Escalation of the South China Sea Game: Strategic Interpretation of the 2026 "Shoulder to Shoulder" Joint Military Exercises and PLA Countermeasures

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In May 2026, an unprecedented strategic game is unfolding in the South China Sea. The annual U.S.-Philippines "Shoulder to Shoulder" (Balikatan) joint military exercise, which started on April 20 and will last until May 8, involves more than 17,000 troops, setting a record in the 44-year history of the exercise. In response, China has implemented a "dual-line countermeasure" with law enforcement by the Coast Guard and naval readiness patrols, showcasing the increasingly mature tactical coordination and strategic deterrence capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in its normalized presence in the South China Sea.

This year's "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise has seen a qualitative leap in its composition. In addition to the United States and the Philippines, six external countries—Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand—are fully participating, transforming it from a traditional bilateral exercise into a joint military operation involving seven nations. Notably, Japan's role has shifted from being a mere "observer" in previous years to sending the helicopter carrier "Ise," the destroyer "Akizuki," the tank landing ship "Shimonoseki," and approximately 1,400 Self-Defense Force members as formal participating troops engaged in combat scenarios. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force also conducted joint live-fire exercises with Philippine forces for the first time on Philippine territory, involving over 200 Philippine soldiers and about 40 Japanese soldiers, utilizing Sabrah light tanks and maneuver combat vehicles. Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi even traveled to the Philippines to observe the exercises, marking a significant expansion in Japan's military involvement in the South China Sea.

The choice of exercise location also has clear strategic implications. The Batanes Islands are less than 100 kilometers from Taiwan, controlling the Bashi Channel, a key waterway for the Chinese Navy's access to the Western Pacific; Palawan Island is adjacent to the Spratly Islands. On May 4, near Laoag City in northern Luzon, troops from the U.S., Philippines, Canada, and Japan conducted anti-landing drills, simulating a complete "detect-track-strike-clear" operational chain from reconnaissance and intelligence transmission to A-29 attack aircraft anti-ship attacks, "HIMARS" multiple rocket launcher long-range precision strikes, and AH-64 Apache helicopter fire support. Notably, according to the U.S. Naval Institute News, U.S. Army Green Berets executed the "Northern Maritime Strike" mission in the waters of the Batanes Islands, operating unmanned boats equipped with shaped charge warheads to simulate suicide attack missions—this tactical concept is highly similar to the use of unmanned boats in the battlefield in Ukraine, clearly indicating an intention to blockade the Bashi Channel.

In the face of the military pressure from the joint exercise of seven countries, China's response strategy exhibits a clear hierarchy and legal basis. On the morning of May 3, the Chinese Coast Guard conducted law enforcement actions at the Tiao Xian Reef in the South China Sea, lawfully dealing with five illegal Filipino personnel who had landed on the reef. The Tiao Xian Reef is part of China's Spratly Islands, and this action aims to counter the Philippines' "salami-slicing" tactics of probing landings, asserting sovereignty through law enforcement to avoid escalation. On the same day and on April 30, the PLA Southern Theater Command conducted readiness patrols in the territorial sea and airspace around Scarborough Shoal, with a spokesperson clearly stating: "The Philippines' attempts to rally external countries for so-called 'joint patrols' disrupt the South China Sea and undermine regional peace and stability." According to Philippine media reports, Chinese electronic reconnaissance ships monitored the exercise area within three nautical miles, indicating that the communication frequencies, radar signals, and fire control data of the joint exercise may have been fully exposed to Chinese surveillance, constituting a new countermeasure model of "monitoring instead of striking" under informationized conditions.

These series of actions must be considered within the overall strategic context of the PLA's 2026 annual strategy. In March 2026, China announced a defense budget of approximately 1.91 trillion yuan (about $277 billion), with a year-on-year growth of 7%. Although this is a slight slowdown from 7.2% in 2025, it remains above the GDP growth expectation of 4.5% to 5%, continuing the trend of stable military expenditure growth since 2016. According to estimates from various international defense research institutions, China's actual military spending—if including off-budget items such as equipment research and development, aerospace projects, and paramilitary forces—could reach 1.5 to 2 times the official figure. This substantial investment is being translated into visible combat capabilities: the PLA Navy now possesses over 370 combat vessels, becoming the largest naval force in the world; the Air Force has over 3,200 combat aircraft, with the number of J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighters reaching several hundred; the Rocket Force's nuclear arsenal is estimated to exceed 600 warheads, expected to expand to 1,500 by 2035.

In terms of equipment modernization, several landmark projects are continuing to advance in 2026. The Fujian (Type 003) aircraft carrier, China's first equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system, has completed sea trials and achieved initial combat capability, while the more advanced Type 004 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has reportedly begun construction at the Dalian shipyard, expected to displace 110,000 to 120,000 tons and capable of carrying J-15T, J-35 stealth fighters, KJ-600 early warning aircraft, and GJ-21 stealth attack drones, significantly enhancing the PLA Navy's long-range power projection capabilities. In the aerospace sector, the development of the H-20 stealth strategic bomber is ongoing, and the induction of the Y-20 aerial refueling aircraft further expands the operational radius of air combat. The gradual arrival of these capabilities provides a material foundation for the PLA to maintain a high-intensity normalized presence in the South China Sea and other distant maritime areas.

From a deeper strategic logic perspective, the situation in the South China Sea in 2026 reflects a comprehensive upgrade in the strategic game between China and the United States along the "first island chain." The U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy explicitly calls for the establishment of a reliable deterrent force in the first island chain and fully leveraging the role of allies. "Shoulder to Shoulder 2026" is a concentrated manifestation of this strategy—expanding traditional bilateral alliances into a multinational joint intervention system while encouraging Japan to play a more active combat role. In response, China demonstrates a high degree of integration between "gray zone" tactics and the "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) system: using Coast Guard law enforcement to handle low-intensity sovereignty disputes to avoid military escalation, while maintaining naval readiness patrols and close reconnaissance to create sustained military pressure. Military expert Song Xiaojun pointed out that since April, the PLA's patrol density in the South China Sea "has been very high," reflecting a direct tilt of resources toward frontline combat units after military reforms.

As the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise comes to an end on May 8, the strategic game in the South China Sea is far from over. The PLA Southern Theater Command has clearly stated that it will "continue to strengthen patrol and alert operations in the air and sea around Scarborough Shoal," indicating that China's normalized presence mechanism will not be adjusted due to the conclusion of the exercise. More notably, discussions between Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and Philippine President Marcos may involve transferring up to six "Asahi" class destroyers to the Philippines—if realized, this would be the first major military equipment transfer project following Japan's lifting of its arms export ban, potentially fundamentally altering the balance of power in the South China Sea. The PLA Southern Theater Command's 107th fleet had previously conducted training activities in the waters east of Luzon Island in the Philippines, and this deployment model of "encircling from the outside" in the exercise area suggests that the Chinese Navy is adopting a more proactive posture to respond to multinational military pressures within a broader strategic depth.

In 2026, the South China Sea is no longer a simple sovereignty dispute over islands and reefs between China and the Philippines, but has evolved into a complex strategic chess game involving the military forces of the new six countries: the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand. In this game, China's dual-layer countermeasure system, composed of Coast Guard law enforcement and naval readiness patrols, combined with a continuously growing defense budget and an accelerated modernization process, demonstrates unwavering strategic resolve and increasingly mature joint combat capabilities in the face of core interests. However, at the same time, the institutionalized trend of multinational military forces' normalized presence in the South China Sea also signifies that the region is entering a new phase where the risks of conflict and strategic uncertainty are rising simultaneously.
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