Eagle Strike-21 Unleashes the Sword East of Luzon: Live Fire Exercises of the 055 Type Zunyi Ship and the Strategic Game of "Shoulder to Shoulder-2026"

In late April 2026, two distinctly different yet closely related military operations unfolded simultaneously in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. On one side was the "Balikatan 2026" joint military exercise, led by the United States and the Philippines, with Japan participating for the first time as a formal member. The exercise involved over 17,000 troops and included forces from Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand. On the other side, the Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted live-fire drills and joint air-sea training in the waters east of Luzon Island, centered around the Type 055 destroyer Zunyi (hull number 107). The high temporal and spatial overlap of these two operations made this round of military maneuvering in the South China Sea one of the most strategically significant confrontational displays in recent years.

The Southern Theater Command publicly confirmed the training operation on April 24, explicitly stating that it was a "necessary response" to the "current regional situation." The composition of the fleet was highly representative: in addition to the Zunyi, it included Type 052D destroyers, Type 054A frigates, and comprehensive supply ships, forming a complete long-range operational group. Notably, during the same period, the Chinese military also publicly released footage of the Liaoning aircraft carrier group operating in the South China Sea. Multi-source satellite imagery and regional naval reports confirmed that the Liaoning strike group included multiple destroyers, frigates, support vessels, and amphibious elements, with at least one Type 055 destroyer operating alongside. This indicates that the Chinese Navy has effectively deployed at least two high-specification maritime combat groups from the South China Sea to the Western Pacific, constituting a direct strategic response to "Balikatan 2026."

The most striking technical highlight of this training was the video of the YJ-20 (Eagle Strike-20) hypersonic anti-ship missile test launch at sea, released by the PLA's official social media account on April 26. The footage included scenes of multiple YJ-20 missiles launching from a vertical launch system on surface vessels, featuring at least two previously unreleased angles. Although some of the footage overlapped with the December 2025 test launch of the YJ-20 from the Type 055 destroyer Wuxi, the inclusion of new material indicates that China is continuing to deepen the operational testing of this key weapon system. The YJ-20 is regarded as one of the most advanced shipborne hypersonic anti-ship missiles globally, capable of reaching speeds of up to Mach 6 during the cruise phase and accelerating to Mach 10 during the terminal dive phase, with a range estimated between 500 to 800 nautical miles (approximately 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers), possessing the capability for a single-shot lethal strike against large surface vessels. The missile is launched from the 112-unit universal vertical launch system of the Type 055 destroyer, supported by target indications from the shipborne integrated RF system, forming a complete long-range maritime strike chain.

From a strategic perspective, the signals conveyed by this training extend far beyond a mere display of military force. Beijing's choice to conduct operations east of Luzon Island—rather than within the disputed waters of the South China Sea—carries profound geopolitical implications. Luzon Island is located approximately 250 kilometers from Taiwan, and several bases authorized for U.S. use are situated in this area. By deploying its most advanced Type 055 destroyers and conducting live-fire tests of hypersonic missiles in this direction, the Chinese Navy is effectively demonstrating the actual coverage of its "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) capabilities to the U.S. Any future military conflict in the South China Sea or the Western Pacific will no longer be defined solely by territorial disputes over islands and reefs but will be shaped by long-range hypersonic strike systems capable of targeting carrier strike groups, expeditionary forces, and allied maritime logistics nodes.

This event should also be understood within the larger context of the Chinese Navy's force development. As of early 2026, ten Type 055 destroyers have been commissioned—among them, the ninth destroyer Dongguan (109) and the tenth destroyer Anqing (110) officially joined the East Sea Fleet stationed at Zhoushan in March 2026. This means that China's three major fleets now each possess at least 2 to 4 Type 055 destroyers, achieving comprehensive deployment of this class. Meanwhile, the total number of Type 052D destroyers has reached 35, along with 4 Type 075 amphibious assault ships, 8 Type 071 dock landing ships, and three active aircraft carriers, allowing the Chinese Navy to build a large modernized fleet with a total tonnage exceeding that of the U.S. Navy's deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific. China's strategy has shifted from defensive deployments within the first island chain to a normalized long-range presence—gradually penetrating the southwestern Pacific through security cooperation and infrastructure development, while maintaining a sustained presence in the Indian Ocean through escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and overseas bases.

Japan's role in "Balikatan 2026" is also noteworthy. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Ikazuchi crossed the Taiwan Strait this month to participate in the exercise, marking Japan's first formal participation as a member in the U.S.-Philippine joint military drills, with plans to launch Type 88 anti-ship missiles during the live-fire exercises. Japan's transition from an observer to a participant is viewed by Beijing as a significant change in the regional security landscape and is one of the key factors prompting the escalation of the Chinese military's response. The Southern Theater Command's decision to conduct training in a formation east of Luzon Island rather than around Taiwan itself indicates that Beijing perceives the warming of trilateral military cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines as a strategic issue that requires independent response, rather than merely an extension of the Taiwan issue.

In summary, the military maneuvering in the South China Sea in April 2026 reveals an accelerating evolution of security realities: the operational deployment of new strike means such as hypersonic weapons is technically altering traditional calculations of maritime power balance; the expansion of multinational joint exercises and the increase in participants are politically raising the temperature of confrontation. In the foreseeable future, a similar "training confrontation against training" model may become the new norm in the South China Sea and surrounding waters. For China, how to demonstrate military strength while avoiding misjudgments and unintended escalations will be an ongoing challenge; for the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines, managing military risks with China while strengthening alliance deterrence will also require a delicate strategic balance.