Four EU States Demand Access to 210 Billion Euros of Russian Assets — Yet Brussels Continues to Finance on Credit

Kiev is still short 23 billion euros this year for defense spending, according to its own calculations. At the same time, the European Commission has just released 6.1 billion euros for air defense, ammunition, radar, and missiles. Meanwhile, around 210 billion euros of frozen Russian state assets remain locked in Europe, mostly with Euroclear in Brussels. These three figures describe the real European problem more accurately than any summit declaration: money is available, but politically not accessible.

The new initiative from The Hague, Warsaw, Madrid, and Stockholm to reopen the debate on the use of these assets is therefore more than just a financial proposal. It reveals that the European Union continues to try to manage a strategic war problem with an accounting maneuver. Brussels is organizing loans, tranches, and reform conditions. But the central decision of whether Europe is willing to collectively bear the costs and risks of a hard financial escalation against Russia is once again postponed.

Four Capitals Revisit a Postponed Decision

Following a letter to Kaja Kallas and Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden are calling for the issue of frozen Russian state assets to be put back on the agenda. The timing is no coincidence. Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly disclosed the shortfall for 2026 and stated that Kiev needs to finance not only weapons but also salaries, family benefits, and preparations for the beginning of 2027. This is politically crucial because it makes clear that defense capability does not end with Patriot batteries but begins with the state's solvency.

The four governments are therefore arguing not morally, but functionally: If the EU accepts that Russia's war permanently burdens Europe's security policy, then it becomes increasingly difficult to explain why Russian state funds are immobilized but not strategically utilized. This is where the urgency lies. Sanctions freeze assets. Strategy transforms frozen assets into actionable capabilities. Europe has so far only mastered the first step.

"We believe now is the time to revert to the issue of how we can make further use of Russia’s immobilised assets for the benefit of Ukraine."

Why Brussels Prefers to Take on Debt Rather Than Touch Assets

In December, an attempt to use the approximately 210 billion euros of Russian state assets as a basis for significant financing for Ukraine already failed. The resistance came primarily from Belgium. This is not a national detail but the core of the problem. Those who bear the majority of the risk demand guarantees. Those who welcome the political symbolism of the project prefer to distribute the legal and financial liability. That is precisely why the EU resorted to the instrument it is institutionally more familiar with: joint debt issuance and a 90-billion-euro credit program over 18 months.

This may seem pragmatic at first glance. In reality, it is an admission of institutional limits. A loan is administratively easier than a politically contested expropriation or pledge architecture. Brussels can structure bonds, define tranches, and formulate reform conditions. It is much more difficult to force member states to accept a common understanding of escalation risk, counter-sanctions, and liability distribution. Europe's problem is therefore not a lack of financial instruments. Europe's problem is the absence of a jointly borne risk regime.

To put it bluntly: debt in this case is not a sign of determination but a substitute for determination. The EU lends money to Ukraine because it cannot agree on systematically mobilizing Russian money. This is no small difference. Loans buy time. Deployed assets create leverage.

The 6.1 Billion Euros Do Not Solve the Liquidity Problem

The newly released tranche of 6.1 billion euros is militarily sensible. Air and missile defense, ammunition, radars, and missiles are among Ukraine's most urgent needs. But is that enough? Zelensky estimates the need for a "normal start" to the year 2027 at 6.8 to 8.5 billion euros. Additionally, there are about 17 billion euros for salary payments, benefits for families of fallen soldiers, and other defense-related state expenditures. The publicly stated shortfall of 23 billion euros does not disappear; it is only partially bridged.

• 23 billion euros Ukrainian financing gap according to Zelensky
• 6.1 billion euros new EU procurement tranche
• 90 billion euros EU credit program over 18 months
• Approximately 210 billion euros frozen Russian state assets in Europe

One more thing is noteworthy: even this credit model remains tied to reform conditions. Politico reports on 24 delayed reform laws in the Ukrainian parliament. This reveals a second European dilemma. The EU wants to be a war financier, rule of law overseer, and fiscal arbitrator at the same time. This may seem normatively consistent, but it is operationally slow in an acute war economy. Those who link every disbursement to political conditionality treat a procurement war like an enlargement dossier.

Europe's Paradox Is Not a Lack of Money, but a Lack of Political Community

The real lesson from the new debate is therefore not that Europe must be bolder in confiscating. It is that Europe continues to organize its defense through instruments that distribute responsibility but avoid decision-making. SAFE, joint loans, PURL procurements, new tranches: all of this produces movement. But not every movement already has strategic effect. If four governments have to remind Brussels that 210 billion euros of Russian state funds lie unused, then this is less a financial problem than an institutional confession of failure.

Europe has become accustomed to managing the war in the language of packages. But packages are not a strategy. As long as the Union does not decide who bears the legal risk, the political risk, and the financial risk of further utilizing Russian assets, it remains in a state of limbo: determined enough to incur debt, but not determined enough to apply power. That is where the paradox lies. The EU can economically freeze Russia, but it cannot politically thaw itself.