From Double-Line Encirclement to Strategic Discourse Power: The PLA's Countermeasures in the South China Sea and the Deep Signals of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum Pre-Meeting

In late April to early May 2026, the security landscape of the Western Pacific underwent a rare concentrated reshaping. The U.S.-Philippines "Shoulder to Shoulder-2026" joint military exercise, the Japan Self-Defense Forces landing in the Philippines for the first time in a formal combat role since World War II, the dual-line countermeasures by the PLA's Liaoning aircraft carrier group and the 107 task force led by the Type 055 destroyer, as well as the upcoming Beijing Xiangshan Forum pre-meeting scheduled for May 7-9, form a panorama of interconnected strategic games. The accumulation of these events not only marks a new intensity level in military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific but also profoundly reflects China's increasingly mature balancing ability between hard power application and soft power layout.

The "Shoulder to Shoulder-2026" exercise commenced on April 20 and lasted until May 8, with a total troop strength exceeding 17,000. Among them, approximately 10,000 were U.S. troops, about 7,000 were Philippine troops, and around 1,400 were from the Japan Self-Defense Forces, with personnel from Australia, Canada, France, and Singapore also participating, along with observers from 17 other countries. This scale set a historical record for the exercise, but what truly drew the attention of the strategic community were three qualitative changes that occurred during the exercise. First, the fundamental transformation of Japan's role. Previously, Japan participated in the "Shoulder to Shoulder" series of exercises only as an observer, but this time it not only sent a combat force of 1,400 but also deployed the "Ise" helicopter destroyer and the "Ray" destroyer, and stationed 88-type shore-based anti-ship missiles along the coast of Ilocos Norte in the Philippines. Particularly sensitive was the "Ray" destroyer's deliberate passage through the Taiwan Strait on April 17, choosing to sail at low speed for 14 hours on the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense, responded sternly at a regular press conference on April 30, pointing out that Japan is "deliberately breaking through the constraints of the 'Peace Constitution' and accelerating the push for 'remilitarization'," and he rarely recalled the atrocities committed by the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War II, such as the "Bataan Death March," implying the historical irony of Japan's military power returning to the Philippines. Second, the exercise subjects shifted from traditional humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism to highly offensive amphibious landings, maritime blockades, and live-fire anti-ship shooting, with the U.S. deploying F-35B stealth fighters, the "Reagan" carrier strike group, and the "DF-21" medium-range missile system. Third, the geographical layout of the exercise was highly focused on northern Luzon Island, located about 140 kilometers from the Taiwan Strait and about 230 kilometers from Scarborough Shoal, forming a cross-fire coverage with the 88-type anti-ship missiles deployed by Japan in the Luzon Strait, effectively rehearsing operational plans for "blockading the throat of the first island chain."

In response to this multinational military pressure, the PLA's reaction can be described as a textbook-level "equivalent escalation." The Southern Theater Command organized two mutually supportive naval action task forces. The first was the 107 task force centered around the Type 055 destroyer Zunyi (hull number 107), which included the Type 052D destroyer Hefei, the Type 054A frigate Xianing, and the Type 903A comprehensive supply ship Luomahu. This task force arrived in the waters east of Luzon Island via the Bashi Channel from April 23 to 24, conducting live-fire shooting, air-sea coordinated maneuvers, rapid ocean deployment, and maritime supply, among other comprehensive real-combat training. The Zunyi is equipped with a 112-unit universal vertical launch system and carries the YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile, with a strike range of up to 1,500 kilometers, and currently, no active air defense missile system in the world can effectively intercept this type of weapon. The 64-unit vertical launch system of the Type 052D Hefei is compatible with the HQ-9B long-range air defense missile, YJ-18A heavy anti-ship missile, and CJ-10 cruise missile, forming a complete firepower chain from air defense to land strike. According to a report by Malaysia's "Asian Defense Security" website on April 25, the 107 task force conducted a test launch of the YJ-20 missile after arriving in the training area, demonstrating substantial deterrent capability in front of the multinational coalition.

The second task force was a mixed fleet centered around the Liaoning aircraft carrier. Commercial satellite images showed that at least 14 major vessels were gathered around the Liaoning, including Type 075 amphibious assault ships, Type 071 landing dock ships, Type 055 and Type 052D destroyers, and Type 054A frigates, with a total tonnage exceeding 200,000 tons. This task force was deployed in the South China Sea about 290 kilometers east of Yongxing Island, with eight J-15 carrier-based fighters and three helicopters on deck, presenting a standard combat configuration. The two task forces, one to the east and one to the west, encircled the approximately 60,000-ton exercise fleet of the U.S.-Japan-Philippines coalition in the middle, forming a tonnage suppression ratio of about 4 to 1. The task force conducted high-intensity subjects such as S-shaped maneuvers to evade anti-ship missiles, constructing multi-layer air defense networks, and practicing three-dimensional landing tactics, showcasing the substantial progress of the Chinese Navy from single aircraft carrier operations to a multidimensional joint combat system. Philippine media ABS-CBN reported that the Chinese Navy sent seven vessels to closely "observe" the exercise, while the maritime portion of the U.S.-Japan-Philippines exercise was concluded early.

Also noteworthy is the widespread interpretation triggered by the appearance of 19-year-old recruit He Jian in the naval promotional video "Toward the Ocean"—public opinion generally believes this hints at the imminent debut of China's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Colonel Zhang Xiaogang responded by stating, "A thousand readers have a thousand Hamlets," neither confirming nor denying, maintaining strategic ambiguity. At the same time, the Y-20B improved transport aircraft made its official debut and executed the mission of repatriating the remains of Korean War martyrs, showcasing the elevation of the Chinese Air Force's long-range strategic delivery capabilities, which Zhang Xiaogang summarized as "bringing the bravest people home with the most passionate 'Chinese heart.'"

Beyond the display of hard power, China is simultaneously laying out its soft power dimension. From May 7 to 9, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum pre-meeting will be held in Beijing, inviting over 120 defense officials, experts, scholars, and media representatives from more than 30 countries and international organizations to attend. The theme of the meeting is "Global Security Governance: Challenges and Solutions," covering topics such as "International Order and International Rule of Law," "New Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific," and "Risk Control of Military Applications of Emerging Technologies," and arranging special thematic exchanges to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum. This timing—coinciding with the "Shoulder to Shoulder-2026" exercise—is no coincidence. While demonstrating military countermeasure capabilities, China is also building a multilateral security dialogue platform, conveying a clear message to regional countries: China possesses both the hard power to defend its sovereignty and the sincerity and mechanisms to promote peaceful dialogue. The Ministry of Defense spokesperson emphasized multiple times at the press conference that "what the Asia-Pacific region needs most is peace and tranquility, and what it needs least is the introduction of external forces to create division and confrontation," which is the official interpretation of this strategic logic.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, the current situation in the Asia-Pacific is undergoing structural reconstruction. Japan is amending its "Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer," in principle allowing the export of lethal weapons, planning to restore the military ranks of the old Japanese army such as "Colonel," and intends to set up legislation through the National Security Council—this series of "remilitarization" measures is accelerating. The U.S. is planning to build a large military fuel depot in Davao City, Philippines, intending to ensure the long-term forward deployment of vessels and aircraft. China, on the other hand, is constructing a more complete offshore defense and deterrence system through the dual aircraft carrier capabilities of the Liaoning and Fujian, the mass service and combat deployment of Type 055 destroyers, and the maturation of the Y-20B strategic delivery platform. Defense Minister Dong Jun's visits to Russia and Kyrgyzstan and attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Defense Ministers' meeting further solidified the strategic pivot to the west. Against this backdrop, the holding of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum pre-meeting is not only a diplomatic event but also a crucial step for China to compete for the narrative power of Asia-Pacific security and counter the military alliance narrative of the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines.

In summary, the confrontation in the South China Sea from April to early May 2026 marks the entry of military competition in the Asia-Pacific into a new phase of "equivalent countermeasures." China is no longer satisfied with diplomatic protests or symbolic displays but is responding to each escalation of external pressure with substantial military deployments and live-fire exercises, while also constructing an alternative security narrative framework through multilateral diplomatic platforms. This dual-track strategy of "hard power countermeasures + soft power dialogue" is reshaping the underlying logic of the Asia-Pacific security ecology.