2026: The Dispersed Operations of Four U.S. Air Force Airfields Will Change the Maritime Strategy of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Connecting the runways of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota on a map reveals a thin line extending north from Guam. The U.S. Air Force anticipates over 6,000 aircraft operations annually at these four airfields in the Northern Mariana Islands and announced the start of an environmental impact assessment in the Federal Register on October 28. This is not merely a follow-up on base renovations; it is the concretization of operational concepts in the rear of the First Island Chain to avoid absorbing a missile attack from China at a single large base.

What the Dispersed Numbers Indicate

According to the U.S. Air Force's plan, each airfield will conduct up to 1,200 takeoffs and landings of fixed-wing aircraft and 320 of rotary-wing aircraft annually, with alternatives increasing those numbers to 1,400 and 384, respectively. It is assumed that each location will have up to 1,000 personnel, 550,000 gallons of fuel, ammunition, chaff, and flares. The significance of revitalizing facilities from the World War II era, such as the North Tinian Airfield, lies not in increasing the number of runways but in enhancing options to continue operating air power after an attack.

Connection to Maritime Traffic Routes

This is where the role of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force becomes apparent. As reported by USNI News on November 6, the aircraft carrier strike group and the JMSDF destroyer "Onami" conducted cross-deck and communication training in the Philippine Sea and South China Sea. The dispersed bases of the Air Force alone do not constitute a combat capability. Only by resupplying fuel, parts, and personnel via sea lines of communication (SLOC) and integrating escort vessels, aerial refueling aircraft, and early warning aircraft into the same operational picture does dispersion become a sustainable capability.

What is important for Japan is not that the Northern Mariana Islands replace Japanese bases. It is the ability to reposition air power using Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands as relay points if airfields in Okinawa and Kyushu are degraded due to attacks or political constraints. Considering the Chinese Navy's advances in the Western Pacific, as pointed out in the Ministry of Defense's 2026 Defense White Paper, this can be interpreted as a shift in the focus of the Japan-U.S. alliance from "forward deployment" to "dispersed sustainability."

Weaknesses Remaining Between Capability and Intent

However, dispersion is not a magic solution to eliminate vulnerabilities. The four airfields are only a few dozen nautical miles apart and depend on the same fuel, road, and port networks. If China targets fuel tanks, communication nodes, and supply ships rather than runways, the apparent effects of dispersion will rapidly diminish. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force plans to present an environmental impact assessment proposal in the fall of 2027 and a final version in the summer of 2028, facing hurdles of local community agreement and budget constraints before operations can commence.

According to Tanaka's perspective, the challenge posed by this plan to the Japan-U.S. alliance is not the number of bases but who will restore supplies to damaged airfields and in how many hours. If the JMSDF escort vessels and U.S. military transport and refueling units cannot operate as a cohesive force from peacetime, dispersed bases will become "many targets." True deterrence relies more on the speed of political decisions to keep SLOC open after an attack than on increasing the number of runways.

Reference Information

• U.S. Department of Defense, Federal Register "CNMI Airfields Training and Exercises," October 28, 2026
• Defense News "US Air Force Eyes Reviving WWII Air Bases in the Pacific," November 6, 2026
• USNI News "Western Pacific Pulse," November 6, 2026