How Italy Achieved the 2 Percent Target with Accounting Tricks and Why This Weakens NATO

Italy reports a defense budget of around 45 billion euros to NATO in 2025. The actual defense spending is about 31 billion euros (according to RID, 2025). The difference of 14 billion euros — nearly 0.5 percent of Italy's GDP — arose from the reclassification of expenditures from other ministries, including cybersecurity and military mobility. This is not an isolated case but a systematic problem in NATO's expenditure measurement.

The Illusion of Target Achievement

When NATO reported last year that Italy had reached the 2 percent threshold, it surprised observers in Rome and Brussels alike. Just the year before, Italy's share was about 1.5 percent. How could an increase of 14 billion euros occur in just a few months? The Italian Ministry of Defense's Documento Programmatico Pluriennale (DPP) does not provide a clear answer. It merely mentions that the NATO report "includes expenditures for military mobility and defense-related expenditures from other sectors" (according to Geopolitica.info, 2025).

The problem is not specific to Italy. Seven other NATO members that had not reached the 2 percent target by 2024 have since crossed the threshold — partly through similar accounting methods. What is presented as an alliance-wide success is, in reality, a statistical adjustment without a corresponding increase in combat capability.

Why GDP Targets Obscure the Real Problem

Donald Trump's "5 Percent Doctrine" and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's support for higher spending targets rely on a simple logic: More money means more security. But this logic only works under one condition — that the money actually flows into military combat capability.

In Italy, this is precisely not the case. Italian society does not perceive an immediate military threat. Surveys show that Italians view Russia as far less of a threat than Poland or the Baltic states. The consequence: Political acceptance for higher defense spending only exists if these expenditures serve domestically attractive goals — jobs, regional economic promotion, visible police presence.

Where the Money Really Goes

Italy's actual spending priorities reveal the gap between NATO rhetoric and military reality:

• 23 billion euros for armored land forces — an unprecedented investment program aimed at restructuring the Italian defense industry (according to RID, 2025). The procurement of battle tanks and armored vehicles brings jobs and political dividends.
• 250 million euros annually for "Strade Sicure" — the deployment of army soldiers for police tasks domestically. This mission is politically popular, but it ties up troops that could instead be training for real emergencies.
• Stagnating or declining expenditures for training, maintenance, and readiness — precisely the areas that determine actual combat capability.

The result is paradoxical: Italy spends more, but the operational capability of the armed forces hardly improves. The armed forces remain among the oldest in Europe, there is no real operational reserve, and recruitment problems, especially in technical specialties (engineering, medicine, cyber), remain unresolved.

The Structural Problem of the Civil-Military Gap

Italy shares this problem with Germany and Spain: A deep gap between society and the armed forces leads to neither the public nor the political class understanding what military capability actually requires. The consequences are ignorance, indifference, and in some cases distrust towards the military.

This gap has historical roots. After World War II, the Italian armed forces — similar to the German and Japanese — lost prestige and societal relevance. For decades, Italian society rejected the use of military force in international relations. The armed forces were only socially accepted again after the Cold War through peace missions — but only under the condition of strict rules of engagement and an emphasis on humanitarian functions.

What NATO Needs to Do Differently

If the goal is indeed stronger allied forces, then merely pressuring for higher budgets is not enough. NATO would need to connect spending targets with initiatives that close the civil-military gap:

• Promote Public Debate: An honest, non-ideological discussion about the purpose of armed forces — namely, to fight.
• Strengthen Reserve Forces: Regional reserve units that allow citizens direct contact with the military without the downsides of general conscription.
• Legitimize Academic Research: In many parts of Europe, engagement with military issues at universities is still viewed ideologically. Without a more pluralistic academic debate, higher defense spending will not translate into real capabilities.

The Uncomfortable Truth

Italy's case shows what happens when defense spending is measured only as a percentage: Governments find creative ways to reach the number without fulfilling the actual task. NATO has created a measurement tool that invites manipulation. And as long as societies like Italy's do not feel immediate threat pressure, nothing will change.

But is that enough? The real question is not whether Italy spends 2 or 5 percent of its GDP on defense. The question is whether these expenditures generate combat capability. Without structural reforms — in recruitment, training, procurement — even a doubling of the budget will change little about Italy's military readiness. More money does not solve a cultural problem.