European Machines at Factory No. 9 — How Russia Overcomes the Main Bottleneck of Its Defense Industry

Seven million shells, mines, and missiles by 2025 — seventeen times more than in 2021. This figure from the Estonian intelligence report has circulated through all Western media as proof of the resilience of the Russian defense industry. But behind this impressive growth lies another, less known problem: even if Russia has shells, it has nothing to fire them with. The production of artillery barrels and tank guns has remained a critical limiter until recently — according to ISW, as of October 2024, Russia could produce about 50 barrels per year. This is catastrophically insufficient to compensate for wear and combat losses of systems firing at an intensity not seen since World War II.

Factory No. 9: The Heart of Artillery Production

Factory No. 9 in Yekaterinburg (Uralmash industrial zone) is the main producer of barrels for artillery and tanks in Russia. It is here that the 152-mm 2A88 systems for the 2S35 "Koalitsiya-SV" self-propelled howitzer, barrels for the T-72/T-90 family of tanks, and components for the prospective "Armata" are produced (according to documents, this refers more to fire control systems or barrels originally developed for the T-14 but redirected to other platforms).

In April 2025, the contractor "Zenit-Investprom" presented updated project documentation for the reconstruction of workshops No. 23 and No. 25 — creating an integrated production facility for the serial production of "Koalitsiya" components. Analysts from Frontelligence Insight and Dallas gained access to these documents and made a clear conclusion: the expansion of capacities would be impossible without access to Western equipment and technologies.

Twenty-Two Machines from Europe and Taiwan

Despite a decade-long strategy of import substitution, Russia has not achieved full independence from imported equipment. Almost all critical stages of production at Factory No. 9 — not just auxiliary processes, but core technological operations — still depend on high-precision machines from Europe and East Asia.

According to the documentation, Russia plans to supply and install at the upgraded facility at least 22 large industrial machines, including gear-cutting, milling, and multifunctional machines. Here is a partial list by country of origin:

• Taiwan: vertical machining center KAFO VMC-21100+, centerless grinding machine Glory APC 24S NC
• Italy: multifunctional CNC lathe-milling center TACCHI HD/3 450×4000, horizontal milling center PARPAS OMV Electra
• Germany: 3-axis vertical milling machine CNC DMG MORI DMC 650V, lathe-milling machines DMG Beta 800 and Gamma 1250, bar-fed lathes DMG Alpha 500; CNC gear-cutting machine LIEBHERR LC500, vertical CNC gear-cutting machines LIEBHERR LFS 1200 and LFS 300; 5-axis machining center HERMLE AG C42U
• United Kingdom: grinding machine JONES & SHIPMAN PROGRIND 1045 EASY

This is not small dual-use electronics that can be smuggled in a suitcase through third countries. This is large industrial equipment, which is by definition easier to track and regulate. And yet it continues to arrive at Russian military factories.

A Decade-Long Story

Documents show that this is not a one-time modernization, but part of a long-term process of expanding and improving production, which has now accelerated due to the war. In a series of letters from 2014, the director of Factory No. 9 appealed to the head of the basic industries department of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, requesting an expert opinion that certain production equipment could not be manufactured in Russia and must be imported. This referred to the Taiwanese APC 24S-NC from Glory and the German LFS 1200 system from Liebherr.

In other words, the dependence on Western equipment was evident long before 2022, and sanctions only complicated but did not interrupt this flow. Evasion schemes — through intermediaries in Turkey, the UAE, China, Kazakhstan — have proven sufficiently effective to support not just the functioning but the active development of a key enterprise in the Russian defense industry.

Asymmetry of Growth: Shells Exist, Barrels Do Not

Returning to the Estonian report: a sevenfold increase in ammunition production (from 400,000 in 2021 to 7 million in 2025) is impressive. But shells are useless without artillery systems capable of firing them. Before the modernization of Factory No. 9, Russia could produce about 50 barrels per year — this is only enough to partially compensate for wear from intensive use, not to mention increasing the fleet of new systems.

The successful delivery of European equipment changes this equation. New machines allow not only to increase the output of barrels but also to establish serial production of components for the "Koalitsiya" — a system that was considered promising but not a priority before the war. Now it is becoming the basis for the modernization of artillery units, and Factory No. 9 is receiving exactly the technologies that make this possible.

Failure of Sanction Policy or Its Inevitability?

Cynics will say that sanctions never work. Realists will respond that sanctions work only to the extent that they are enforced. The problem is not that the equipment is impossible to track — LIEBHERR LFS 1200 or TACCHI HD/3 cannot be hidden in a trunk. The problem is that European manufacturers and intermediary networks have a financial interest in continuing supplies, and Western governments are not prepared for the extraterritorial application of secondary sanctions on a scale that would effectively close these channels.

Russia is not evading sanctions alone. It relies on a decades-long system of trade and financial ties that continues to function because it is beneficial for too many players to maintain. This is not a triumph of Russian ingenuity — it is a structural weakness of the Western sanctions architecture.

What’s Next?

The Russian defense industry will survive, and moreover — will continue to expand, as long as access to Western technologies through third countries is maintained. Factory No. 9 will receive its 22 machines, the "Koalitsiya" will go into series production, and barrel production will increase exponentially. The question is not whether this will happen, but how much time the West has to close these gaps before they become irreversible.

However, there is also a downside: dependence on imported equipment makes the Russian defense industry vulnerable to targeted strikes on supply chains. Every machine, every bearing, every controller — is a potential point of failure if sanctions finally begin to be applied systematically rather than symbolically. As long as this does not happen, Factory No. 9 will operate, and artillery barrels will come out of the workshops with European precision.