From Fujian Ship to Type 004: Analysis of the Strategic Leap and Shortcomings of the PLA Aircraft Carrier Fleet

In March 2026, the development of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's aircraft carriers reached a critical juncture. The Type 003 Fujian has completed the final phase of sea trials and is about to officially enter service, while the larger Type 004 "super carrier" has also begun to take shape in the dock. This rapid development has caused unease in the Pentagon, but behind the apparent increase in the number of hulls, the core element that truly determines combat capability—the development of carrier-based aviation—has revealed significant delays.

The Fujian is China's third aircraft carrier, with the hull number CV-18, measuring 316 meters in length and approximately 76 meters in width, making it the largest non-nuclear powered combat vessel in the world. Since beginning sea trials in May 2024 until the end of 2025, the Fujian has completed nine sea trials. On September 22, 2025, Chinese state media publicly released video footage of the Fujian conducting electromagnetic catapult tests during its ninth sea trial return, showing that the J-15T, J-35, and KJ-600 carrier-based aircraft completed launch verification. According to an analysis in the March 2026 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings magazine, the Fujian is likely to complete all tests and officially enter service in the first half of 2026.

The most striking technical feature of the Fujian is its flat deck design and the application of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS). This marks a complete departure from the ski-jump takeoff method used by the Liaoning and Shandong, adopting the same technological path as the U.S. Ford-class carriers. Compared to traditional steam catapults, electromagnetic catapults offer higher energy efficiency, smoother acceleration curves, and lower structural stress on the hull, which can extend the service life of carrier-based aircraft and increase sortie rates. However, multiple reports indicate that the Fujian's electromagnetic catapult system has encountered some technical issues during debugging, which is not surprising— the U.S. Navy's USS Ford also experienced years of teething problems with its electromagnetic catapult system.

Meanwhile, China's fourth aircraft carrier is under construction. According to commercial satellite imagery analysis, the Type 004 carrier may become the world's largest conventionally powered aircraft carrier, designed to carry over 100 aircraft, while the standard air wing for the U.S. Ford-class carriers is about 90 aircraft. This scale expansion not only signifies an enhancement in strike capability but also reflects the PLA Navy's strategic intent to establish sustained air superiority in blue-water operations. China has added a second large shipyard for aircraft carrier construction and has implemented a fusion of civilian and military shipbuilding capabilities, significantly shortening the construction cycle for aircraft carriers.

However, the aircraft carrier itself is merely a floating platform; true combat power depends on the air power it carries. This is precisely the biggest shortcoming currently faced by the PLA Navy. Although the Fujian and the future Type 004 carrier possess advanced catapult systems, China has yet to form a scaled fleet of fifth-generation carrier-based stealth fighters. In contrast, the U.S. Navy has already been able to deploy over 40 F-35C stealth fighters on a single carrier and up to 20 F-35B fighters on America-class amphibious assault ships. Additionally, Japan and South Korea are rapidly expanding their F-35 fleets, with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force having completed F-35B takeoff and landing tests on the Izumo-class helicopter destroyers.

China's fifth-generation carrier-based aircraft primarily rely on the J-35 fighter, a twin-engine medium stealth fighter that bears similarities to the U.S. F-35, but still lags behind in engine technology, avionics systems, and combat experience. The J-35 catapult tests conducted on the Fujian in September 2025 were an important milestone, but it will take time to develop combat capability. According to open-source intelligence analysis, the mass production of the J-35 is relatively slow, and by early 2026, the number of aircraft produced may not be sufficient to equip the Fujian with a complete stealth fighter squadron. While China's existing land-based J-20 stealth fighters have excellent performance, they are not designed for carrier operations and would require extensive aerial refueling support to operate from land bases in support of maritime operations, making sustained operations difficult.

This generational gap in air power means that at the current stage, the PLA Navy's carrier strike groups remain at a clear disadvantage when facing the combined air power of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. Any attempt to launch large-scale maritime and aerial operations in the Taiwan Strait or the First Island Chain will face strong suppression from the U.S. military's forward-deployed F-35 groups and the F-35 squadrons of the Japanese and South Korean air forces. Therefore, although the commissioning of the Fujian marks a significant advancement in Chinese carrier technology, its deterrent value outweighs its practical combat value in the coming years.

In the long run, the PLA Navy's carrier strategy remains a race against time and scale. If China can achieve large-scale production of the J-35 in the next three to five years and develop more advanced sixth-generation carrier-based aircraft (such as the J-36 or J-40) on that basis, then by the early 2030s, the PLA Navy, with three to four electromagnetic catapult carriers and hundreds of fifth-generation carrier-based aircraft, will possess genuine blue-water combat capabilities. However, until then, the air superiority of the U.S. and its allies in the Western Pacific region remains firmly established.

It is worth noting that the rapid expansion of the PLA Navy also brings numerous training, logistics, and organizational challenges. Carrier operations require not only vessels and aircraft but also a mature carrier-based aviation training system, effective fleet coordination capabilities, a reliable supply chain, and experienced command personnel. The U.S. Navy has built a complete set of operational theories and training standards through nearly a century of carrier operations experience. The Chinese Navy is still catching up in these "soft power" aspects, which is why the Fujian, while technically close to U.S. levels, is still considered to have gaps in overall combat capability assessments.

In summary, the commissioning of the Fujian in March 2026 marks a critical turning point for China, moving from "having aircraft carriers" to "effectively utilizing aircraft carriers." The PLA Navy is building a modern carrier fleet at an unprecedented speed, which is a core component of China's strategy to become a global maritime power. However, whether this ambitious plan can truly translate into combat power depends on whether carrier-based aircraft like the J-35 can achieve large-scale deployment in the coming years, and whether the Chinese Navy can fundamentally shift from near-sea defense to blue-water operations in training, command, and operational theory. In this race for "super carriers," hardware is just the starting point; software is the key to determining victory or defeat.