Germany's Strategic Shift and the Dutch Warning: Europe Prepares for the Post-Ukrainian Security Order

On April 22, 2026, Germany's Defense Minister Boris Pistorius presented the most comprehensive strategic document package for the realignment of the Bundeswehr in decades in Berlin. At the same time, the Dutch military intelligence service MIVD published its annual report, which provides an alarming assessment of the Russian threat to NATO. Both developments mark a turning point in European defense policy, revealing the contours of the future security architecture of the continent.

The German strategy package is titled "Responsibility for Europe" and includes four core documents: an independent military strategy, a new capability profile, a personnel growth plan, and a redesigned reserve strategy. Pistorius emphasized during the presentation that a military strategy is as necessary in this historical phase as it has rarely been before. The documents are designed as classified living documents that are subject to ongoing revision and are intended to serve as the strategic foundation of the Bundeswehr for the next twenty years.

The new military strategy identifies Russia as the primary threat and outlines scenarios for possible attacks on NATO territory. A notable doctrinal shift is the so-called one-theater approach, which no longer views NATO territory, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region as separate operational areas, but rather as interconnected security spaces. This reflects the understanding that geopolitical developments in one region have immediate impacts on other world regions and that the Bundeswehr must plan accordingly in a networked manner.

The accompanying capability profile marks a departure from rigid hardware quotas, i.e., the question of how many tanks, aircraft, or ships the Bundeswehr needs. Instead, a flexible, effects-based planning model is being introduced. Pistorius named priority areas such as deep precision strike, air defense against hypersonic missiles, and drone capabilities. Germany essentially starts from scratch with long-range weapon systems, highlighting the need for catch-up.

The personnel growth plan envisions an expansion from the current 185,420 active soldiers to 260,000 by the mid-2030s, complemented by a parallel buildup of the reserve from about 60,000 to at least 200,000 assigned reservists. This would result in a combined total strength of 460,000 combat-ready troops. The plan unfolds in three phases: a rapid buildup by 2029, a capability-focused expansion by 2035, and a longer-term technology-driven phase until 2039 and beyond. Since January 2026, new legislation has anchored these milestones, with conscription as a fallback option already enshrined in the new military service law should recruitment targets be missed. Deputy Inspector General Nicole Schilling reported that recruitment is currently ten percent above last year's level and applications have increased by twenty percent.

The reserve is no longer viewed as a secondary force that is only activated in emergencies but is now explicitly positioned on par with the active troops. Reservists are to take on homeland defense tasks and ensure that Germany functions as a logistics hub for allied forces that may be deployed eastward in a crisis. Pistorius referred to the reserve as the hinge between the military and civil society.

In this strategic context falls the annual report of the Dutch military intelligence service MIVD, which was published the day before. According to the MIVD, Russia could, under the most favorable conditions, possess sufficient combat power for a regional challenge to NATO within a year after the end of hostilities in Ukraine. Moscow's goal would not be a military defeat of the alliance but its division through limited territorial gains, possibly under the threat of nuclear weapon use.

As long as Russia is fighting in Ukraine, a conventional war against NATO is practically excluded, according to the MIVD. Nevertheless, Russia is already making concrete preparations for a possible conflict with the alliance. MIVD Director Vice Admiral Peter Reesink stated unequivocally that Russia represents the greatest and most immediate threat to peace and stability in Europe.

The figures mentioned in the report are alarming. Russia has suffered about 1.2 million permanent losses since 2022, including more than 500,000 dead. On the Ukrainian side, permanent losses amount to about half a million. Particularly concerning is a convergence of daily combat death rates in 2025, which is developing unfavorably for Ukraine. Despite these losses, Russia has expanded its armed forces in 2025 through recruitment and training of personnel, production of heavy weapon systems, and preparation of strategic munitions reserves.

The Zapad-2025 exercise in Belarus in September showed improvements in command and control as well as the integration of unmanned systems at all levels. The MIVD assesses the Russian armed forces as larger and more effective than before the war in Ukraine. Russia has been able to maintain its arms production despite sanctions, and the large-scale use of one-way attack drones demonstrates the capability of an adaptable defense industry both quantitatively and qualitatively.

These simultaneous developments in Berlin and The Hague illustrate the dilemma of European defense. On one hand, awareness of the threat and the political will to rearm are growing. Germany has the money and has initiated procurements, as Pistorius emphasized, but he also admitted that not all variables are under control. The increased demand for air defense systems from the Middle East has already constrained global production capacity. On the other hand, the MIVD report shows that Russia, despite massive losses, is not only maintaining its military capability but also increasing it.

The goal announced by Pistorius to become the strongest conventional fighting force in Europe by 2039 assumes that the current procurement and recruitment plans remain on schedule. The bureaucratic reduction and modernization agenda EMA26, with its 153 specific measures and 580 implementation steps, is intended to assist in this. A key innovation is that all internal regulations will be given an automatic expiration date. Whether this will be sufficient to meet the set deadlines in an environment of global arms shortages and tightening production capacities will remain the central question of European defense capability in the coming years.