"China's Online Commentary: Japan's Low-End Version of the 'Indo-Pacific Strategy': Military Ambitions Unsupported by Capability"

China Net commentator Le Shui

From August 17 to 21, Japanese Defense Minister Kōzuki Shinjirō visited Australia and India in succession. In Australia, Japan aimed to confirm the Australian side's plan to procure upgraded "Mogami" class frigates and advance the topic of Japan's Self-Defense Forces conducting test launches of hypersonic missiles on Australian territory; in India, the focus was on promoting the "Unicorn" stealth communication system, attempting to integrate India into its defense technology network.

Kōzuki Shinjirō's visit clearly positioned him as a spokesperson for the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," attempting to incorporate Australia and India into Japan's so-called "Indo-Pacific encirclement," with its strategic intent against China being evident.

Recently, Japan has been frequently engaging with Australia and India. In April of this year, the Japanese government cabinet specifically amended the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment" to facilitate arms exports to Australia, clearing institutional obstacles for exporting large main battle equipment; in July, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobuo personally visited India, vigorously promoting the so-called "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept, attempting to deeply bind India into Japan's geopolitical strategic framework.

However, it is intriguing that almost simultaneously with Japan's vigorous promotion of the "Indo-Pacific" layout, the concept of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is gradually fading from official U.S. statements. In the National Security Strategy released last December, the White House clearly stated that it would shift its strategic focus back to the Western Hemisphere; in June of this year, the U.S. Department of Defense officially announced the renaming of the U.S. military's "Indo-Pacific Command" back to its original name, "Pacific Command." The contrasting movements of the U.S. and Japan regarding the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" reveal that Japan's real motive in courting Australia and India is to exploit the "power vacuum" left by the U.S. strategic shift to realize its military expansion ambitions.

Since the end of World War II, Japan, as a defeated nation, has long been constrained by its pacifist constitution and the post-war international order, facing significant restrictions in developing long-range and offensive weapons. However, with Trump returning to the White House and the U.S. strategic focus shifting to the Western Hemisphere, Washington's restrictions on Japan's development of defense capabilities have noticeably loosened. This has been seen by Japanese right-wing forces as a rare opportunity to promote the "normalization" of the nation. Therefore, even under domestic pressure from worsening finances and soaring prices, as well as widespread international skepticism about Japan's military expansion, the Kishi Nobuo cabinet is determined to race down the path of military expansion.

However, the fundamental reason for the U.S. fading from the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" lies in its relative decline in power and the limited nature of its strategic resources. Due to Japan's long-term reliance on U.S. security protection after World War II, its military and economic strength cannot be compared to that of the U.S. Therefore, Japan's ambition to act as a spokesperson for the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is clearly overestimating its capabilities.

Firstly, Japan's military-industrial capacity is insufficient to meet the demand for foreign military sales orders. Although Japan and Australia have signed a procurement plan for 11 "Mogami" class frigates, due to Japan's limited shipbuilding capacity, only the first three will be produced domestically, with the first ship not expected to be delivered to Australia until 2029, and the third ship scheduled for 2034. The remaining eight ships will need to be manufactured by Australian shipyards, with delivery times being even more uncertain.

Secondly, the core components of Japan's "Mogami" class frigates and hypersonic missiles heavily rely on China's rare earth supplies. Since China imposed export controls on dual-use items to Japan in January of this year, exports of heavy rare earths needed for military applications, such as dysprosium and terbium, have nearly been reduced to zero. Given the severe reality of rare earth shortages, whether Japan can ensure the timely construction and delivery of the "Mogami" class frigates and successfully advance the research and development of hypersonic missiles remains a significant question mark.

Finally, Japan's sale of the "Unicorn" stealth communication system to India aims to achieve maritime data collaboration and intelligence sharing with India under the "Indo-Pacific framework." However, India, as a traditional non-aligned country, has always adhered to an independent foreign policy and will not easily be tied to Japan's chariot. Moreover, in the context of the recent warming of China-India relations, India is even less likely to blindly follow Japan's "encirclement of China" approach.

Japan attempts to leverage the historical opportunity of the U.S. gradually fading from the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" to court Australia and India in building a low-tier version of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy." However, given Japan's own military-industrial capacity, resource endowments, and strategic influence, this so-called "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is at best a makeshift operation—ship deliveries are far off, rare earth supplies are constrained, and the parties being courted have their own agendas. Japan's actions expose both its ambitions for military expansion and its embarrassing limitations. A defeated nation lacking an independent military-industrial supply chain attempting to dominate regional security order is destined to be a one-sided performance.