Colby's NATO Review by November 6 Makes Europe's Defense an American Test

About 80,000 U.S. soldiers remain stationed in Europe. At the same time, Elbridge Colby is expected to present Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with at least four options by November 6 on how the American presence on the continent can be reorganized or reduced. This is precisely where the strategic shift of the past week lies. Washington is no longer discussing Europe's security primarily as an alliance commitment, but as a variable arrangement: those who provide access, bases, overflight rights, industrial openness, and political support remain at the top of the American defense calculus. Those who hesitate become negotiable variables.

This can be welcomed as overdue burden-sharing. But that is too simplistic. The real problem is not that Europe should take on more responsibility. The real problem is that responsibility can be politically transferred, but capabilities cannot. Money can finance brigades, order ammunition, and beautify budget goals. However, it cannot replace in a few months those American enablers on which Europe's conventional defense truly relies: air refueling, reconnaissance, space architecture, command networks, strategic transport, and parts of deep precision effects.

A Review Process Instead of a Guarantee

The Terms of Reference disclosed by Reuters are therefore politically more significant than many summit declarations. By September 18, the top U.S. commander in Europe is to consult with Colby on courses of action; by November 6, concrete options for Hegseth are to emerge from this, even though the entire review is formally supposed to be completed only in December. This accelerated timeline already shows that it is not about an abstract situation analysis. It is about decision readiness.

It is also noteworthy what is being reviewed. Not only defense spending, not only national contributions to the NATO Force Model, but explicitly also access, basing, and overflight, meaning those infrastructural and political prerequisites that enable American power projection. According to Reuters, space, cyber, and intelligence architectures are also included. In other words: The U.S. is not just assessing whether Europe pays more. They are evaluating whether Europe remains politically and logistically reliable enough for American operations.

This changes the logic of the alliance. Article 5 has always been intentionally succinct, but in political practice, deterrence relied on predictability. Now, an evaluation mechanism replaces predictability. Protection is not abolished, but conditionalized. This is a fundamental difference. Deterrence depends on Moscow being able to expect fixed response patterns. A defense umbrella, whose concrete density is determined only after questionnaires, deadlines, and political sympathy values, is by definition less credible.

Europe Replaces Contributions, but Not Structures

The European side rightly points out that it is catching up. NATO is now pushing for the 5 percent target, and several states have pledged additional contributions for crisis forces. However, Washington's June decisions show how limited this compensation remains in the short term. According to information Reuters received from military circles in June, the number of U.S. fighter jets available for NATO, specifically the F-15 and F-15E, is decreasing by a third to 99; the contingent of MQ-4 and MQ-9 drones is being halved to 12. These are not symbolic corrections, but concrete losses in range, reconnaissance, and response speed.

Boris Pistorius made the crucial statement at that time: A too-rapid withdrawal without clarity on replacements creates dangerous capability gaps. These gaps do not disappear simply because Europe reports higher percentages. The NATO definition of defense spending is broad; it counts many things, from research to certain support services. This may make sense for statistics. However, for operational capability, the old Weber question remains crucial: What is actually ready when?

Here, the discomfort of the current debate becomes apparent. Europe can build more conventional mass in the medium term. It can order additional ammunition, finance more units, and substitute some U.S. contributions in the Force Model. But the qualitatively decisive layers of deterrence remain American in nature. Those who do not control satellite imagery, integrated air defense, tanker fleets, long-range command networks, and rapid political approvals are only conducting Europe's defense on paper.

The New Burden-Sharing Measures Behavior, Not Just Capabilities

Particularly revealing is the political addition in Washington's questionnaire to its allies. It inquires not only about budgets but also whether governments have restricted U.S. access and overflight and whether they reject measures that could hinder transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. This is more than alliance management. It is the translation of military presence into political good behavior.

Here lies the real test for Europe. The American message is: Lead more, pay more, replace more. But at the same time, Europe is to develop industrial independence only in ways that do not impair American access and remain as smooth as possible in foreign policy. This is not a clean transition to European sovereignty. It is a transition to European primary responsibility under ongoing American ultimate control.

For Berlin, this is particularly uncomfortable. Germany can point to higher budgets, brigades in Lithuania, and large procurements. However, the central deficiencies of European defense do not lie in the absence of announcements but in dependence on U.S. enablers and U.S. decision-making speed. More spending is necessary. It is just not sufficient. Otherwise, Zeitenwende remains a budgetary shift with a NATO label.

The European Paradox

Washington is correct in part of its diagnosis: Europe has relied too long on American surpluses. But Washington is now intentionally or carelessly confusing two different questions. The first is who should bear the main burden of Europe's conventional defense. There is only one reasonable answer: increasingly the Europeans themselves. The second is whether the necessary strategic prerequisites are already available in Europe. The honest answer to that is: no.

This is precisely why Colby's review is not merely an administrative exercise. It is a stress test for the fundamental formula of the alliance. If the U.S. transforms its guarantee into an evaluation system before Europe has built the necessary capabilities, a healthy burden-sharing will not emerge. A security order will arise in which responsibility is Europeanized while the decisive instruments remain American. This is the contradiction of the coming months. Europe is to lead. But it may only lead with borrowed tools.