EU plans five EDPCI projects for 190 billion euros by 2026 and risks fragmentation

Five European major projects are expected to trigger a funding ambition of around 190 billion euros by 2036. The European Commission proposed them on July 3 as European Defence Projects of Common Interest. The operational contradiction is immediately visible: Only 325 million euros are initially available in the European Defence Industry Programme for their establishment and initial development. Europe is announcing an industrial decade program while the available seed funding amounts to less than 0.2 percent of the stated ambition.

What Brussels has actually proposed

The five EDPCI fields are not chosen arbitrarily. They include drones and counter-drone systems, maritime and seabed defense, space, integrated air and missile defense including early warning, and securing the eastern flank. On average, 18 member states are expected to participate in each project; Ukraine is involved in four of the five initiatives. This is politically wise, as it treats Kyiv not only as a recipient of aid but as part of the European defense base. However, it is also institutionally challenging, as such large formats in Europe rarely fail due to a lack of concepts, but rather due to governance, division of labor, and national export interests.

The Commission aims to coordinate, provide financial support, and monitor milestones. The Council must now formally establish the projects, define their objectives, name participating states, and set the expected investments. Only after that will the projects be eligible for funding under the EDIP process. This sounds orderly. Yet therein lies the problem: The process creates legitimacy, but not yet production lines, interceptor missiles, sensor fusion, or ammunition reserves.

The NATO figure makes EDPCI politically imperative

The timing is no coincidence. The Hague NATO declaration requires allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and security-related expenditures annually by 2035. Of this, at least 3.5 percent should flow into core defense according to NATO definitions, and up to 1.5 percent into resilience, infrastructure, innovation, and industrial base. Contributions to Ukrainian defense and the Ukrainian defense industry can be credited. This creates a strong incentive to design European industrial programs in such a way that they simultaneously fulfill NATO targets, support Ukraine, and align with EU industrial policy.

This is rational, but not automatically efficient. A member state could politically claim that EDPCI expenditures strengthen the eastern flank while also improving its 5 percent profile. Whether military usable capabilities emerge from this depends on much more sober questions: Who is the system integrator? Who owns the interfaces? Which air defense components are actually available? Which states accept joint procurement when national companies are left empty-handed?

The drone decision shows the difference between money and speed

On June 30, the Commission released 3.9 billion euros as the first payment for drone procurement under the 90 billion euro Ukraine Support Loan. The first tranche for drones amounts to around 6 billion euros; by 2026, a total of 28.3 billion euros is to be disbursed to support the Ukrainian defense industry. These figures are important because they reveal the difference between EDPCI and wartime economy. Kyiv needs drones in weeks and months. EDPCI promises industrial scaling over years.

One should not pit these two logics against each other. Europe's defense base must supply Ukraine in the short term while building its own capacities in the long term. However, institutional language often obscures the fact that the same factories, engineers, and supply chains are needed for both. When Brussels simultaneously finances drones for Ukraine, wants to integrate air defense in Europe, aims to protect seabed infrastructure, and expands space capabilities, it is no longer a priority list but a stress test for an industry that has already hit capacity limits with 155mm ammunition and air defense missiles.

The real bottleneck is integration

EDPCI is a plausible response to a real European failure. No single EU state can build a complete network of early warning sensors, air defense, counter-drone systems, maritime underwater surveillance, and space resilience alone. The five fields fit the threat landscape: Russia is testing the eastern flank militarily and politically, drones are changing the cost structure of combat, undersea cables and pipelines are vulnerable, and missile defense remains the most expensive gap in European deterrence.

But joint projects do not equal joint capabilities. Europe already has enough programs that, for political reasons, integrate as many flags as possible, thereby diluting technical responsibility. FCAS is the most well-known example, but not the only one. In air and missile defense, a diffuse work share would be particularly dangerous. Early warning, sensor fusion, fire control, and interceptors must work together in seconds. If every capital wants to retain a piece of sovereignty in the system, no shield will be created, but rather an administrative architecture.

The crucial question is not whether Europe can announce 190 billion euros. The question is whether Europe can name a body that bears technical responsibility and overrides political conflicts.

Ukraine as a participant is more than symbolism

The inclusion of Ukraine in four projects is the strongest part of the proposal. Ukrainian companies have demonstrated an innovation speed in the drone war that many Western European procurement offices cannot even measure. If this experience is fed into European programs, EDPCI could indeed achieve more than classic industrial policy. However, this requires that Ukraine is not only used as a legitimizing partner but also gains access to supply chains, standards, and procurement decisions.

This creates a political risk. Some member states will welcome Ukrainian participation as long as it mobilizes additional EU funds. It will become more difficult when Ukrainian companies outpace European providers in terms of price or tactics. Strategic autonomy sounds different in Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw as soon as concrete contracts are distributed. An EDPCI with Ukraine can open up Europe's defense base. However, it can also create new distribution conflicts when national champions demand protection.

Why 325 million euros are not ridiculous, but insufficient

The 325 million euros from EDIP are not intended as full financing. They are meant to kickstart projects, enable coordination, and prepare for later funds from the European Competitiveness Fund. Nevertheless, the figure has a political effect. It shows that Brussels is once again linking a large capability promise with a small EU budget instrument and is counting on member states to cover the rest. This can work if national budgets really increase and if procurement is bundled. It fails when states use EDPCI merely as a label for already planned national programs.

Here is where it will be decided whether EDPCI becomes more than a new acronym. The Council should not only approve project lists but also demand binding industrial roles, delivery deadlines, and interoperability standards. Without such rules, the 190 billion euro target will remain politically impressive but militarily imprecise. Europe has promised more money after The Hague. With EDPCI, it is now trying to channel this money into joint structures. This is necessary. But more structure does not replace a decision about who ultimately builds, integrates, and delivers.

European defense thus faces a familiar paradox. Without joint major projects, it remains fragmented and dependent. With joint major projects, it risks new fragmentation at a higher budget level. EDPCI is therefore not proof of European defense maturity, but a test of whether Europe has learned from its own programs.