Defense Minister Dong Jun's Absence from the Shangri-La Dialogue for Two Consecutive Years Exposes Shortcomings in Defense Diplomacy

When the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore concluded on May 31, one detail was more interesting than the tension in the venue: Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun did not attend for the second consecutive year, with the front line being represented by PLA Major General Meng Xiangqing and other representatives. According to CNA, over 40 countries and more than 550 representatives participated in this forum, and while China did not send a minister, almost every key issue could not avoid China.

Absence Itself is a Signal

I do not believe this is merely a scheduling issue. The Shangri-La Dialogue is not a formal alliance mechanism, but it is the main venue for defense discourse in the Asia-Pacific. The absence of the minister means that Beijing has minimized the risks of public debate; the presence of a major general retains the space for voicing opinions and questioning. This is a low-cost defense diplomacy, with the advantage of being controllable, but the downside is obvious: the outside world will narrate China's lack of military transparency more smoothly.

Japanese Defense Minister Kōzuki Shinjirō directly mentioned China's military spending growth and capability expansion at the meeting, expressing hope to maintain direct communication with Dong Jun. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called on Asian allies to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP and stated that the U.S. would invest $1.5 trillion to strengthen military power. In plain terms, while others treat the forum as an occasion to draw up lists, set budgets, and pressure allies, if China only responds with principled statements, it risks losing out in agenda setting.

PLA Modernization Becomes Background Noise at the Venue

The underlying background of this debate is that the PLA's equipment upgrades have entered a systematic stage, rather than just showcasing individual pieces of equipment. The key points that have attracted the most attention over the past year can actually be categorized into three types:

• Naval long-range capabilities: The Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian aircraft carriers form a three-carrier framework, with carrier-based aircraft, early warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and anti-submarine helicopters gradually being completed.
• Area denial capabilities: The Dongfeng series, long-range rocket artillery, land-based air forces, and maritime and aerial reconnaissance systems have increased the operational costs within the first island chain.
• Unmanned and electromagnetic warfare: Drone swarms, unmanned boats, electronic jamming, and anti-drone equipment are beginning to transition from display to training grounds.

These capabilities do not need to be showcased item by item at the Shangri-La Dialogue; other countries will speak for China. The problem is that the stronger the capabilities, the greater the pressure to explain them. Chinese representatives emphasize strategic stability and oppose turning the Asia-Pacific into a geopolitical competition arena; this logic is sound. However, the technocrats view it more coldly: once modernized equipment reaches a scale, neighboring countries are not looking at motive statements but at usable capabilities.

South China Sea Disputes Add Pressure to Defense Diplomacy

The Dutch frigate De Ruyter's involvement in disputes near the Paracel Islands, the Philippines' renewed mention of the tenth anniversary of the South China Sea arbitration, and Japan's discussion of so-called new militarism were all concentrated on the same weekend. The Chinese delegation chose to approach the issue from the perspective of post-World War II international order and historical responsibility to counter Japan's moral qualifications; regarding the South China Sea, they continued to emphasize sovereignty and maritime air security.

This approach is very complete in the domestic context, but it has a shortcoming in a multilateral venue: it leans towards political narrative and lacks verifiable military risk management arrangements. For example, rules for maritime encounters, hotline frequencies, distances between ships and aircraft, and boundaries for electronic jamming are the technical parameters that military officials from various countries truly care about. Without these parameters, both sides can only portray each other as threats.

The Real Test is Not the Venue Confrontation

Chinese defense diplomacy now faces a contradiction: the more modernized the PLA becomes, the less it can rely solely on low-key handling of external concerns. Aircraft carriers, Type 055 destroyers, stealth carrier-based aircraft, and unmanned systems are all hard power, but hard power requires accompanying discourse and crisis management mechanisms; otherwise, every normal training exercise will be packaged as a regional crisis.

My judgment is that Dong Jun's absence will not change the pace of PLA construction, nor will it affect the restoration of the military hotline between China and the U.S. However, it exposes a more realistic issue: as China increasingly possesses equipment that can be used in distant seas, is Beijing willing to explain in the same professional and specific manner how these capabilities will be constrained and managed? This question is more difficult to answer than a few confrontational remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue.