Barikatan 2026 and Japan's First Post-War Combat Participation: A New Turning Point in Northeast Asian Maritime Security

On May 6, 2026, from the coast of Ilocos Norte in northern Luzon, Philippines, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile (SSM-1) was fired in a live-fire exercise towards the South China Sea. This marks a historic moment as it is the first time since World War II that Japan has dispatched combat troops to the Philippines to participate in live-fire training. This exercise, conducted within the framework of the U.S.-Philippines-led multinational joint training "Balikatan 2026," symbolically indicates that Japan's defense policy is undergoing its most significant transformation since the post-war period.

Balikatan 2026 was held from April 20 to May 8, with over 17,000 troops from seven countries— the United States, the Philippines, Japan, Canada, France, Australia, and the United Kingdom— participating, making it the largest scale ever. Japan deployed 1,400 Self-Defense Force personnel, making it the third largest contingent after the U.S. and the Philippines. This included combat units comprising about 60 members from the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), two transport ships, one escort ship, anti-ship missile systems, and even aircraft and missile defense systems, demonstrating a projection of genuine combat capabilities beyond mere rear support or search and rescue training.

Notably, a live-fire coastal defense training was conducted on May 4 at the La Paz sand dunes near Laoag. The 25th Infantry Division operated a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and joint defense against maritime attacks was simulated by the forces of the U.S., Philippines, Japan, and Canada. HIMARS can be equipped with Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) developed by Lockheed Martin, which have demonstrated the capability to strike maritime moving targets at ranges exceeding 200 miles. This signifies an enhancement of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the South China Sea, serving as a direct deterrent to China's maritime expansion.

Simultaneously, the exercise prominently featured the use of unmanned systems. Drones patrolled offshore and conducted reconnaissance from above while the troops trained to respond to simulated invading forces. Major General James Bartholomew, commander of the 25th Infantry Division, stated, "All countries are considering more unmanned systems," emphasizing the importance of autonomous weapons in future battlefields. However, some technical challenges were also revealed, such as some shots at aerial targets with Stinger missiles missing their mark.

Alongside these military exercises, there were groundbreaking diplomatic developments. On May 5, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi met with Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro in Manila and officially decided to enter discussions for the export of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's Abukuma-class escort ships. The Abukuma-class has been in service for over 30 years, and the Ministry of Defense plans to decommission all six ships sequentially. The Philippines has long expressed interest in acquiring these vessels, and discussions have been ongoing behind the scenes.

This defense equipment export follows the revision of the three principles of defense equipment transfer and their operational guidelines implemented by the Sanae Takaichi administration in April 2026. The previous five categories of "rescue, transport, surveillance, monitoring, and mine sweeping" have been abolished, and the export of weapons with lethal capabilities has been fully liberalized. If the export of the Abukuma-class escort ships is realized, it is likely to be the first case under the new system. Both countries will establish a working group that includes defense authorities' policy, operations, and equipment sectors to accelerate discussions toward comprehensive equipment cooperation, including education, training, and maintenance support. The Philippines hopes for a transfer at no cost or at a low price, which would require a revision of Article 116-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law in the regular Diet session of 2027.

The backdrop to Japan's proactive defense posture is the rapidly increasing defense budget. Defense Minister Koizumi revealed in a press conference on April 17, 2026, that the defense-related budget for fiscal year 2026 reached 1.9% of GDP. The total amounts to approximately 10.6 trillion yen, including about 9 trillion yen for the Ministry of Defense, along with approximately 1.6 trillion yen for security-related costs such as public infrastructure development and maritime safety. In fiscal year 2025, the combined initial and supplementary budgets are expected to achieve 2% of GDP, ahead of the government's target for fiscal year 2027. Furthermore, considering that the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued in January 2026 calls for allied nations to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, Japan's defense budget is likely to expand further.

China's response, unsurprisingly, has been strong. The Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned the Takaichi administration as "new militarism," and a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Manila posted on Facebook on May 3, stating, "What this region needs is peace and stability, not block politics. It is rare for security to be entrusted to external forces, and it usually backfires." Militarily, the People's Liberation Army of China has deployed over 100 naval and maritime security vessels in the East China Sea, conducting the largest maritime power projection in East Asia's history. Additionally, the deployment of the aircraft carrier Liaoning to the south, enhancing its presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, should be viewed as a deliberate signal timed with Balikatan 2026.

Dr. Naoko Aoki, an East Asia security expert at the RAND Corporation, analyzes Japan's involvement in Balikatan, stating, "For China, this is proof of stronger cooperation between Japan and its defense partners, and it demonstrates Japan's improved combat readiness." Dr. John Hemmings, director of the Henry Jackson Society's Center for National Security, points out that this serves as a clear deterrent signal to Beijing not to attempt to seize Taiwan while the U.S. is preoccupied in the Middle East. These perspectives clearly indicate that Balikatan 2026 is not merely a military exercise but a strategic message redefining the geopolitical balance in the Indo-Pacific region.

Historically, this represents a remarkable change from the era when Japan was limited to observational participation or search and rescue and rear support in the Philippines. With memories of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in the 1940s still lingering, the deployment of Japanese combat troops to the country symbolizes a break from the past and a new role for Japan in regional security. Considering Prime Minister Takaichi's mention in November 2025 of the possibility of deploying the Self-Defense Forces if China attempts to seize Taiwan by force, it is evident that Japan's defense policy is fundamentally shifting from a posture of exclusive defense to proactive deterrence.

The greatest lesson left by Balikatan 2026 is that the era of Northeast Asia's maritime security can no longer be maintained by one or two bilateral alliances alone. Regular maritime joint activities among the four countries of Japan, the U.S., Australia, and the Philippines will become a permanent framework in the South China Sea, and the lifting of restrictions on Japan's defense equipment exports will accelerate the modernization of the Philippine Navy. Strengthening deterrence along the first island chain is not only a preparation for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait but also an essential investment to maintain the international order of a free and open Indo-Pacific. After 80 years post-war, Japan is finally accelerating its transition from an "economic power" to a "defense power."