Gerasimov Claims 85 Percent of Liman and Reveals the Crisis of Reporting in the Russian Army in Ukraine

The figure of 85 percent for Liman sounds impressive only until it is placed next to a map. According to the ISW assessment from May 16, 2026, Russian forces have confirmed presence in approximately 0.06 percent of Liman, while Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported control over 85 percent of the city. The difference between these two figures is not a typical error of military fog. It is no longer fog, but a system for producing a desired reality.

Report on the Offensive West of Kupiansk

On May 16, Gerasimov met with the command of the Russian grouping of troops "West" and described the situation on the Kupiansk, Borovaya, and Liman directions as if the Russian operation had already moved to the next phase. In his account, Russian troops are advancing west of Kupiansk towards Shevchenkove, have entered Velika Shapkovka, occupied Borovaya and Kutykovka, and control half of Shiykovka and most of Liman. If taken literally, this report presents a nearly classic picture of the Soviet operational school: seizing a node, reaching communications, and then pressing on to the next road intersection.

But this is where the problem begins. ISW points out that it sees no evidence of sustained Russian control in Kupiansk, let alone west of it. According to the same assessment, it may involve several infiltration groups in the city itself, rather than a created base for movement towards Shevchenkove. Confirmed Russian penetration is estimated at about 14.2 percent of Kupiansk and 6.5 percent of Kutykovka. In Shiykovka and Velika Shapkovka, according to the institute, no Russian positions have been confirmed, with the nearest Russian forces located about two kilometers from Shiykovka and four kilometers from Velika Shapkovka.

Why Shevchenkove Became a Political, Not a Military Target

The choice of Shevchenkove as the next target is logical in itself. The settlement west of Kupiansk is located at the junction of roads H-20, T-2110, M-03, and P-78, which theoretically can threaten Ukrainian ground communications between the Kharkiv, Kupiansk, Borovaya, and Izium directions. For the General Staff, it is a beautiful arrow on the map: Kupiansk, then Shevchenkove, then a threat to Kharkiv from the east. In an academic setting, such a scheme can be drawn in two minutes.

In war, it cannot be drawn instead of executed. To threaten Shevchenkove, one must first take Kupiansk not at the level of formulation, but at the level of supply, rotation, suppression of Ukrainian counterattacks, and holding of quarters. Since the fall of 2025, the Russian army has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to enter disputed settlements with a small number of infantry and then present these infiltrations as operational advances. This is cheaper than a full breakthrough and more convenient for reporting. But the cost of such savings manifests later: when command begins to plan the next operation based on previous exaggerations.

Beautiful Reports as a Military Institution

In Russian military culture, the expression "beautiful report" has long meant not style, but a management disease. The Soviet army also knew this disease, especially in the late period when reporting on the fulfillment of norms was often more important than the norms themselves. But the Soviet system had a different material base: dense staffs, an excess fleet of equipment, and a large mobilization depth. The modern Russian army combines the old habit of flattering reporting with a much narrower resource corridor. An error in a report today quickly turns into an error in combat orders.

It is telling that criticism has come not only from Western analysts. Russian ultra-nationalist military bloggers, usually inclined to interpret any Russian successes broadly, also do not confirm the scales claimed by Gerasimov. According to ISW, some of them pointed out that even the most optimistic maps do not show the entry of Russian troops into Borovaya, let alone its complete capture. One commentator sarcastically suggested that with such logic, it would soon be possible to report the capture of Kharkiv.

Official Statistics and Operational Reality

The contrast is heightened by data from the Russian Ministry of Defense for May 16-17. TASS, citing the ministry, reported the interception of 1,054 Ukrainian drones in one day, as well as Flamingo and Neptune-MD missiles; another report mentioned approximately 1,115 lost Ukrainian servicemen in one day across the entire combat zone. Separately, the ministry stated that Ukrainian drone assembly points and temporary deployment locations were struck in 164 districts. These figures cannot be automatically considered false simply because they are Russian. But their function is obvious: to create the impression of a controlled, broad, and technically successful offensive process.

The problem is not that the Russian side is conducting an information war. All sides are doing so. The problem is that the Russian vertical, judging by the recurrence of such episodes, is increasingly failing to separate external messaging from internal management knowledge. If the figure for Liman is intended only for the public, it is propaganda. If it enters real operational calculations, it becomes a military risk. The difference is fundamental: propaganda deceives the enemy or society, poor reporting deceives one's own staff.

What This Means for the Spring-Summer Campaign of 2026

For Ukraine, such a gap between the report and the terrain creates a window of opportunity, but does not guarantee success. The Russian army still possesses significant artillery, missile, and drone resources; mass strikes on Ukrainian rear areas and drone assembly sites will continue. The Kupiansk direction remains dangerous precisely because Moscow is trying to turn local infiltrations into a broader operational design. However, when the design is ahead of the actual front line by dozens of kilometers, the likelihood of not a breakthrough, but a waste of forces on an unprepared task increases.

For Russia, the main risk lies in institutional self-deception. The army can survive an individual inaccurate report. It fares worse in a situation where an inaccurate report becomes the normal way of communication between the regiment, army, grouping, and General Staff. In this sense, Gerasimov's May statement is important not as a curiosity about the percentages of Liman, but as a symptom: the Russian command system is trying to compensate for the limited pace of the offensive with an inflated picture of success.

An old staff truth sounds harsh: the map does not tolerate flattery. One can convince the chief that Liman is almost taken; one cannot convince the road H-20, Ukrainian artillery, and one's own supply units to behave as if it were true.

My forecast is cautious. The Russian command will likely continue to pressure the Kupiansk-Borovaya-Liman arc because political logic requires a demonstration of movement. But if the actual rates of advance remain closer to the confirmed infiltrations than to the reports of the General Staff, the summer campaign of 2026 will not result in an operational collapse of Ukrainian defenses, but a new series of costly local battles. The Russian army will not collapse from beautiful reports. It will simply pay for them with people, equipment, and time.

Sources

• Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 16 May 2026.
• TASS, Russian Defense Ministry statements on Ukrainian UAV interceptions and reported losses, 16-17 May 2026.
• TASS, report on strikes against Ukrainian UAV assembly sites and temporary deployment points in 164 districts, 17 May 2026.