ECOWAS activates its regional force in response to jihadist escalation: a fragmented response in the Sahel

West Africa is at a critical turning point in its security history. The decision made last week by the military leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to activate a regional defense force marks a late but necessary recognition of what analysts now describe as an "existential threat" to regional stability. This mobilization comes in a context marked by unprecedented jihadist violence, deep geopolitical fragmentation, and significant operational challenges that threaten the effectiveness of any collective response.

The security meeting held in Sierra Leone resulted in an ambitious plan for the initial deployment of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. This regional force, historically known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and later renamed the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), faces an adversary of a radically different nature than those it has fought in the past. Unlike the political rebel groups it confronted in Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Côte d'Ivoire, the jihadist organizations currently operating in the Sahel possess a transnational ideology, sophisticated tactics, and remarkable adaptability.

The figures of violence speak for themselves and reveal the extent of the challenge. Between January and June 2025, the region recorded 12,964 conflict-related deaths across 5,907 distinct incidents, according to data from the Center for Democracy and Development. Almost all of these victims are concentrated in four countries: Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. This violence is no longer limited to isolated rural areas where government authority has always been weak. Bold attacks are now striking major urban centers, demonstrating the growing capacity of armed groups to project their power.

The most symbolic attack of this evolution remains the assault carried out in late January 2026 against the international airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger, by a group affiliated with the Islamic State. This event, claimed by the Islamic State's Sahel Province (ISSP), sent a clear signal: no space is sanctified, even in the heart of capitals. At the same time, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), the main faction affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the region with an estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, has maintained a blockade on fuel supply routes to Bamako since last September. This strategy of economic strangulation paralyzes mobility and essential services in the Malian capital, illustrating a concerning tactical sophistication.

The landscape of armed groups presents a formidable complexity that complicates any counter-insurgency strategy. Beyond JNIM and ISSP, regional security forces must contend with at least six other major organizations: Boko Haram (approximately 1,500 fighters), the Islamic State West Africa Province or ISWAP (3,500 to 5,000 fighters), Lakurawa (approximately 1,000 fighters), and Ansaru (2,000 to 3,000 members). These groups operate according to sometimes divergent logics but share a common ability to exploit porous borders, dense forest areas, and community tensions to expand their territorial grip.

The political fragmentation of ECOWAS itself may constitute the most serious obstacle to the effectiveness of this new military mobilization. In January 2025, three Sahelian states led by military juntas – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – officially left ECOWAS to form their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This break is not merely administrative: it reflects a fundamental divergence on governance models, strategic alliances, and security priorities.

The AES has collectively turned its back on France, its historical ally and former colonial power that had deployed around 4,000 soldiers as part of Operation Barkhane to combat armed groups. Paris faces persistent accusations of excessive interference in national security affairs, fueling an anti-French sentiment that facilitated the complete withdrawal of French forces from the region. In the vacuum left by this departure, around 2,000 Russian fighters have been deployed in the three AES countries, initially under the banner of the Wagner paramilitary group, and then under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defense via the Africa Corps. This Russian presence is accompanied by bilateral defense agreements and marks a major geopolitical shift whose implications extend far beyond the military framework.

Beverly Ochieng, an analyst based in Dakar for the consulting firm Control Risks, emphasizes that the challenges facing the ECOWAS force are multiple and interconnected. Funding represents a significant obstacle. Nigeria, which has historically provided 75% of the personnel and a substantial share of the ECOWAS mission budget, now finds itself in a weakened economic position. The high inflation of 2023, exacerbated by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and chronic economic mismanagement, limits Abuja's ability to play its traditional role as a regional giant. Moreover, Nigerian defense forces are themselves spread across multiple fronts: jihadist groups in the northeast, criminal gangs in the northwest and central-north, and separatist movements in the south.

Potential sources of external funding remain uncertain. The United States, after initially wrongfully accusing Nigeria of allowing a "genocide" against Christians, recently normalized its relations with Abuja last December and may contribute to funding the force. France, seeking to rebuild its regional influence after its expulsion from AES countries, may also provide financial support, particularly through its growing rapprochement with Nigeria.

Operational coordination also poses immense challenges. The region faces at least eight major armed groups that use forested areas as sanctuaries and cross-border movement corridors. ECOWAS will need to determine geographic and operational priorities: should it focus on Liptako-Gourma, the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger where JNIM and ISSP are fiercely contesting territorial control? Should it also target maritime pirates or criminal gangs that exploit security gaps? These strategic questions remain largely unanswered.

Beverly Ochieng stresses the need for social interventions in rural areas where armed groups recruit their members. These organizations do not merely conduct military operations; they establish forms of local governance by collecting taxes, providing resources such as fertilizers, building mosques, and promising security that states cannot guarantee. Without addressing the root causes of local adherence to these groups – poverty, marginalization, lack of public services – any military victory risks being ephemeral.

The possibility of collaboration between ECOWAS and AES appears limited in the short term. The military leaders of AES have been inflexible in their rejection of mediation attempts by states like Senegal, which maintains friendly relations with the Sahelians. AES is working to establish its own combined force of 6,000 men and seeks to demonstrate that it can compete with ECOWAS by effectively combating armed groups. This dynamic of regional competition significantly complicates any prospect of unified action.

However, there exists a paradoxical opening. One of the major criticisms leveled by AES upon its departure from ECOWAS was precisely the latter's lack of support for counter-terrorism operations, with the bloc perceived as excessively focused on political and electoral issues. If ECOWAS can demonstrate a credible and sustained commitment to combating armed groups, this could mitigate AES's hostility and pave the way, in the long term, for intelligence sharing, joint monitoring, and potentially joint missions, as suggested by Beverly Ochieng.

The broader geopolitical context adds an additional dimension to this complex equation. Russia has consolidated its influence through bilateral defense agreements and the deployment of the Africa Corps under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow presents the current security challenges as rooted in Western interference and calls for collective international support for AES countries. This narrative resonates favorably with juntas that legitimize their hold on power by the necessity of combating insecurity that civilian governments would have been unable to control.

The coups that brought these military leaders to power follow a remarkably similar pattern. In Mali in 2020, in Burkina Faso in 2022, and then in Niger in 2023, the armed forces systematically justified their takeover by the failure of civilian authorities to counter jihadist violence. Ironically, the security situation has significantly deteriorated under the rule of these juntas, with a marked increase in attacks against military bases and civilian centers in recent months.

The region thus finds itself caught in a vicious cycle: insecurity fuels political instability, which in turn weakens governance and creates conditions conducive to the expansion of armed groups. The fracture between ECOWAS and AES only exacerbates this dynamic by fragmenting resources, duplicating efforts, and creating strategic inconsistencies that directly benefit jihadist organizations.

The activation of the ECOWAS regional force thus represents a necessary but deeply imperfect attempt to respond to an existential crisis. Without reconciliation with AES, without adequate funding, without effective coordination, and without a social strategy complementary to military action, this mobilization risks reproducing past failures on an even larger scale. The coming year will determine whether ECOWAS can overcome these colossal obstacles or whether the region will further descend into a spiral of violence and political fragmentation, the outcome of which remains uncertain.