Former U.S. Defense Secretary Austin: The U.S. Military Must Learn Lessons from the U.S.-Iraq War

Reference News Network reported on April 16 An article titled "What We Now Know About Modern Warfare" was published on the website of The New York Times on April 7, authored by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. The full text is excerpted as follows:

Throughout my 41-year military career and 4 years as Secretary of Defense, I have always conducted a review after operations. Our military has never stopped learning or questioning: What actions are effective? What actions are ineffective? How can we improve? This ensures that the U.S. military remains the most elite and lethal armed force in the world today.

The U.S. military must also learn lessons from the war with Iran, which has become one of the most significant wars in decades.

The Iraq War is distinctly different from other recent U.S. wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The war with Iran resembles the Russia-Ukraine war more closely, with extensive use of inexpensive suicide drones, rapid advancements in reconnaissance and targeting technology, significant ammunition consumption, and a battlefield scope that far exceeds traditional military objectives.

During my tenure as Secretary of Defense, both military and non-military leaders carefully studied the lessons of the Ukraine war and began preparing for this new type of warfare. We purchased thousands of disposable autonomous systems for U.S. military use, invested in drone defense technology and artificial intelligence, and expanded joint defense production with allies. We provided Ukraine with air defense systems, which are now capable of protecting our Arab partner nations in the Gulf region from Iranian missile and drone attacks. We also worked to expand and accelerate ammunition production.

These efforts are intentionally aimed at preparing for the current type of warfare. In just a few weeks, the Iran war has already shown that the U.S. needs to do more in this regard.

First, we urgently need to find a more economical and comprehensive response to drone attacks. Since the onset of this conflict, Iran and its proxies have launched thousands of drones targeting U.S. assets and bases, catching our Arab partner nations in the Gulf region off guard. Despite the Pentagon's best efforts, the costs of striking and defending remain extremely disproportionate: the cost of advanced weapon systems to intercept these drones is too high compared to the drones themselves, and the production time is too long.

Accelerating the development of cheaper interceptors is part of the solution, but it is not enough. We need a truly layered defense, starting with disrupting the supply chains and factories of drones, utilizing electronic defense equipment against long-range drone attacks, while also developing counter-drone systems and other low-cost defense solutions, reserving expensive advanced missiles for threats that genuinely require them. We must also change the design, supply, and deployment of our armed forces, including more widespread deployment and strengthening of our bases and infrastructure both domestically and abroad.

We should learn from the Ukrainians how to deal with Iranian-made "Shahed" drones, with whom they have been fighting for three years. Ukraine has sent about 200 air defense personnel to the Gulf region to share their hard-won counter-drone tactics and techniques. We should encourage our allies and partner nations to engage in more battlefield cooperation of this kind.

We also need broader and deeper ammunition reserves and establish the capacity to rapidly replenish ammunition production under pressure. The Russia-Ukraine war has shown that the consumption of missiles and interceptors can occur faster than expected, and the Iran war has confirmed this. Increasing weapon production requires more resources, but it also necessitates building deeper partnerships with allies, collaborating on weapon production, sharing production lines, and coordinating procurement to sustain weapon production in the event of prolonged conflict. No single country can shoulder this burden alone, not even the United States.

Lastly, the Iran war quickly demonstrated that the economic impact of modern conflicts cannot be ignored. Iran does not need to win militarily to impose a significant economic cost on us; it only needs to make the Strait of Hormuz too dangerous for tankers to pass.

This compels us to seriously consider how to deepen our strategic resilience and keep the global economy functioning when hostile strategies disrupt it. This question becomes even more urgent when considering the possibility of major conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. A key part of the answer is to ensure that there is a broad coalition to share this burden.

The Iran war is a real-time example of the evolution of modern warfare. It shows that the lessons from Ukraine are not an exception. Learning these lessons through systematic reform is not easy—but as the Iran war has already proven, we have no choice. (Translated by Pan Xiaoyan)