ECOWAS mobilizes 2000 soldiers against jihadist expansion: a delayed and fragmented response in the Sahel

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) announced last week the deployment of a regional force of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026, during a meeting of military chiefs of staff held in Freetown, Sierra Leone. This decision comes amid an unprecedented security deterioration in the Sahel and West Africa, where armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are intensifying their operations and expanding their territory into coastal states. However, this initiative, as necessary as it may be, faces major structural challenges that could compromise its effectiveness.

The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), officially created in 1999, has played a crucial role in resolving several regional conflicts over the past three decades. From the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s to the Malian crisis of 2012-2013, and the forced departure of Gambian President Yahya Jammeh in 2017, this multinational force has established itself as the first effective regional security mechanism in Africa. Unlike traditional UN missions focused on peacekeeping, the ESF has often engaged in direct combat, although its troops have also been criticized for human rights violations during early interventions.

This time, however, the mission will be of a radically different nature. For the first time in its history, the ESF will have to confront not political rebels or military factions, but ideologically motivated jihadist groups equipped with sophisticated guerrilla tactics. Violence related to these groups has reached alarming levels: between January and June 2025, the region recorded 12,964 conflict-related deaths during 5,907 incidents, according to the Center for Democracy and Development. Almost all of these victims are concentrated in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

The jihadist groups operating in the region have demonstrated remarkable adaptability. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main faction affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Sahel, has between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters and is currently blockading fuel supply routes to Bamako, the Malian capital, paralyzing the economy and essential services of the city since last September. Meanwhile, the Islamic State's Sahel Province (ISSP) claimed responsibility for the bold attack on Niamey International Airport on January 30, 2026, demonstrating that even heavily secured urban areas are no longer safe. In Niger, the armed forces reported eliminating 17 terrorists and arresting 33 others during operations conducted between February 15 and 22, also seizing 1,098 sticks of dynamite, 48 kilograms of cannabis, and approximately 23,250 liters of smuggled fuel.

But the most insurmountable challenge for ECOWAS remains the deep fracture with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These three countries, all under the control of military juntas that came to power through coups between 2020 and 2023, officially left ECOWAS in January 2025 to form their own defensive alliance. This secession was motivated by fundamental disagreements over prioritizing the fight against terrorism over issues of democratic legitimacy and a return to constitutional order.

The three AES states are at the geographical heart of the jihadist threat, with several armed groups operating along their common borders. Their departure has significantly reduced the size and influence of ECOWAS, while depriving the regional bloc of its ability to effectively coordinate counter-terrorism operations in the most critical areas. On February 26, 2026, the defense ministers of the AES met in Ouagadougou to finalize the development roadmap for their joint force of 6,000 men, demonstrating their willingness to chart an independent path.

This rupture also has a major geopolitical dimension. The three AES countries expelled French forces, which numbered around 4,000 soldiers engaged in the fight against jihadist groups, accusing Paris of excessive interference in their national security affairs. Instead, they have turned to Moscow: approximately 2,000 Russian fighters, initially from the Wagner paramilitary group and then from the Russian state-controlled African Corps, have been deployed in these three countries. China, through its Global Security Initiative, has also signed counter-terrorism cooperation agreements with the AES. Yet, the concrete results of these new partnerships remain limited, as evidenced by the attack in Niamey in January.

Funding is another major obstacle. Nigeria, which traditionally provides 75% of personnel for ECOWAS missions and is the main financial backer of the organization, is going through a difficult economic period. The country is facing high inflation, the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, and multiple security challenges on its own territory. Nigerian defense forces are mobilized on several fronts: jihadist groups in the northeast, criminal gangs in the northwest, and separatist movements in the south. This situation significantly limits Abuja's ability to replicate the massive deployments of the past.

According to Beverly Ochieng, an analyst for Control Risks based in Dakar, alternative funding sources could come from the United States, which has strengthened its security cooperation with Nigeria since December 2025, or from France, which seeks to maintain its influence in the region despite its expulsion from Sahelian states. But beyond funding, operational coordination is also problematic. The force will have to confront at least eight different armed groups, including JNIM, the West African Province of the Islamic State (ISWAP, 3,500 to 5,000 fighters), Boko Haram (approximately 1,500 fighters weakened since the death of their leader in 2021), Ansaru (2,000 to 3,000 members), and the emerging group Lakurawa (approximately 1,000 fighters) operating along the Niger-Nigerien border.

These groups use dense forest areas as refuges and cross-border movement corridors, making any conventional military operation extremely complex. More concerning, they have developed sophisticated recruitment strategies in rural areas where the state is absent or perceived as predatory. By collecting local taxes, providing fertilizers to farmers, building mosques, and promising security, these groups have succeeded in gaining the allegiance of entire communities.

Faced with this reality, a purely military approach seems doomed to failure. Beverly Ochieng emphasizes the need to integrate social interventions in the rural areas from which armed groups draw their recruits. Without investment in infrastructure, education, health, and local governance, any military victory will be only temporary. The ECOWAS force will also need to establish clear priorities: should it focus on jihadist groups or also address maritime pirates and criminal gangs that exploit the security vacuum?

Despite these obstacles, there is a slim possibility of future collaboration between ECOWAS and the AES. ECOWAS's emphasis on counter-terrorism, rather than political and electoral issues, could over time soften the intransigent stance of the Sahelian juntas. States like Senegal, Ghana, and Togo maintain friendly ties with the AES and could serve as mediators. In the long term, intelligence sharing, joint surveillance, and coordinated operational missions remain conceivable.

The planned deployment of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026 represents a necessary but largely insufficient response to a threat that has already cost tens of thousands of lives and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Regional fragmentation, financial constraints, operational complexity, and the absence of a coherent socio-political strategy are all challenges that could condemn this initiative to failure. The real question is not whether ECOWAS can mobilize 2,000 soldiers, but whether these soldiers, once deployed, will have the resources, coordination, and strategy necessary to confront a jihadist insurgency that continues to expand and become more sophisticated.