From Liaoning Carrier Group to YJ-20 Test Launch: Analyzing the New Pressure Tactics of the PLA's South China Sea Strategy

In late April 2026, the situation in the South China Sea suddenly escalated. As the U.S.-Philippines "Shoulder to Shoulder-2026" joint military exercise commenced on April 20, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) centered around the Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group conducted an unprecedented display of naval power and realistic combat drills in the South China Sea and the waters east of Luzon Island. This series of military actions was not merely routine training but represented Beijing's first comprehensive strategic response using a complete aircraft carrier strike group in conjunction with hypersonic anti-ship missile systems in the face of multinational joint military exercises in the region.

The catalyst for the events can be traced back to April 17. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer "Yūgure" crossed the Taiwan Strait, marking the fourth such passage by a Japanese warship since September 2024. More symbolically, April 17 coincided with the 131st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which forced China to cede Taiwan to Japan. The PLA Daily subsequently published a commentary accusing Tokyo of "hurting the feelings of the Chinese people." Three days later, the U.S. and the Philippines launched the "Shoulder to Shoulder-2026" joint military exercise, the largest since the exercise's inception in the 1990s, with over 17,000 personnel participating from the U.S., Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand. Notably, Japan participated for the first time with combat troops, sending approximately 1,400 Self-Defense Force members to the Philippines, making it the third-largest contributor of forces after the U.S. and the Philippines. Japanese forces will conduct live-fire exercises using the Type 88 coastal defense missile in the waters north of Luzon Island, marking the first time Japan has launched this type of weapon system outside its territory.

In response to this strategic pressure, the PLA reacted swiftly and multidimensionally. On April 20, the day the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise opened, the Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group sailed south through the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, the Eastern Theater Command dispatched the 133rd Naval Task Group through the Yonaguni Channel—a waterway located in the Ryukyu Islands, close to the Japanese mainland—into the Western Pacific. On April 22, the Navy announced that the Type 076 amphibious assault ship "Sichuan" had set sail from Shanghai to the South China Sea. This is China's first new-generation drone mother ship, capable of operating both unmanned aerial vehicles and manned aircraft simultaneously, and its trial voyage near the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise area carries clear and significant symbolic meaning.

On April 25, the Southern Theater Command officially confirmed that the fleet was conducting training exercises in the waters east of Luzon Island. The formation was led by the Type 055 destroyer "Zunyi," with images showing "Zunyi" leading four vessels in formation. Most notably, according to pro-PLA social media accounts, the Type 055 destroyer again launched the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile during this training exercise. Although this information has not been independently verified, in December 2025, China publicly broadcast footage of the Type 055 destroyer launching the YJ-20, confirming that this weapon has transitioned from the testing phase to operational deployment.

The tactical significance of the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile cannot be underestimated. The missile employs a boost-glide or quasi-ballistic attack profile, with a cruising speed exceeding Mach 6 and a terminal speed approaching Mach 10, compressing the enemy's reaction time into an extremely short window. Its estimated range is about 1,500 kilometers, meaning that the Type 055 destroyer deployed east of Luzon Island could theoretically cover targets far beyond the tactical maritime range, extending strike depth to critical nodes in U.S. reinforcement routes. Traditional sea-based air defense systems—including the Aegis combat system and Standard series interceptors—were initially optimized for predictable ballistic missile targets, and the existing multi-layered defense architecture faces fundamental questions regarding its effectiveness against the hypersonic maneuvering terminal penetration capabilities of the YJ-20.

The Type 055 destroyer itself warrants in-depth analysis. With a standard displacement of approximately 13,000 tons, although officially classified as a destroyer by China, it is essentially a large surface combatant of cruiser-level capabilities in terms of displacement, command functions, and strike capabilities. Its 112-cell universal vertical launch system can mix hypersonic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarine weapons, and land-attack cruise missiles, providing unprecedented firepower flexibility. In a fleet combat system, the Type 055 vessel serves not only as a protective barrier for the aircraft carrier but also as an independent offensive strike node and the central command for fleet air defense. Its dual-band radar architecture and advanced C4ISR systems enable it to act simultaneously as both sensor and shooter, reducing reliance on independent command platforms and achieving faster engagement cycles in high-threat environments.

From a strategic perspective, the deployment method of the Liaoning strike group conveys a clear message: Beijing is no longer satisfied with verbal protests but has chosen to position its most advanced surface combat forces and politically valuable aircraft carrier in locations where allied planners can see, measure, and calculate the consequences of military actions. The Liaoning strike group is conducting simultaneous operations on both sides of Luzon Island, in conjunction with the trial deployment of the Type 076 drone mother ship, creating a pincer-like maritime pressure situation—encircling the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise area from both the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea.

Notably, the Ministry of Defense's routine press conference on April 30 provided an official narrative framework for this series of actions. Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang reiterated China's position regarding the South China Sea situation while announcing that from May 7 to 9, the 2026 Xiangshan Forum will be held in Beijing, inviting over 120 defense officials, experts, and media representatives from more than 30 countries and international organizations to attend, with the theme "Global Security Governance: Challenges and Solutions." This diplomatic agenda contrasts with military pressure, reflecting the PLA's strategic thinking of "combining civil and military efforts."

From a broader perspective, this incident marks a new phase in the South China Sea contest. Beijing is transitioning from a low-intensity gray zone strategy primarily focused on maritime law enforcement, with military presence as a secondary aspect, to a formal military display centered on aircraft carrier strike groups and hypersonic weapon systems. This shift is not coincidental—it occurs in the first year of China's 14th Five-Year Plan, with a 7% increase in the defense budget reaching 1.94 trillion yuan, and during a window where the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war continues to provide practical lessons for various countries. A recent article published in Small Wars Journal on the limitations of the PLA's officer system points out that while China's military modernization has made significant technological progress, the centralized command culture has not fundamentally changed. This means that while the "hard power" displayed by Beijing is increasingly formidable, its actual combat effectiveness in complex battlefield environments remains uncertain.

Overall, the April 2026 standoff in the South China Sea is a landmark moment for China's military power projection capabilities. The 14 vessels of the Liaoning strike group, the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missiles from the Type 055 destroyers, and the first operational maritime deployment of the Type 076 drone mother ship—all these elements together constitute a complete demonstration of a maritime denial system. It sends a clear signal to regional allies and potential adversaries: the future conflict dynamics in the South China Sea will no longer revolve solely around territorial disputes over islands and shoals but will be shaped by long-range hypersonic maritime strike systems capable of targeting aircraft carrier strike groups and expeditionary forces.