor for armed groups, illustrating the inability of regional security architectures to keep pace with the adaptive strategies of terrorist organizations.

In total, the Sahelian paradox is as follows: quantitative indicators of terrorist violence may decrease in certain areas, while the strategic power, territorial control, and social influence of armed groups continue to grow. As long as security responses take precedence over political and developmental approaches, the Sahel risks seeing the gap widen between the statistical perception of improvement and the reality of a threat that is becoming increasingly entrenched in the very fabric of societies.