Europe's Defense Policy Test: Between American Dependence and Strategic Autonomy

The transatlantic security architecture is facing its greatest test since the end of the Cold War. While U.S. President Donald Trump is pushing NATO allies to increase defense spending to five percent of GDP, senior American diplomats are warning of the consequences of protectionist European arms policies. At the same time, voices in Europe are growing that demand greater strategic independence from Washington. This development reveals a fundamental conflict between economic interests and security necessities that will decisively shape the future of European defense integration.

The recent statements by U.S. ambassadors Andrew Puzder (EU) and Matthew Whitaker (NATO) make it clear that Washington perceives current European defense initiatives as a direct threat to transatlantic cooperation. At the center of the criticism are programs like SAFE (Security Action for Europe) and EDIP (European Defense Industry Program), which make it more difficult for American defense companies to access the European market. From an American perspective, particularly problematic is the planned cap of 35 percent for U.S. participation in European defense projects, as well as the demand for European control over the design, configuration, and future modifications of weapon systems.

Germany is at the center of a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, Berlin has announced plans to nearly double its defense spending from 86 billion euros in 2025 to 152 billion euros by 2029 – an unprecedented rearmament in the history of the Federal Republic. On the other hand, this massive increase in spending threatens to shake the German social contract, which has been based for decades on a combination of a strong export industry and comprehensive social security. The shift of capital from the manufacturing sector to the defense industry, combined with the loss of cheap Russian energy imports and increasing competitive pressure from China, poses fundamental challenges to the German economic structure.

Proponents of European strategic autonomy, led by French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, argue that Trump's unpredictable foreign policy leaves Europe with no other choice. The recent demands from the U.S. President for the purchase of Greenland, his interference in European domestic politics, and his ambivalent stance towards Russian aggression have shaken the foundation of transatlantic trust. In this situation, the European Union must become a true global power capable of representing its security interests independently.

However, this approach faces significant structural obstacles. The European Union does not have its own army and cannot directly finance defense spending, but can only subsidize it through grants or the theoretical possibility of joint borrowing. The latter would effectively result in financial transfers from Germany and the Netherlands to France, Italy, Greece, and other countries with higher defense spending. These recipient states pursue highly different security policy priorities – from France's global ambitions to Italy's focus on the Mediterranean to Poland's existential concern over the Russian threat.

The creation of a consolidated European defense industry would also require member states to give up important sources of employment and exports in favor of a system with low democratic control. France, despite Macron's rhetoric, is the country most resistant to such consolidation. The failure of the Franco-German FCAS fighter jet project illustrates the difficulties: Paris is unwilling to abandon the principles of national independence that have formed the basis of French state policy since 1958. A European defense industry would require a common understanding among all member states regarding the nature of threats, the development of new capabilities, control over intellectual property, and above all, arms exports – issues for which Brussels lacks both the capacity and democratic legitimacy.

Particularly contentious is the planned revision of the EU Defense Procurement Directive in 2026, which aims to establish a European preference. This would directly influence how EU states spend their national resources on defense procurement. Washington insists that EU countries should retain full sovereign autonomy in procurement decisions, without Brussels imposing additional eligibility criteria similar to those in SAFE and EDIP. The economic implications are significant: U.S. defense companies are not only suppliers but partners that have invested heavily in European economies, created tens of thousands of well-paying jobs in Europe, and provided advanced technology that strengthens NATO.

The United States points out that it has always welcomed European investments and competition in its own defense market, including through Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements (RDPAs) with 19 of the 27 EU countries. Restrictive European measures would directly contradict the obligations of member states under these agreements and undermine access to the long-shared transatlantic defense industrial base. From the American perspective, creating barriers for U.S. industry would slow down Europe's rearmament and undermine both NATO readiness and interoperability by cutting off access to integrated transatlantic supply chains.

The alternative to a centralized EU defense lies in intergovernmental cooperation. The United Kingdom has already successfully established minilateral defense partnerships with AUKUS and the Joint Expeditionary Force. Poland is sensibly collaborating with South Korea, as both countries rely on large conventional ground forces. Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom are jointly developing the GCAP fighter jet program. These projects strengthen European security without generating the political tensions that comprehensive EU integration would bring.

The historical division of labor between economic integration in Brussels and security guarantees from Washington has preserved peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area for over 70 years. A change in this order carries significant risks. The European Union is a peace project, not a war project. Its success is based on economically connecting France and Germany – a success that has required Washington's continued commitment to NATO. A shift in responsibilities would create tensions among member states that could ultimately threaten the existing structures of European cooperation.

The debate on European strategic autonomy must therefore be conducted more pragmatically. In the short term, there is no alternative to American capabilities for deterring Russia. In the long term, new spending programs should be developed through intergovernmental agreements, with NATO focusing on maintaining interoperability. Defense spending does not need to be equal in percentage terms but should vary according to fiscal space and voter willingness. Fortunately, it is precisely the Northern European states and those on NATO's eastern flank that are the most capable and willing to increase their defense budgets in response to the Russian threat.

European decision-makers face a clear choice: either they pursue policies that restrict market access and fragment the defense sector, or they promote an environment of openness, competition, and innovation. The latter approach supports collective security, readiness, resilience, and cost-effective investments – to the benefit of taxpayers, workers, and soldiers on both sides of the Atlantic.