Europe's Defense Policy Turning Point: Between Historical Rearmament, Nuclear Realignment, and Strategic Autonomy

The European defense landscape is currently undergoing the most profound transformation since the end of the Cold War. Triggered by the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the increasing pressure from Washington for a fairer burden-sharing within NATO, and the growing awareness of strategic vulnerabilities, the security policy course of the continent has fundamentally shifted. What manifested as a historic wave of rearmament in 2025 continues in 2026 with an unprecedented intensification of institutional, doctrinal, and industrial defense efforts.

The stark numbers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) paint a picture that would have seemed unimaginable just a few years ago: European military spending rose by 14 percent in 2025 to 739 billion euros – the steepest increase since the 1950s and more than a doubling within a decade. Thus, Europe recorded the highest relative growth of all continents. In global comparison, the United States remains at the top with 854 billion US dollars, followed by China with 336 billion and Russia with 190 billion US dollars. Germany, with defense spending of around 97 billion euros – an increase of 24 percent compared to 2024 – has overtaken the United Kingdom as the largest European defense investor and now ranks fourth worldwide.

This change is significantly driven by the new defense investment agreement adopted at the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025, known as the Hague Investment Plan. This plan stipulates that alliance partners must spend at least 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense annually by 2035 – divided into 3.5 percent for military core capabilities such as troops and weapon systems, and 1.5 percent for defense-related infrastructure, cybersecurity, and civil defense preparedness. Only Spain secured an exemption. If this target is met, European defense spending could grow to nearly 800 billion euros by the end of the decade, according to analyses by McKinsey & Company.

Germany is at the center of this rearmament dynamic, explicitly aiming to develop the Bundeswehr into the "strongest conventional armed force in Europe." According to Colonel (ret.) Ralph Thiele, chairman of EuroDefense Germany, there are currently 153 major projects underway. The procurement program includes, among other things, the reinforcement of infantry brigades with additional Puma infantry fighting vehicles, a multi-billion euro contract for 237 "Future Soldier" systems by 2029, and the planned acquisition of up to 600 Skyranger-30 air defense gun systems to close air defense gaps. Additionally, there are 20 new Eurofighters, extensive investments in missile systems – including Patriot, IRIS-T, and Meteor – as well as maritime expansion with up to 42 manned units integrated with 50 unmanned systems, including new corvettes and submarines. Military space programs with investments in reconnaissance satellites, space launch vehicles, and laser-based defense systems in orbit also enjoy strategic priority.

Alongside conventional rearmament, a tectonic shift is occurring in Europe's nuclear strategic architecture. Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated in February 2026 on the "Power Shift" podcast that Germany would not develop its own nuclear weapons but is open to including French and British nuclear weapons in an expanded deterrence arrangement. "The offer from the French government cannot simply be left unexamined in times like these," Merz said verbatim. French President Emmanuel Macron had previously offered multiple times to extend France's nuclear umbrella to European partners and announced an expansion of the French nuclear arsenal in March 2026. An agreement reached in July 2025 between Paris and London enhances coordination between the two European nuclear powers – both governments stated they could not envision a scenario in which the vital interests of one nation would be threatened without it also applying to the other. In addition to Germany, France and the UK are in discussions with Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and other countries about closer nuclear cooperation, joint exercises, and articulating common security interests.

These national and alliance political efforts are complemented by an increasing role of the European Union as a defense policy actor. The European Commission adopted its White Paper on the Future of European Defense in March 2025 and shortly thereafter presented the "Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030." This defines four strategic flagship projects – the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield – and calls on member states to form capability coalitions in nine key areas, including air and missile defense, strategic enablers, military mobility, cyber and electronic warfare, and drone defense. The ReArm-Europe plan provides member states with expanded fiscal flexibility to strengthen production and readiness. By 2027, a Europe-wide military mobility space with harmonized rules and a network of land, air, and sea routes is also to be established, developed in close coordination with NATO.

The alliance exercise calendars for 2026 underscore the new operational reality. The focus is clearly on the Nordic-Baltic axis: Cold Response 26, with 32,500 soldiers in Norway and Finland, has already been completed. The new US-led exercise series Sword 26, which replaces the previous DEFENDER-Europe format, is currently running from late April to May in eight European countries from the Arctic to Poland and is integrated with the Swedish exercise AURORA 26 and the maritime maneuver BALTOPS 26. Additionally, there are the three permanent "Sentry" operations – Baltic Sentry, Eastern Sentry, and Arctic Sentry – which ensure a continuous presence and deterrence along the entire eastern flank.

Despite this impressive momentum, the situation remains complex and contradictory. The GLOBSEC report 2026 on the readiness of the eastern NATO flank concludes that progress is real but uneven, with critical gaps remaining in mobilization, logistics, and industrial capacity. The production gap documented by AirStreet Press shows that there is a significant discrepancy between budget increases and actual industrial delivery capability. The International Monetary Fund also dampens expectations that higher defense spending will automatically generate economic growth. And the failure of talks regarding a British accession to the EU defense fund SAFE highlights the ongoing frictions between institutional levels.

Nevertheless, the year 2026 marks an irreversible turning point. The combination of massively increased budgets, the gradual emergence of a European pillar within NATO, the nuclear strategic realignment between Paris, London, and Berlin, and the institutionalization of defense at the EU level creates a new security policy reality. That Poland already spends 4.5 percent of its economic output on defense – more than any other European state – that Spain has reached the two percent target for the first time since the 1990s after a 50 percent increase in spending, and that even traditionally reserved nations like Sweden are participating in the nuclear strategic debate illustrates the breadth of this transformation. Europe's much-discussed "turning point" is no longer a political buzzword – it has become geopolitical reality.