Germany's Military Rise and the Reorganization of European Defense Policy

The European security architecture has been undergoing a fundamental transformation since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine. While President Emmanuel Macron has persistently advocated for European strategic autonomy since 2017, a development is now emerging that is increasingly causing concern in Paris, Rome, and Warsaw: Germany is on the verge of becoming the dominant military power in continental Europe – with potentially far-reaching consequences for the balance within the European Union and NATO.

After decades of military restraint, shaped by the historical burdens of the 20th century and the hope for a lasting peace dividend following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Berlin has radically realigned its defense policy. According to analyses by the Atlantic Council, German defense spending already significantly exceeds that of most European partners. Current plans by the federal government suggest that the German military budget could surpass that of France and the United Kingdom – both nuclear powers – combined in the coming years. This development is all the more remarkable as Germany is focusing all its investments on conventional warfare, while London and Paris must allocate significant resources to their costly nuclear deterrent capabilities.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized at the end of February 2026 that the alliance must increasingly be led by Europe, while maintaining a strong U.S. presence. This statement reflects the new American defense strategy, which calls on Europe to take on more responsibility as Washington shifts its priorities to the defense of U.S. territory and the deterrence of China. At the 61st Munich Security Conference, it became clear that NATO members need to increase their military spending to significantly more than 3 percent of national GDP – a demand that far exceeds the previous 2 percent benchmark and requires massive structural adjustments to European defense budgets.

Germany is responding to this changed strategic situation with unprecedented determination. A large portion of the additional funds is flowing into German defense companies, foremost Rheinmetall, which is rapidly becoming one of the largest defense corporations in Europe. This industrial policy component is causing unease in neighboring countries: The strategic autonomy of Europe that Macron seeks threatens to de facto become a German hegemony in the defense sector. High-ranking French, Italian, and Polish officials fear that European defense policy will increasingly bear a German accent – both in technological and industrial terms.

In parallel to these national developments, the European Union established the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2026 with a budget of around one billion euros. The program is spread over ten competitive calls for proposals and 31 thematic areas, ranging from early-stage research to the development of deployable defense technologies. The strategic priorities include advanced detection and sensor systems, quantum-based tactical communication solutions to counter highly advanced cyber threats, space-based defense infrastructures, AI-supported reconnaissance systems, and air and missile defense systems.

The EDF aims to strengthen Europe's technological sovereignty and reduce dependence on external suppliers. Projects must be supported by at least three independent entities from different EU member states, and the generated intellectual property must remain under European control. These requirements are intended to ensure that technologies funded by the EDF directly strengthen the European defense industrial base and do not become dependent on non-European strategic actors.

However, the fragmentation of the European defense industry remains a central challenge. Roberto Cingolani, CEO of Leonardo, emphasized at the end of February 2026 to CNBC the need for increased collaboration among European defense companies. The industry must leverage synergies and pool resources to succeed in a competitive global environment. The looming collapse of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) – a German-French-Spanish fighter jet program – illustrates the structural difficulties of European defense cooperation: asynchronous procurement cycles, diverging military requirements, and, above all, conflicts over the distribution of work shares and industrial benefits complicate even ambitious multinational projects.

The operational dimension of this transformation is manifesting in several NATO large-scale exercises. On February 11, 2026, the new Operation Arctic Sentry was launched in response to the increasing security challenges in the High North. Additionally, Operation Eastern Sentry has been ongoing since September 2025 in response to Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace. These operations signal NATO's readiness to reinforce its eastern flank and deter further aggression.

The United Kingdom has announced that it will increase its defense spending from 2.4 to 2.6 percent of GDP by 2027 – an increase that necessitated cuts in development aid. France, despite broader spending cuts to contain a 5.4 percent deficit, is holding firm to its defense budget. These national efforts underscore the seriousness of the situation but still lag behind the German rearmament dynamic.

The strategic implications of these developments are multifaceted. On one hand, Germany's military rise undoubtedly strengthens NATO's conventional deterrence capability on its critical eastern flank. On the other hand, the emerging asymmetry within Europe poses the risk of political tensions. The question of European strategic autonomy has always been not only a technical or industrial one but also a deeply political one: Who leads Europe in defense matters? France, which possesses nuclear deterrence and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has traditionally seen itself in this role. Germany, on the other hand, brought economic strength but military restraint.

This balance is now fundamentally shifting. Germany's emerging military preeminence could lead to a redefinition of power relations within the EU in the medium term – with potentially destabilizing effects on the already fragile European cohesion. While Poland and the Baltic states generally welcome a stronger German military engagement, they watch with suspicion whether Berlin has definitively overcome its historical consensus with Moscow.

The coming years will show whether Europe can successfully integrate Germany's military rise into a coherent pan-European defense strategy – or whether continental Europeans will revert to old patterns of mutual distrust. Institutional mechanisms such as the EDF and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) provide frameworks for cooperation, but the political will to overcome national particular interests in favor of genuine strategic integration will be crucial. Given the multipolar threat landscape – from Russia's imperial ambitions to China's growing influence and fragile transatlantic relations – a united, capable European defense policy is existential. Whether Germany can exercise this leadership role with the necessary sensitivity to historical resentments and multilateral balance will be a key question for the security of Europe in the 21st century.