Sahel: The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel Against the Intensification of the Jihadist Threat

The Sahel States Alliance is going through a critical phase of its existence. As the joint military force of 5,000 men, inaugurated in December 2025, begins its first large-scale operations, jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are intensifying their attacks across the region. The first two weeks of March 2026 perfectly illustrate this symmetrical escalation where each military advance meets a calculated terrorist response.

The military deployment by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger represents an unprecedented ambition for these three nations that have broken with their former Western partners and the Economic Community of West African States. Based in Niamey, the Nigerien capital, this joint force has a centralized command and relies on the operational resources of the three member states. According to the latest operational reports, Malian and Burkinabè forces eliminated more than one hundred terrorist fighters between February 21 and March 6, 2026, primarily in the northern Sahel border region. These figures, while significant, must be analyzed in the broader context of a jihadist insurgency that now controls vast territories and demonstrates remarkable adaptability.

The ministerial meeting on February 26, 2026, in Ouagadougou marked a turning point in the operational coordination of the Alliance. The defense ministers of the three countries finalized the roadmap for the second year of the AES, emphasizing the integration of intelligence and the planning of large-scale cross-border operations. This coordinated approach directly addresses the transnational nature of the jihadist threat, where groups like Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Sahel exploit porous border areas to escape military pressure.

The offensive launched by the Burkinabè armed forces in early March against jihadist positions around Djibo, in the northern Sahel region, illustrates the new operational doctrine of the Alliance. Rather than settling for defensive reactions, government forces are adopting an offensive posture aimed at regaining control of strategic roadways and breaking the encirclement of urban centers. Airstrikes combined with ground operations have neutralized more than fifty militants, according to official military sources. This counter-offensive occurs in a context where nearly ten percent of the Burkinabè population is displaced within the country, a telling testament to the scale of the humanitarian crisis generated by the conflict.

In Niger, the attack carried out in early February 2026 against the main airport and an adjacent military base by the Islamic State in the Sahel revealed the persistent vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure, even in supposedly secure areas. This bold operation demonstrates that jihadist groups retain their capacity for asymmetric strikes despite increased military pressure. The fact that such strategic facilities can be targeted raises questions about the effectiveness of intelligence and the perimeter protection of sensitive sites.

The technological dimension of the Sahelian conflict is also experiencing a concerning evolution. Since 2023, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has launched nearly a hundred attacks using armed drones, according to data compiled by international observers. This technological escalation by the insurgents reflects not only their access to sophisticated supply chains but also their capacity to absorb military innovations. In the face of this emerging aerial threat, government forces must adapt their anti-drone defense systems, a considerable technical and financial challenge for armies with constrained budgets.

Alongside the efforts of the Sahel States Alliance, the Economic Community of West African States is attempting to structure its own collective response. The plan announced in August 2025 calls for the mobilization of a 260,000-strong counter-terrorism force, an ambitious figure that reflects the scale of the perceived threat. Initially, ECOWAS will deploy a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel by the end of 2026, primarily intended to protect coastal states against the southward expansion of jihadist groups. This parallel initiative creates a fragmented security architecture where two regional mechanisms coexist without true coordination, reflecting the political divisions that have fractured West Africa since the military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The geographical expansion of the jihadist insurgency may be the most alarming trend of 2026. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin recorded its first attacks in the circles of Kenieba and Kangaba in Mali, near the Guinean border, in 2024. This gradual penetration into new territories suggests a deliberate strategy of expansion aimed at creating alternative fallback zones and exploiting new populations vulnerable to radicalization narratives. The tri-border area separating Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has transformed into an epicenter of conflict where the Islamic State in the Sahel and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin have anchored their presence, creating strategic implications for both central Sahel and coastal West Africa.

The growing collaboration between the Islamic State in the Sahel and the Islamic State Province in West Africa, based in Nigeria, represents a new dimension of the threat. The regional office of the Islamic State for West Africa, Maktab al-Furqan, is now coordinating the transfers of fuel, weapons, equipment, and even fighters and instructors to the Burkinabè and Malian fronts. This transregional logistics provides the insurgents with strategic depth that significantly complicates the task of government forces, which are forced to think about their operations on the scale of multiple interconnected theaters.

The American military presence in the region, although reduced, remains a factor in the Sahelian security equation. Approximately 1,500 American soldiers are deployed in the region, notably at the drone base in Niger, which served as a platform for strikes against jihadist groups in West and North Africa. However, the strained relations between Washington and the military juntas in central Sahel have significantly limited the effectiveness of this cooperation. The French withdrawal and the American redeployment have created a security vacuum that Russian partners and other actors are attempting to fill, without reversing the jihadist expansion dynamic.

The fundamental issue facing the Sahel States Alliance goes far beyond the strictly military dimension. Counter-insurgency operations, no matter how intensive, cannot alone resolve a crisis rooted in political marginalization, economic exclusion, intercommunal tensions, and the weakness of state institutions. The increasing militarization of the response, symbolized by the joint force of 5,000 men and ECOWAS's plans for an army of 260,000 soldiers, risks paradoxically exacerbating popular grievances if not accompanied by parallel strategies of inclusive governance, economic development, and transitional justice.

The first two weeks of March 2026 confirmed that the Sahel remains one of the most volatile conflict theaters in the world. The elimination of more than one hundred jihadist fighters by Malian and Burkinabè forces, the counter-offensive around Djibo, and the coordination meeting in Ouagadougou testify to a real political will and operational capacity of the Sahel States Alliance. Nevertheless, the attack on the Niger airport, the proliferation of jihadist drones, the territorial expansion of the insurgents, and the fragmentation of the regional security architecture remind us that the road to stabilization will be long and fraught with obstacles. The question is no longer whether an exclusive military solution can prevail – the last fifteen years of conflict have demonstrated its limits – but rather whether regional and international actors can build a truly holistic approach combining security, governance, and development before the insurgency becomes irreversibly entrenched in the Sahelian social fabric.