Europe's Turning Point: Between Strategic Autonomy and Structural Weaknesses

The transatlantic security architecture is at a turning point. While the new U.S. defense strategy for 2026 explicitly assigns Europe the primary responsibility for its conventional defense, European NATO partners are grappling with the question of whether and how quickly they can take on this role. The answer is complex and reveals both significant progress and fundamental weaknesses in the European defense architecture.

In December 2025, NATO adopted its joint budgets for 2026, signaling a new era of collective defense. However, behind this facade of unity lies a profound shift: the U.S. no longer views Europe as a vulnerable junior partner but as an economically and militarily potent actor that must act independently. This position was made unequivocally clear in February 2026 by Pentagon Undersecretary Elbridge Colby in Brussels: Europe must significantly enhance its combat capabilities and take the lead in protecting its own continent.

The European response to this American realignment varies. Germany, under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, has accelerated its Zeitenwende and is now pursuing the explicit goal of transforming the Bundeswehr into the strongest conventional military force in Europe. The figures are impressive: Germany is already investing significantly more in defense than its European partners and is expected, according to estimates from the Atlantic Council, to soon spend more than France and the United Kingdom combined – and this exclusively for conventional forces, without the costly nuclear deterrence.

However, this German dominance is causing unease in Paris, Rome, and Warsaw. France's President Emmanuel Macron, who has been advocating for European strategic autonomy since 2017, increasingly sees his vision tinged with a German accent. The concern is real: as Berlin invests a large portion of its additional defense spending in German companies like Rheinmetall, the European defense industry could increasingly fall under German control.

Meanwhile, Poland has emerged as the powerhouse of European defense. With currently about 4.1 percent of GDP allocated for defense in 2024 and a target of 4.7 percent for 2025, Poland is not only the largest NATO defense spender in terms of GDP share but also now has the largest army in the EU – numerically stronger than the French and German armed forces. This development underscores the changed security situation on NATO's eastern flank and Poland's determination to act as a bulwark against potential Russian aggression.

At the EU level, the Readiness 2030 framework is taking shape. With planned investments of about 800 billion euros for defense and resilience measures, it includes the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defense Initiative, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield. At the NATO summit in 2025, all member states committed to achieving a defense budget of 3.5 percent of national income by 2035 – an ambitious goal that not all partners are likely to meet.

Yet despite rising budgets and political declarations of intent, structural problems persist. Europe has about 1.4 million active soldiers, but interoperability remains limited. A particularly illustrative example: European armies currently use twelve different types of battle tanks. This fragmentation results not only from differing strategic cultures and the lack of a centralized command but also from decades of national procurement policies. Even the joint procurement target of 35 percent continues to be missed, which analysts attribute partly to ongoing procurement nationalism, partly to Europe's underdeveloped defense industry, and the dependence on American suppliers.

Military readiness reveals further gaps. The approximately 80,000 U.S. soldiers currently stationed in Europe maintain a high level of readiness – they can be quickly deployed and sustain operations. Smaller European units do not reach this level. According to the think tank Bruegel, Europe would need at least 300,000 additional soldiers in the event of Russian aggression without U.S. support, possibly even more, to compensate for the fragmented nature of such a multinational force.

Nuclear deterrence remains another fundamental challenge. France and the United Kingdom are Europe's only nuclear powers, while the continent largely relies on the American nuclear umbrella, including American warheads stationed in Turkey, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte made it clear in January 2026 before the European Parliament: Europe "dreams" if it believes it can build a credible defense without the U.S.

In addition to conventional and nuclear capabilities, deterrence today must also encompass cyber and gray zone threats. Here too, Europe struggles: the responses to ongoing Russian hybrid activities on European soil – sabotage, military signaling, and information manipulation – have so far failed to significantly curb the Kremlin's underlying campaign.

Several European countries have responded to this threat by reintroducing or expanding conscription. The Baltic states, which form the frontline on NATO's eastern flank, as well as Denmark and Belgium, have implemented mandatory or voluntary military service models. These measures aim not only to increase troop strength but also to enhance societal resilience and defense readiness.

The timeframes set by European politicians to replace most U.S. capabilities, except for nuclear deterrence, collide with a rapidly changing international order. European states must secure themselves against an increasingly unreliable transatlantic relationship. President Trump's escalating remarks about the takeover of Greenland in January 2026 triggered a wave of demands from European leaders for greater autonomy and accelerated rearmament. Even if these threats subsided, it would be a misinterpretation to assume that the alliance structure has been restored.

The new U.S. defense strategy makes it clear: Russia is "not capable of seeking European hegemony." The European NATO members "outstrip Russia in economic size, population, and thus in latent military power." The non-U.S. NATO GDP amounts to 26 trillion dollars compared to Russia's 2 trillion dollars. Therefore, the strategy asserts, European NATO must "take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense."

This sober American assessment raises the central question: If Europe is economically and demographically so superior, why can it not independently ensure its own security? The answer lies in fragmentation. Europe's greatest weakness is not a lack of potential but the inability to harness that potential. The deep reluctance of member states to subordinate defense decisions to a supranational authority remains embedded in the constitutional order of the EU. The Common Security and Defense Policy is strictly intergovernmental and based on unanimity – national security and thus central defense decisions remain exclusively a matter of national sovereignty.

The coming years will show whether Europe can master the balancing act between national sovereignty and collective action capability. The means are available, the political will is growing, but the structural hurdles remain high. Germany's rearmament, Poland's military buildup, and the 800 billion euro initiative are impressive steps. However, without genuine integration, joint procurement, and supranational command structures, the question remains whether Europe would truly be capable of action in a crisis – or whether the strategic autonomy that Macron has been speaking of since 2017 remains a vision that collapses under national realities.