Europe's Security Policy Turning Point: EU Parliamentarians Demand Defense Union with Independent Command Structures

On May 9, 2026 – Europe Day, which commemorates the Schuman Declaration of 1950 – a new cross-party alliance of EU lawmakers called for the rapid establishment of a European defense union that would be operational independently of NATO in case of emergency. The initiative marks a potential turning point in the European security architecture and brings a debate to the parliamentary level that has so far primarily been conducted in security policy think tanks and national defense ministries.

"Relying solely on the United States for the protection of Europe is a dangerous gamble," states the declaration signed by several dozen lawmakers. Among the most prominent German signatories are FDP defense politician Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, CDU foreign policy expert Michael Gahler, SPD MEP Tobias Cremer, and Green politician Hannah Neumann. Lukas Sieper from the Party of Progress (PDF) and lawmakers from numerous other EU member states have also joined the alliance. The cross-party composition of the alliance underscores that the demand for strategic autonomy is no longer just a project of French Gaullists or individual federalists, but is increasingly entering the mainstream of European politics.

Specifically, the alliance calls for the establishment of independent EU command structures and a rapid reaction force that would be operational without relying on NATO resources. The lawmakers criticize in particular that the governments of EU member states regularly express political will to strengthen military capabilities, but lack "real determination" in implementation. National individual interests continue to block progress in the joint procurement of defense equipment – a bundling of procurement projects could save up to 100 billion euros annually, according to the parliamentarians.

The demand for more European independence is not an isolated phenomenon but reflects profound structural shifts in the transatlantic relationship. The National Defense Strategy of the United States, published in January 2026, formalizes a trend that has been observed for several years: Washington no longer views the security of Europe as its primary strategic commitment. The strategic focus is increasingly shifting to the Indo-Pacific. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) intensifies this course by further exposing the differences between Congress and the White House on issues of European security and increasing pressure on Europeans to fundamentally realign their defense policy.

In parallel to the political developments, an unprecedented fiscal effort is taking place. At the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025, all 32 alliance partners – with the exception of Spain – committed to increasing their defense spending to five percent of GDP by 2035, of which at least 3.5 percent must be allocated to direct military expenditures. This is more than a doubling of the previous target of two percent, which was agreed upon at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014. According to the NATO Annual Report 2025, presented by Secretary General Mark Rutte in March 2026 in Brussels, European allies and Canada increased their defense spending by 20 percent in 2025 compared to the previous year, reaching a record sum of 498 billion euros. For the first time in the history of the alliance, a European ally, Norway, surpassed the United States in per capita defense spending.

Poland remains the undisputed leader among European NATO states with 4.30 percent of GDP, followed by Lithuania (4.00 percent), Latvia (3.74 percent), and Estonia (3.42 percent). Germany reached a value of 2.39 percent of GDP in 2025 – around 95 to 100 billion euros – placing it in the upper midfield, but far from the targeted five percent mark. For the fiscal year 2026, the federal government has increased the defense budget to 82.69 billion euros, which, together with the special fund for the Bundeswehr, results in a total volume of about 108 billion euros – an increase of 20.2 billion euros compared to 2025. The largest increase, amounting to 16.8 billion euros, is allocated to military procurement, which now constitutes 27.06 percent of the defense budget. Nevertheless, Germany remains more focused on readiness and maintenance compared to France or Poland: 40.7 percent of the budget is allocated to operations and maintenance, while investments in infrastructure are relatively modest at 4.6 percent.

The national efforts are complemented by the European SAFE program (Security Action for Europe), a credit instrument of the EU amounting to 150 billion euros to support joint procurement projects. Nineteen member states have applied for access to the funds, with disbursements beginning in early 2026. Poland receives the largest share with 43.7 billion euros, followed by Romania (16.7 billion), France and Hungary (each 16.2 billion), and Italy (14.9 billion). The conditions of the SAFE loans stipulate that a maximum of 35 percent of the component costs may originate outside the EU, EEA, EFTA, or Ukraine – a clause aimed at strengthening the European defense industry and reducing strategic dependencies.

The economic implications of this unprecedented arms buildup are increasingly concerning international financial institutions. A working paper published by the International Monetary Fund in March 2026 examines the macroeconomic consequences of synchronized defense buildup and arrives at a nuanced conclusion: While previous phases of increased defense spending showed positive growth effects with cross-border spillover effects, the multipliers in the current, unprecedentedly synchronized buildup may be lower – especially if monetary policy does not act in an accommodating manner. The European Central Bank estimates in its Economic Bulletin that the new defense measures will cumulatively account for 0.6 percent of GDP over the period from 2025 to 2027, with the lion's share falling on Germany. The growth effects are estimated at about 0.1 percentage points per year for 2026 and 2027, with the inflation effect assessed as moderate.

The nuclear question raised by EU parliamentarians adds an additional strategic dimension to the debate. Although the joint declaration does not yet address the issue of nuclear deterrence, lawmaker Lukas Sieper hinted at the presentation of the alliance that it would be taken up in the future: Nuclear weapons should be abolished globally, but as long as "powerful actors with malicious intent" possess them, it would be better for the EU itself – rather than just individual member states – to have nuclear capabilities. This statement is noteworthy in that it transfers the strategic logic of the French force de frappe to the European level and implicitly raises the question of European nuclear participation beyond American extended deterrence.

The urgency of security policy is underscored by the GLOBSEC report on the readiness of NATO's eastern flank, published in March 2026. The analysis of ten countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea notes real but uneven progress with critical gaps in mobilization, logistics, and industrial capacity. At the same time, the SIPRI report 2025 highlights the extent of global rearmament: Global military spending reached nearly 2.9 trillion US dollars, setting a new record – the eleventh consecutive year of increasing expenditures. Europe recorded the fastest increase among NATO members since 1953, with a 14 percent rise to 864 billion dollars.

Against this backdrop, the initiative of the EU parliamentarians appears less as a radical break and more as a logical consequence of a realignment of European security policy that has been emerging for years. The establishment of independent military structures is seen by the signatories not as a replacement for NATO, but as a necessary complement that keeps Europe operational should the transatlantic security guarantee lose its reliability. Whether and how quickly the parliamentary demand becomes concrete institutional reality largely depends on the political dynamics in the coming months – particularly the stance of the major member states Germany and France, as well as the further course of Washington. Europe Day 2026 could, in retrospect, prove to be the moment when the European Union began not only to lament its security policy dependence on the United States but to actively overcome it.